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[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...

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REIMAGINING INDIA<br />

can subsequently cause what can be<br />

termed a “policy reversal” by government.<br />

Such policy reversals can arise<br />

under several conditions some of which<br />

are:<br />

• Suppose government is running high<br />

deficits and implements a tight monetary<br />

policy by increasing interest<br />

rates. Due to the inflexibility of the<br />

banking sector in passing on interest<br />

higher incidence of NPA in balance<br />

sheets. This may force the government<br />

to revive the banking sector<br />

through measures like recapitalization<br />

which will be a direct burden on<br />

government budget. As discussed<br />

earlier, the cost of reviving banks is<br />

very high in the case of India. <strong>The</strong><br />

government indeed began a partial<br />

privatization of banks as part of its<br />

economic reform process initially<br />

providing Rs.40 billion from 1991-92<br />

to 1992-93 to 19 nationalized banks.<br />

Subsequently, the government has<br />

spent around Rs.164.5 billion at a<br />

rate of between 0.02 and 0.7 percent<br />

of GDP each year from 1993-99.<br />

Though there was a decline in NPA<br />

from 17.8 percent in 1997 to 11.4 percent<br />

in 2002 they are still very high.<br />

• A second reason for policy reversal is<br />

the existence of weak regulatory and<br />

supervisory framework in the Indian<br />

Banking sector. <strong>The</strong> UTI mutual<br />

funds crisis is an example of this (See<br />

Appendix A.1).<br />

<strong>The</strong> government began a partial privatization of banks,<br />

initially providing Rs.40 billion from 1991-92 to 1992-93<br />

to 19 nationalized banks. Subsequently, ithas spent<br />

around Rs.164.5 billion at a rate of between 0.02 and 0.7<br />

percent of GDP each year from 1993-99<br />

on the state of the financial system.<br />

Standard and Poor’s (Polackova, 1999)<br />

estimate the fiscal cost of a future<br />

banking crisis in India will be around<br />

15 percent of GDP. This is so high because<br />

of the persistent inefficiencies in<br />

the banking system even after a decade<br />

of financial reform (Bhattacharya and<br />

Patel, 2003). Bhattacharya and Patel<br />

(2003) put the estimate of government<br />

guarantees in India as around 12 percent<br />

of GDP. Hence government guarantees<br />

are a crucial part of analysis of<br />

a financial sector especially in developing<br />

economies.<br />

<strong>The</strong> overview of the reform process<br />

brings up the question of policy reversal<br />

which is covered in the next section.<br />

5. Policy Reversal<br />

Most of the financial reforms in the Indian<br />

economy were guided by “.... objectives<br />

of increasing operational efficacy<br />

of monetary policy....” (RBI, 1997,<br />

page I-9). It is argued that under current<br />

inefficiencies (especially high NPA<br />

and the large share of government ownership)<br />

in the banking sector, any efforts<br />

by government to ensure macroeconomic<br />

stabilization (say reduction<br />

in fiscal deficit) or restructuring will<br />

involve an offsetting effect, adversely<br />

affecting the initial policy objectives,<br />

which will transmit mainly through the<br />

financial sector. This offsetting effect<br />

rates rise this will lead to banking<br />

stress. This inflexibility arises mainly<br />

because of the government’s policy<br />

of directed and concessional lending<br />

to priority sectors. Because of a regulated<br />

interest rate regime, the banks<br />

cannot adjust their deposit rates<br />

much, say in the, area of savings deposits.<br />

Thus stress in the banking<br />

sector will be directly reflected in a<br />

6. Conclusion<br />

<strong>The</strong> present paper has reviewed the financial<br />

sector reform process in India<br />

focussing on the banking sector. It can<br />

be safely concluded that financial sector<br />

reform in India is incomplete. <strong>The</strong><br />

banking sector remains inefficient because<br />

of several factors viz. high reserves<br />

and liquidity requirements, a<br />

poor regulatory and supervisory framework,<br />

the presence of implicit government<br />

guarantees, high transaction costs<br />

etc. <strong>The</strong>se inefficiencies can adversely<br />

affect the long-term policy objectives<br />

of a sound fiscal system and can even<br />

lead to policy reversals.<br />

128 THE <strong>IIPM</strong> THINK TANK

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