Mayhem in Mali:A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report

Mayhem in Mali: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report
Personalities Behind the Insurgency
A Focus on the various Islamist Militants and Tuareg rebels in Northern Mali
Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
the looming west african offensive in mali
By Andrew McGregor ...................................................................................................................................................2
the tribal militias of northern mali
By Andrew McGregor ...................................................................................................................................................6
Amir of the Southern Sahara: A sketch of AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar
By Dario Cristiani .........................................................................................................................................................9
.
For Profit Jihad: An In-Depth Profile of AQIM’s Abou Zeid
By Dario Cristiani .......................................................................................................................................................12
Nomadic Tuareg tribes
Algerian Leaders of AQIM Reassert Control with Appointment of New Saharan Amir
By Andrew McGregor .................................................................................................................................................14
AhmAd al-Tilemsi: The Commander of MUJWA’s Osama bin Laden Brigade
By Jacob Zenn....................................................................................................................................................15
Bringing militant salafism to the tuareg: a profile of veteran rebel iyad ag ghali
By Andrew McGregor .................................................................................................................................................16
Regional neighbors wary of intervention in mali
By Andrew McGregor .................................................................................................................................................20
Outlook
By Jacob Zenn ............................................................................................................................................................22
Introduction
In this Quarterly Special Report (QSR) on Mayhem in Mali, we focus on the various Islamist fighters
who have taken over northern Mali. The QSR includes profiles of important personalities in the Sahel
region such as Abou Zeid, a brutal, committed and resilient militant under whose leadership AQIM
has become extremely realist and results-oriented. A portrait is also provided of former AQIM leader
Mokhtar Belmokhtar whose strong knowledge of the territory and connections with local gangs have
allowed him to play a prominent role in the region. Another sketch in the QSR is of AQIM’s new
Saharan amir Jemal Oukacha whose appointment can be seen as an attempt by the Boumerdes-based
leadership to reassert their authority in the wild Sahara/Sahel sector. A snapshot of the commander of
MUJWA’s Osama bin Laden brigade, Ahmad al-Tilemsi, is included along with description of MUJWA’s
split from AQIM, which occurred under his leadership in 2011. The concluding profile is of veteran
Tuareg rebel Iyad ag Ghali, the head of Ansar al-Din a religiously-oriented armed group.
Residents fleeing south from an
Islamic insurgency in
northern Mali
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This Special Report includes
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Analysis publication.
We focus not only on the leadership of the West African states and African Union in tackling the
problem but also on the lack of resolve by all parties involved in the military intervention and the
interrelated assembling of Islamist and Tuareg rebel forces.
The Economic Community of West African States has endorsed a military intervention operation
in the northwest side of the beleaguered Sahel belt that is scheduled to begin in January. ECOWAS
will send 3,300 troops to northern Mali to “regain the occupied regions in the north of the country,
dismantle the terrorist and criminal networks and restore effectively the authority of the state over
the entire national territory,” said Ramtane Lamamra, the commissioner for peace and security of the
African Union, which has endorsed the plan.
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Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
The ECOWAS military operation might have difficulty
getting started by January however, chiefly because the roles
of the 15 member states are uncertain. A leaked internal
ECOWAS assessment of the Nigerian armed forces, which
would lead any ECOWAS intervention, says the Nigerian
armed forces are in terrible shape and unlikely to be able
to carry out anything more than rear-area support and
security operations. Algeria may find itself compelled to
join the campaign as the price of keeping Western troops
out of it. Alternatively, there is also the possibility of a quick
deterioration in the situation in northern Mali before then
or even a preemptive al-Qaeda strike designed to warn off
possible participants in the intervention.
The Looming West African
Offensive in Mali
Andrew McGregor
As Tuareg rebels battle radical Islamists with heavy weapons
for control of the northern Mali city of Gao, Mali and the
other 15 nations of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) have planned a military offensive
designed to drive both groups out of northern Mali in an
effort to re-impose order in the region and prevent the sixmonth
old conflict from destabilizing the entire region.
An ECOWAS Intervention Force
(PANA Online [Dakar], May 30). Though the Islamists
have agreed to talks, the mediators in Ouagadougou have
insisted the largely Tuareg Islamist Ansar al-Din movement
of Iyad ag Ghali sever all ties with al-Qaeda before talks can
proceed, a move that seems most unlikely at this point (AFP,
June 18; for a profile of Ag Ghali, see Militant Leadership
Monitor, February 2012). Ansar al-Din spokesman Sena
Ould Boumama has warned that his movement “will fight
ECOWAS if it engages us in northern Mali” (al-Akhbar
[Timbuktu], n.d., via Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7).
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria are all expected to
contribute troops to the mission if it receives authorization.
Mauritania, which has conducted cross-border counterterrorist
operations in Mali in the past but is not a member
of ECOWAS, has only expressed its “availability to join
common efforts” to resolve the crisis (AFP, June 4). The
ECOWAS intervention, which is projected to consist of
3,270 men, will have to stabilize southern Mali before it
can effectively restore control of the north to the Bamako
government.
Algeria, with a capability for desert operations and a powerful
military with decades of combat experience, has been urged
by some Western and regional nations to take a leading role
in any intervention, but appears reluctant to provide ground
forces. Algeria’s participation is widely viewed as the key to
success for any military intervention. Earlier this month,
Algerian intelligence chief General Muhammad “Toufik”
Mediène described a potential Algerian role consisting
of intelligence provision and airlifts of necessary materiel
from Tamanrasset and Reggane (Jeune Afrique, June 14).
Algeria’s main condition for participation will likely be the
complete absence of Western troops from the campaign,
particularly French forces.
ECOWAS maintains that a military intervention would be a
last resort if talks hosted by the ECOWAS-appointed mediator
(Burkino Faso President Blaise Compaore) should fail, but
with negotiations in Ouagadougou going nowhere and
divisions between the formerly allied rebel groups erupting
into open conflict in northern Mali, there will be inevitable
pressure to step up preparations for a military intervention.
One obstacle to deployment so far has been the absence of a
formal invitation from Malian authorities, though there has
been discussion within ECOWAS of launching a military
intervention without Mali’s consent (PANA Online [Dakar],
June 9; Le Combat [Bamako], June 20).
Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou is a strong
supporter of the intervention and claims to have information
regarding the presence of Afghan and Pakistani instructors
working with the Islamists in northern Mali, but has not
shared the details publically (France 24, June 7. With a
large and often restless Tuareg minority in northern Niger,
Issoufou has much to lose by allowing the creation of an
independent state in northern Mali. The Niger Foreign
Minister has stated that “the military option is the only one”
for Mali (Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7).
The Government in Bamako
ECOWAS has explicitly rejected the rebels’ “so-called
declaration of independence” and has stated that it will
“never compromise on the territorial integrity of Mali”
2
In post-coup Bamako, the lack of political leadership
remains a major stumbling block to resolving the crisis.
Dissatisfaction is growing in many quarters with the

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
prevarications of Transitional Government Prime Minister
Cheick Modibo Diarra and his continued opposition to a
foreign military intervention (22 Septembre [Bamako], June
19). Mali’s 70-year-old transitional president, Dioncounda
Traoré, was attacked by pro-coup demonstrators in Bamako
on May 22, enduring injuries that forced his evacuation
to a Paris hospital (AFP, June 5). Complicating matters is
the continued presence of coup-leader Captain Amadou
Haya Sanogo, despite the ECOWAS-ordered dissolution
of Sanogo’s Comité National pour le Redressement de la
Démocratie et la Restauration de l’Etat (CNRDRE) on June
7.
In return for ending his destructive putsch and agreeing
to step aside for a transitional government, Sanogo has
been rewarded with official former head-of-state status, a
generous monthly allowance, a prominent residence and
two vehicles. This decision came despite the opposition of
ECOWAS, which wanted to return Sanago to a subordinate
position in the military (L’Indépendant [Bamako], May 23;
Le Combat [Bamako], June 12). The 39-year-old Americantrained
Sanogo is reported to rarely leave his well-guarded
residence inside the Kati military base outside of Bamako.
In a recent interview, Sanogo insisted that if the Army
were given the means, it “would recover the north in a few
days” (Jeune Afrique, June 9). Members of the CNRDRE,
including Sanogo, continue to wield influence by having
formed the Comité militaire de suivi de la réforme des forces
de défense et de sécurité (CMSRFDS) on June 12 to absorb
the CNRDRE, though the new committee will allegedly act
in only an advisory role (Le Pays [Ouagadougou], June 14;
L’indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], June 18).
Supporters and opponents of the March military coup
have organized themselves into two fronts: the pro-putsch
Coordination of the Patriotic Organizations of Mali
(COPAM) and the anti-putsch Front for Safeguarding
Democracy and Republic (FDR), though in a positive
sign, the two groups have been meeting for discussions of
Mali’s political future (Le Republicain [Bamako], June 18).
COPAM took advantage of the attack on Dioncounda Traoré
to hold a convention to advance the name of Captain Sanogo
as the new transitional president, which only created further
suspicion as to the motives and identity of those behind
the attack on the transitional president (L’Indépendant
[Bamako], May 23, May 25; Le Combat [Bamako], June 2;
Info Matin [Bamako], June 7). Since then, several leaders
of COPAM have been jailed while others appear to have left
the country. Nonetheless, a pro-Sanogo radio station, Raio
Kayira, urges opposition to ECOWAS “meddling” in Malian
affairs and hosts regular calls for the death of Dioncounda
Traoré and former members of the government (Jeune
3
Afrique, May 30).
Clashes between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din
On May 26, Ansar al-Din and the secular Mouvement
National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) announced
their merger as the Transitional Council of the Islamic State
of Azawad (L’Essor [Bamako], May 30). However, by June
1, the MNLA had issued a new document declaring all
provisions of the May 26 merger agreement “null and void”
(AFP, June 1). Mossa ag Attaher, an MNLA spokesman,
admitted that the group had made a mistake in drafting the
agreement: “[We] accepted the idea of an Islamic State but
it should have been written that we will practice a moderate
and tolerant Islam, with no mention of Shari’a” (AFP, June 1).
A June 8 statement from Ansar al-Din expressed the
movement’s disappointment with the MNLA’s withdrawal
from the Gao Agreement, but stated the movement would
continue alone if necessary: “Unfortunately we were surprised
with the Nouakchott statement issued by the Political Bureau
of the movement which stated its clear refusal of the project
of the Islamic state… therefore the Jama’at Ansar Al-Din
declares and ensures to the sons of its Islamic ummah
[community] its adherence to the Islamic project.”[1] Clashes
between the two movements were reported the same day in
Kidal, resulting in the city being roughly divided between
the two armed groups (AFP, June 8).
Though the short-lived agreement spoke of an “independent
Azawad” nation, Ansar al-Din leader Iyad ag Ghali has since
returned to his opposition to the establishment of a new state:
“We are not asking for much: just the application of Shari’a
law in the northern and southern regions. We are Malians
and we are against the division of Mali… Anyone who does
not lead the fight under our flag is our enemy and will be
fought. Secularism is disbelief. Whoever is for a secular state
is our enemy and will fought by all means” (Reuters, June
16).
While the MNLA were willing to agree to an Islamic State,
their conception of a moderate and tolerant Islamic base
quickly proved at odds with the Islamists of Ansar al-Din and
the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) splinter group,
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA),
whose eagerness to begin lashing people for trivial offenses
threatens to dissipate even the small popular support they
may have enjoyed several months ago. Their numerous
prohibitions and severe punishments have defied even the
advice of the AQIM Amir, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud (a.k.a.
Abdelmalek Droukdel), who used a May 23 audiotape
release to warn the Islamists: “It is a mistake to impose all the
rules of Islam at once on people overnight… So, for example,

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
shutting down places of drugs, liquors and immoralities is
something that they can seek to do now without delay, but the
implementation of the just punishment is the responsibility
of the Shari’a legislators and should come gradually” (Sahara
Media [Nouakchott], May 23).
Face-to-face negotiations between Iyad ag Ghali and MNLA
leader Muhammad ag Najim in Gao have had little success,
as the gulf between the freedom and independence sought
by the Tuareg of the MNLA and the strictly regulated
future offered by the Salafists of Ansar al-Din is too great
(Le Republicain [Bamako], May 30). Ag Ghali, who is
reported to now speak only Arabic and wishes to be known
by the Arabic name of Abu Fadil, is insistent on giving space
to AQIM in the new state of Azawad, a breaking point in
negotiations with the MNLA (Jeune Afrique, June 9).
Prior to the current fighting in Gao, a major clash between
the MNLA and Ansar al-Din occurred in Timbuktu on June
13. Other confrontations have been reported in northern
towns where residents have demonstrated in favor of the
MNLA and against the Islamists (L’Essor [Bamako], June
19; AFP, June 13). The Malian government is also preparing
a file for submission to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) concerning the slaughter of disarmed prisoners at
Aguelhok in late January, an action claimed by Ansar al-
Din during a joint operation with the MNLA (Le Combat
[Bamako], June 12). In its public statements and attitudes, it
is clear the MNLA is now trying to distance itself from the
Islamist factions, particularly with possible ICC prosecutions
looming if ECOWAS is successful in retaking northern Mali
(Info Matin [Bamako], June 12).
Dissension in the North
There are many indications that those northern Malians
who have not fled the country outright have already tired
of Islamist rule. By some reports, the situation in Gao (coadministered
by the MNLA) is becoming critical, with a lack
of food, water, electricity and currency (L’Essor [Bamako],
May 23). In Kidal, youth and women tired of Ansar al-Din’s
social restrictions gathered to display their opposition to
the movement with slogans, public smoking in defiance of
the ban on tobacco use, and stone-throwing by the women,
who removed their Islamist-decreed veils after Ansar al-Din
elements retreated in damaged vehicles (Le Republicain
[Bamako], June 7; Le Combat [Bamako], June 7).
In the town of Bourem, MUJWA outraged local residents
by opening three prisons for those “caught doing sin,” one
for men, one for women and one for children. In Douentza
(Mopti Region), the power supply has been shut down for
4
lack of fuel and MNLA fighters are reported to be looting local
homes (L’Essor, June 12, June 19). In the town of Goundam,
two-thirds of the population of 12,000 has left, while the
remaining young men often have verbal confrontations with
the rebels that result in their arrest (L’Essor [Bamako], June
7).
The Malian Army
Since 1991, the Malian military has suffered from
underfunding, nepotism, corruption, under training, poor
pay and a failure to maintain its aircraft and armor. Chronic
demoralization is the result of purges of the officer corps,
attempts to integrate former Tuareg rebels with loyalist
troops and being required to operate in unfamiliar desert
terrain with a lack of intelligence, equipment or ammunition
(Jeune Afrique, June 17). Malian troops suffered greatly in
the northern campaign earlier this year from an almost total
lack of air support from the much-decayed Malian air assets.
On a recent visit to the Amadoui Cheickou Tall military
base, Malian Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra told
government troops: “If God gives me the time and strength
to liberate the country, I promise that my government will
not spare any effort to create a strong, modern, efficient and
effective army, an army that frightens, an army that brings
peace” (L’Essor [Bamako], June 5). Where the money will
come from to support a revival of the military is uncertain;
the economic disaster that followed the coup d’état has
resulted in the state budget being reduced from FCFA 1400
billion (2600 million USD) to FCFA 870 billion (1653 million
USD) (Le Combat [Bamako], June 4). Even the removal of
ECOWAS sanctions has failed to renew capital flows into
Mali until the army returns to its barracks and a new, elected
government is formed.
Malian fortunes in the north will rest in the hands of three
senior officers known for their fighting skills and distaste for
barracks life: Colonel al-Hajj Gamou, a Tuareg, Colonel Ould
Meydou, an Arab, and Colonel Didier Dakuo, a southerner.
Gamou and Meydou met with Algerian authorities last
month regarding future operations in northern Mali (AFP,
May 24). Colonel Meydou narrowly escaped the military
revolt at the Kati military base that started the coup and took
refuge in Mauritania, where he says he is prepared to return
to the field with 1,000 men of the Arab militia he commands
(Jeune Afrique, June 17).
Using deceit, Colonel Ag Gamou was able to escape from
northern Mali into Niger with his command intact when
the rest of the Malian Army collapsed. Though presently
disarmed, some 600 pro-state Tuareg fighters under his
command are awaiting redeployment into northern Mali at

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
a military base near Niamey (Independent [London], May
10; L’Indépendant [Bamako], June 18).
In addition to the desert-fighting skills of these militias,
roughly 2,000 regulars with ten armored vehicles under
Colonel Dakuo are available in the Mopti Region town of
Sévaré, close to the southernmost area occupied by the
rebels. For now, this total group of roughly 3,000 to 4,000
men represents all the forces the Malian Army can count
on. They will face rebels equipped with superior Libyan
arms supplemented by vast stocks of military materiel seized
from the Malian Army earlier this year. Nearly all the Army’s
Russian-made assault tanks have been destroyed or disabled.
Mali’s military will be handicapped in their re-conquest of
the north by the absence of its elite unit, the “Red Beret”
parachute commando regiment of some 600 men under the
command of Colonel Abidine Guindo. The regiment, which
doubled as the presidential guard, was officially disbanded
by the putschists after it remained loyal to ex-President
Amadou Toumani Touré and succeeded in spiriting Touré
out of the country before he could be arrested. A failed
counter-coup led by the “Red Berets” on April 30 complicated
matters further, with members of the regiment now being
put on trial for opposing the new government.
The Role of Militias
The Arabs of northern Mali have largely remained loyal to
the concept of a secular and unified Malian state and have no
wish to come under Tuareg rule, whether secular or Islamist.
An armed branch of the Arab opposition, the Front national
de libération de l’Azawad (FNLA, also known as al-Jabhah
al-Arabiya, “the Arab Front”), has vowed to wage war “for
the liberation of Timbuktu and the independence of our
territory,” while maintaining a secular, non-secessionist and
non-Islamist identity (AFP, June 5; L’Essor [Bamako], June
7).
Another group is the Front de libération du Nord-Mali
(FLNM - National Front for the Liberation of Northern
Mali), formed on May 28 as an umbrella group for the
largely Black African Songhai and Peul/Fulani Ganda Koy
and Ganda Iso militias, which have a strong anti-Arab and
anti-Tuareg character (Le Republicain [Bamako], May 30;
for the Ganda Koy, Ganda Iso and other Malian militias,
see Terrorism Monitor, April 20). The militias, which have
a notorious reputation for violence against civilians, say
that the peace talks in Burkina Faso do not concern them as
negotiations should follow military action (VOA, June 26).
A Timbuktu militia allegedly formed from the Songhai and
Tuareg ethnic groups has vowed to expel the Islamists from
that city. According to Hamidou Maiga, a former officer in
5
the Malian Army, the Mouvement patriotique de résistance
pour la libération de Tombouctou (MPRLT) “will engage in
military action against the invaders until they leave” (AFP,
June 7).
Retaking Northern Mali
Malian military sources have indicated a plan to retake the
north would begin with the liberation of Douentza in Mopti
region. Military operations are projected to employ irregular
but unreliable units such as the Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy
militias (Le Politicien [Bamako], June 7). A drive from
the south could be accompanied by the reinsertion of
Colonel Ag Gamou’s Tuareg militia from the southeastern
border with Niger. The number of rebels is uncertain, but
the MNLA claims to have 10,000 men under its command,
while the Ansar al-Din is estimated to have 500 and MUJWA
to have some 300. Driving these groups out of the cities of
Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu might require challenging urban
warfare, but dealing with a guerrilla campaign in the desert
wilderness could prove even more difficult.
Washington and Paris would undoubtedly be called on
to provide intelligence (particularly aerial surveillance),
logistical support and financial support. If Algeria prevents
the use of American or French Special Forces for gathering
operational intelligence on the ground, it might deploy its
own Groupe d’Intervention Spécial (GIS) for this purpose.
The deployment of air assets, whatever their source, will be
complicated by the possible rebel possession of anti-aircraft
weapons from Libya’s armories. Such weapons appear to have
been used by Ansar al-Din on June 15 against two unmarked
planes (likely American surveillance aircraft) flying over
Timbuktu (AFP, June 17).
Conclusion
While both Ansar al-Din and the MNLA are engaged in
talks in Burkina Faso, it is safe to say that time is running out
for a negotiated solution. The crisis in Mali and the outflow
of refugees is destabilizing the entire region. There is also no
desire either regionally or internationally to allow the further
entrenchment of terrorist groups in the area such as AQIM
or MUJWA, neither of which are involved in negotiations or
any other effort to restore order to northern Mali. However,
the opposition of Algeria to the involvement of Western
militaries (on the ground at least) and a general Western
reluctance to become heavily involved in such efforts after
the Libyan debacle will ultimately leave such efforts in the
hands of ECOWAS. However, this organization can deploy
only a limited number of troops from a handful of countries
with a limited history of cooperation in the field. The use of

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
different languages, arms and communications systems will
not enhance the efficiency of a West African intervention
force, and the absence of accurate intelligence could prove
fatal in a confrontation with experienced, determined and
well-armed rebels on their home turf. Without substantial
cooperation and support from Algeria or Western militaries,
the small composite force of roughly 3,300 men envisaged
by ECOWAS may experience many of the same setbacks
experienced by the shattered Malian military earlier this
year. While growing divisions amongst the Malian rebels
may seem to present an opportune time for intervention,
any military defeat suffered as the result of an over-hasty
deployment could rock the political foundations of West
African nations such as Nigeria that are enduring bloody
insurgencies of their own.
Note
1. Sanda Ould Bouamama, Spokesman of Jama’at Ansar al-
Din, “Statement from Jamaat Ansar Al-Din about the MNLA
repealing of the Gao agreement,” Timbuktu, June 8, 2012.
The article above was published as “Intervening in Mali:
West African Nations Plan Offensive against Islamists
and Tuareg Rebels” in Terrorism Monitor on June 28,
2012.
The Tribal Militias of Northern
Mali
Andrew McGregor
Following shocking developments in March—a military
coup, the collapse of the national security forces, the conquest
of northern Mali by Tuareg rebels and the emergence
of an Islamist group with apparent ties to al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—the land-locked African
nation entered into a tense stand-off. Even as the military
staff of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) was forming plans for a military intervention
and neighboring Algeria placed a reinforced garrison and
substantial air elements on high alert at their military base
in the southern oasis of Tamanrasset, the most immediate
source of further conflict became Arab and African tribal
militias unwilling to accept Tuareg dominance in northern
Mali.
Ganda Koy
6
The most prominent of these militias is known as Ganda
Iso (“Sons of the Land”), the successor to an earlier group
notorious for its attacks on civilians known as Ganda Koy
(“Lords of the Land”). According to Seydou Cissé, regarded
as the “founding father” of Ganda Iso, the earlier Ganda
Koy movement was formed over 1994-1995 by Imam
Muhammad n’Tissa Maiga to resist attacks on the sedentary
and semi-nomadic population (largely black African Songhai
and Peul/Fulani) from bandits and lighter-skinned nomads
(primarily the Tuareg, Arabs and Mauritanians, collectively
and commonly referred to in Mali as “the whites”).
After its formation, Ganda Koy engaged in brutal attacks
on the lighter-skinned peoples of northern Mali in a
conflict that became racially and ethnically defined. Ganda
Koy’s most notorious operation involved a massacre of 53
Mauritanians and Tuareg marabouts (holy men) of the Kel
Essouk clan near Gao in 1994. The militia was alleged to have
received support and funding from the Malian army and was
composed largely of former Malian soldiers, many of whom
were granted an amnesty and reabsorbed into the military
when the movement was officially dissolved in March, 1996
(Jeune Afrique, September 24, 2008). In reality, however,
the movement had merely entered a dormant phase and has
since been resurrected in one form or another whenever
tensions rise between the rival communities of northern
Mali.
Ganda Koy was effectively disrupted by Colonel Amadou
Baba Touré, who succeeded in infiltrating the movement
with his own agents so that their every move was known
in advance. The Colonel also harassed the leadership of the
movement, including Cissé, with short periods of detention
without charge. Cissé attempted to convince Colonel Touré
that Ganda Koy was not engaged in an ethnic struggle, but the
continued pressure from security forces split the movement
(L’Indépendant [Bamako], August 12, 2010; Mali Demain
[Bamako], September 26, 2008).
Efforts by Ganda Koy in 2008 to enter the political process
were rebuffed by the Malian establishment. Refusal to hear
Ganda Koy grievances led to threats from the movement
that they would resume their military activities (Nouvelle
Liberation [Bamako], November 19, 2008; Le Tambour
[Bamako], November 25, 2008).
A Ganda Koy unit believed to be largely Fulani in origin
attacked a military camp at Ouattagouna in Gao region
in March 2011. The attack closely followed the arrest of a
Ganda Koy commander, Aliou Amadou (a.k.a. Sadjo),
on charges of possessing illegal weapons (22 Septembre

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
[Bamako], March 25). When the president of the Ganda Koy
movement, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, did not appear for a
press conference in July, 2011 it was believed that his absence
was due to pressure from the military (22 Septembre
[Bamako], July 4, 2011).
A statement attributed to Ganda Koy was issued in December
2011, in which the movement declared it was reactivating its
armed units in Mali as of December 11 to counter Tuareg
fighters returning from Libya with their arms and called
on Songhai and Fulani members of the Malian military to
join the fighting units of Ganda Koy as soon as possible (Le
Politicien [Bamako], December 16, 2011).
Ganda Iso
Seydou Cissé says he formed Ganda Iso in 2009 in the
interests of “maintaining social stability in the region” and
ensuring there would be justice rather than immunity for
malefactors: “We had no choice in creating the Ganda Iso.
Each community had its own militia. And to be feared and
dreaded, we needed to have our own militia” (L’Indépendant
[Bamako], August 12, 2010).
Sergeant Amadou Diallo, a Peul/Fulani, was appointed head
of the military arm of the movement with responsibility
for training recruits, while Seydou Cissé was to be the
civilian head of the political movement. This arrangement
fell apart after Sergeant Diallo conducted a broad daylight
massacre of four Tuareg civilians in the village of Hourala
on the weekly market day, bringing swift retaliation from
armed Tuareg (Mali Demain [Bamako], September 5, 2008;
Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako], September 9, 2008). At
this point Cissé says, he realized Diallo had “deviated from
our goal” and “deflected our plans.” Though Ganda Iso was
blamed for this attack, Cissé claims it was the result of Diallo
allying himself with the Tolobé Peul/Fulani of Niger, whom
Cissé described as “great bandits.” When Cissé was called
to account by then Malian president Ahmadou Toumani
Touré, he told the president he was only seeking respect for
his people and asked for the transfer of his nemesis, Colonel
Ahmadou Baba Touré. A split followed between Diallo and
the civilian leadership of the movement; according to Cissé:
“Sergeant Diallo did not understand our struggle. While we
are fighting for the security of the area, he was fighting for his
own account. In a document that the State Security gave me,
Ahmadou Diallo required as a condition of peace that the
state gives him 30 million FCFA [West African CFA Francs],
a villa and a car” (L’Indépendant [Bamako], August 12,
2010). An ex-member of Ganda Iso echoed this evaluation:
“The movement of Diallo is not a product of the Ganda Koy.
It pursues the unsatisfied plan of a man who manipulates his
7
brothers to try to intimidate the Malian nation in the sole
goal of making money” (Nouvelle Liberation [Bamako],
September 26, 2008).
Ganda Iso’s September, 2008 killing of the four Tuareg
civilians was variously reported to have occurred in reaction
to the murder of an elderly Peul man by an armed group in
Tin Hamma or as the result of damage to Peul herds during
a May 12 attack by Imghad Tuareg on a Malian gendarmerie
base in Ansongo (L’Essor [Bamako], October 7). [1] It is
uncertain whether the Ganda Iso killers were aware that
three of their Imghad victims were also cousins of Colonel al-
Hajj Gamou, the powerful leader of a loyalist Imghad Tuareg
militia, but a reported call from Diallo after the killings to
the office of the Malian president complaining that Colonel
Gamou’s militia was harassing Peul/Fulanis in the Ansongo
region suggests that this had a role in the selection of targets.
However, making a personal enemy of one of the most
effective and occasionally ruthless desert fighters in northern
Mali was ultimately a poor decision and Diallo soon had new
complaints that Gamou had buried many of Diallo’s relatives
up to their neck in holes in the desert. [2]
On the night of September 14, 2008 a gun battle broke out in
Gao when one of Colonel Gamou’s patrols surprised a group
of Ganda Iso (possibly led personally by Ahmadou Diallo)
allegedly caught in the midst of an assassination attempt
on Muhammad ag Mahmud Akiline, the director of Mali’s
Agency for Northern Development (Nouvelle Liberation
[Bamako], September 16, 2008; L’Indépendant [Bamako],
September 18, 2008). While the Army was busy arresting
some 30 suspected members of Ganda Iso and hunting down
the movement’s leadership, its communications branch was
simultaneously denying the presence of any militias in Mali,
insisting the Army’s deployment in Gao was intended only
to “prevent people from creating a mess” (Le Republicain
[Bamako], September 24, 2008).
Colonel Gamou retaliated against Ganda Iso in a September
16, 2008 attack on Fafa, Ahmadou Diallo’s hometown in
the movement’s Ansongo district stronghold (Nouvelle
Liberation [Bamako], September 19, 2008). The raid
yielded a large store of guns, grenades and mortars, but
many of the movement’s supporters claimed they could not
understand why security forces were focused on a “selfdefense”
unit rather than rebels and brigands in northern
Mali (L’Indépendant [Bamako], September 19).
Security sweeps arrested dozens more members and
Ahmadou Diallo fled to neighboring Niger, where he was
arrested only days later and extradited to Mali, where he was
soon released “on the sly” by his friends in the government

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
(Radio France Internationale, September 27, 2008; Info-
Matin [Bamako], June 15, 2009).
Ganda Iso was far from finished, however, and on January
1, 2009 members of the movement hurled hand grenades
at the homes of three prominent Imghad Tuareg leaders in
Timbucktu, including Muhammad ag Mahmud Akiline,
who had escaped an earlier Ganda Iso assassination attempt
in September, 2008. General Ahmadou Baba Touré claimed
that the grenade-throwers were among those arrested in
the September, 2008 security sweep and later released. [3]
In June, 2009, an armed group believed to be Peul/Fulani
members of Ganda Iso attacked a Tuareg camp in Tessit, part
of the Ansongo district of Gao Region, killing six Tuareg
(Info Matin [Bamako], June 15, 2009). It was reported by
some sources that the murderers were the same as those
suspected in the September 2008 killing of four Tuareg
civilians (Info-Matin [Bamako], June 16, 2009).
After talks with the government, a demobilization and
disarmament “peace flame” ceremony for Ganda Iso was
held in 2010, emulating an earlier and better-known
“peace flame” commemorating the Tuareg demobilization
and disarmament following the 1996 rebellion. The event
was widely regarded as a failure in which old and obsolete
weapons were turned in for public incineration before
an audience that included neither senior members of
government nor the military leader of Ganda Iso, Ahmadou
Diallo (22 Septembre [Bamako], August 9, 2010).
Ganda Iso in the Current Conflict
There have been reports that the post-coup Malian military
has resumed its old patronage of the “Ganda” movements by
providing food and military equipment to 1,000 members of
Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy (Le Combat [Bamako], March
28). Ganda Iso clashed with the independence-seeking
Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA)
in mid-March, reportedly killing six rebels and wounding
seven others. The MNLA attacked a Ganda Iso training camp
in the Ansongo district in retaliation on March 15, suffering
the loss of al-Her ag Ekaratane, a deserter from the Malian
Army and the former chief of the camel corps in Ansango
(L’Indépendant [Bamako], March 20; 22 Septembre
[Bamako], March 19). Ganda Iso fighters gathered at Gao
are reported to have melted away when combined MNLA/
Ansar al-Din forces approached.
8
The MNLA has maintained from the beginning of the
rebellion that the movement brings the various peoples of
northern Mali together in pursuit of an independent state
of “Azawad,” including the Kel-Tamashek (the Tuareg selfname),
the Songhai, the Peul/Fulani, the Arabs and the
“Moors” (Mauritanians). In practice, however, there has
been little evidence that any of the non-Tuareg communities
are represented in the MNLA in any significant numbers.
Ahmadou Diallo appears to have shared the concerns of the
military coup leaders over the handling of Tuareg rebels by
the Bamako politicians, telling an interviewer in 2008 that
Bamako’s response to Tuareg rebellions in the north was
“too politicized.” According to Diallo, “The military had the
means and the weapons to fight dissidents and bandits in
the north, but had its hands tied and was forced to follow
orders” (Le Temoin du Nord [Bamako], October 17, 2008).
Though this may have been true at the time (as the 2009
defeat of Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga attests),
this was no longer the situation when the Tuareg began the
new rebellion last January, wielding firepower superior to
that of the Malian Army courtesy of the looted armories of
Libya.
Diallo is reported to have met his end in a battle with MNLA
rebels in the Ansongo district on March 25 (Reuters, March
25; L’Essor [Bamako], March 28). A Bamako report that
honored this “outstanding” warrior claimed that Diallo’s
death had dealt a serious blow to the morale of Ganda Iso
and its civilian supporters (Le Combat [Bamako], March
28). It is for now unclear who might succeed Diallo as
military leader of the movement.
In the meantime, a somewhat less aggressive and more
diverse alternative to Ganda Iso may have emerged in the
north. On April 4, the newly formed Coalition of People from
North Mali brought together a variety of former politicians
and administrators from the northern provinces under the
chairmanship of former Prime Minister and Gao native
Ousmane Issoufi Maigi (2004-2007). The Coalition urged
soldiers and civilians to prepare for a liberation struggle
and there are reports that the recruitment of volunteers
has begun, possibly with an eye to opening a corridor for
humanitarian aid as severe food shortages loom in the north
(L’Essor [Bamako], April 7; Le Républicain [Bamako],
April 6).
Pro-Government Tuareg Militias
After the current rebellion began on January 17, there were
early reports of victories by Colonel Gamou’s pro-government
Tuareg militia, followed by the surprising news in late March
that this arch-loyalist had defected to the MNLA. However,
when Colonel Gamou arrived in neighboring Niger in early
April he admitted that his defection was only a ruse following
the collapse of the Malian Army in the north, one that
enabled him to shift 500 men and dozens of combat vehicles

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
through rebel lines to safety without losses. For now his men
have been disarmed and Gamou and his leading officers
moved to Niamey (Radio France Internationale, April 6). In
the event of an ECOWAS intervention, they would likely be
returned to the field. There are other Tuareg, particularly of
the Imghad, who want no part of the MNLA or the Ansar al-
Din, but organized resistance in the current circumstances
would be difficult. Many who oppose the rebels have simply
fled across the borders until a safe return is possible.
The Arab Militias
Though Ganda Iso may treat the Arabs and Tuareg as a
common enemy, there are in fact enormous differences
between the two communities exacerbated by a traditional
lack of trust and the recent introduction into northern Mali of
the largely Arab al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb movement
(AQIM). AQIM’s apparent alliance with the newly-formed
Salafist-Jihadist Ansar al-Din group under the command of
veteran Tuareg militant Iyad ag Ghali has only complicated
affairs.
and Islamist Tuareg in northern Mali (with the latter possibly
receiving support from AQIM), there is a growing likelihood
that Arab and African-based “self-defense” militias may take
advantage of such an opportunity to try and reverse the
recent Tuareg gains in the region. A descent into tribal and
ethnic warfare in northern Mali would be sure to devastate
an already marginal region for years to come.
Notes
1. Wikileaks: U.S. Embassy Bamako cable 08BAMAKO778,
September 9, 2008.
2. Ibid
3. Wikileaks: U.S. Embassy Bamako cable 09BAMAKO3,
January 5, 2009.
4. Ibid
The above article was published as “‘The Sons of the
Land’: Tribal Challenges to the Tuareg Conquest of
Northern Mali” in Terrorism Monitor on April 20,
2012.
After the Malian Army fled Timbuktu, the strong Arab
trading community in that city formed its own resistance
group of several hundred men to combat Tuareg rule, the
Front de Libération Nationale d’Azawad (FLNA). According
to the movement’s secretary-general, Muhammad Lamine
Sidad, the Arabs “have our own interests to defend—a
return to peace and economic stability” (Reuters, April 9).
Unable to match the firepower of the rebels, the Arab militia
has decamped to the outskirts of Timbuktu, waiting for an
opportunity to expel the Tuareg.
Amir of the Southern Sahara:
A Sketch of AQIM’s Mokhtar
Belmokhtar
Dario Cristiani
The pro-government Bérabiche Arab militia led by Colonel
Muhammad Ould Meidou appears to have ceased operations
in northern Mali for the present, though there are reports of
a new Bérabiche militia in training (Le Combat [Bamako],
January 31). The Bérabiche have often turned to self-defense
militias in the past and it is possible that Mali’s Kounta
and Telemsi Arabs may do the same now if it is the only
alternative to Tuareg rule.
Conclusion
Many Malians believe that Ganda Koy and its successor
Ganda Iso enjoy a certain immunity in their relationship with
Mali’s security forces as a means of applying pressure on the
nation’s northern communities. A 2009 U.S. Embassy cable
noted that Bamako’s “catch and release policy” regarding
Ganda Iso suspects “does not seem to have helped matters”
[4] With the looming possibility of a clash between nationalist
9
Personal Profile
Born in the medieval city of Ghardaïa in central Algeria,
nearly 372 miles due south of Algiers, on June 1, 1972,
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is known by different names and
nicknames. He is known as Khaled Abou Abbass, and his
many nicknames include: “the Elusive,” “Marlboro Man” and
Belawarr (“One-eyed”) referring to the loss of an eye that
occurred while involved in jihadist activities in Afghanistan.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar became fascinated with the concept
of jihad as a teenager. The mysterious assassination of
Abdullah Azzam acted as a catalyst for him. Azzam, a
Jordanian-Palestinian jihadist preacher based in Peshawar
and crucial mentor of the late Osama bin Laden, whose
legacy greatly inspired Belmokhtar, represented the turning
point in his background. Belmokhtar decided to head to
Afghanistan, joining the jihadist current and undertaking
training in several mujahideen camps throughout the failed

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
state. [1] Shortly after returning to Algeria, he joined the
Groupe Islamique Armeé (Armed Islamic Group-GIA),
quickly becoming one of its most important commanders.
According to a Mauritanian media source, Belmokhtar
allegedly travelled to Sudan for meetings with Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri while the two lived there in
the 1990s before being expelled to Afghanistan (Carrefour
de la République Islamique de Mauritanie, January 8, 2011).
An internal split occurred among the members of the
GIA dividing those that wanted to severely decrease mass
casualty attacks on civilians—a hallmark of the Algerian civil
conflict—yet still sought to attack international targets and
those who retained a more parochial outlook focused tightly
on the establishment of an Islamic state within Algeria’s
borders. Those that splintered off pledging (in theory) not to
attack non-combatants—yet later transform the conflict from
a local to regional one—formed the Groupe Salafiste pour
la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat-GSPC) in the late 1990s. Belmokhtar joined
the GSPC and was the most active militant of the groups in
the southern zone. His early rise in the then less strategically
important areas for the GSPC—but most vital to al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) today—led to the role
that he currently plays in the Sahelian/Saharan territories
encompassing north-eastern Mauritania, northern Mali
and southwestern Algeria. The new center of his activities
has been the city of Tamanrasset at the base of the Ahaggar
Mountains. Belmokhtar’s interest in smuggling and other
illicit traffic—including possible human trafficking—sharply
increased. In a few years, these types of so-called “collateral”
activities became even more significant than proper “minor
jihad” in itself. In the eyes of many global jihadi purists, this
greatly lessened Belmokhtar’s credibility.
It was at this time that he began to focus beyond the previous
narrow scope of overthrowing the Algerian government.
He then became interested in fighting the Mauritanian
state, in part because of Mauritania’s diplomatic relations
with Israel (which have since been severed in reaction to
the January 2009 Israeli assault on Gaza and the resultant
Palestinian casualties) (Al-Ahram Weekly, March 25-
31, 2010). Belmokhtar is considered to be the figure that
expanded jihad from a war-fatigued Algeria into a vulnerable
Mauritania. He is believed to have been behind the killing of
17 Mauritanian soldiers in the garrison of Lemgheity in the
country’s northern Tiris Zemmour Region in 2005 as well as
the mind behind the failed attack on the French embassy in
Nouakchott (PanAfrican News Agency, June 16, 2005).
The increasing pressure from the Algerian security forces
drove Belmokhtar further south. His primary territorial
base is believed to be the under-governed area of northern
Mali. When the GSPC re-branded itself as a franchise of al-
Qaeda, with the birth of AQIM, Belmokthar retained his
operational independence in the south, although he had
to “share” this region with another main commander of
AQIM, Abou Zeid—leader of the “Tariq ibn Ziyad” brigade,
operating mainly in the southern-eastern regions and closely
connected to AQIM’s overall amir Abdelmalek Droukdel,
based in the northern Kabylie region in the Atlas Mountains
along Algeria’s Mediterranean coast. [2] Although rivals,
Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid share the same modus operandi,
as they are now more focused on utilitarian undertakings,
such as smuggling and kidnappings, than on traditional
jihadis acts aimed at damaging the government of Algerian
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
The relationship between Mokhtar Belmokhtar and
Abdelmalek Droukdel has always been rather complex.
Although the two personalities have been thought of as
peer competitors for years, this did not prevent them from
pursuing particular collaborative efforts when their tactical
interests converged.
Operational Profile
Belmokhtar’s profile is characterized by a strong mix
of ideology and pragmatism, with the latter sometimes
overwhelming the former. He is the leader of the Katiba
al-Mulathimin—The Battalion of Veiled Men—recalling
the religious reformist message of the Almoravids in their
struggle against Idrissids. [3] The personal history of his
militancy is similar to that of many fellow jihadists the world
round. He migrated to Afghanistan, the center of the U.S.
and Saudi-sponsored insurgency in the 1980s, where he
claims to have fought against the Soviet forces.
However, given the timetable of his Afghan experience at the
beginning of the 1990s, it is more likely that he trained in
militant camps and possibly took part only in the internecine
fighting among different jihadi parties in Afghanistan who
sought to oust the derelict Marxist regime while jockeying
for power among themselves. This initial experience in the
Afghan theatre marks a stark difference between Belmokhtar
and his main AQIM rival in the Sahara/Sahel, Abou Zeid, as
the latter never went to Afghanistan, spending his militant
years in the inhospitable Sahara rather than in a far-flung
jihad.
As Afghanistan mutated from an ideological to a civil war,
Belmokhtar then returned to Algeria in 1993. Algeria had
10

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
by then turned into one of the focal points of the emerging
global jihadist landscape. The Islamist victory in the
elections of 1991, the consequential annulment, the military
coup and the following eruption of a massive domestic
crisis threw Algeria into a period of extended turmoil. This
disquiet quickly spiraled into a ghastly civil war marking
the bloodiest period in the history of post-independence
Algeria. The history of Belmokhtar’s militancy has always
been characterized by a certain degree of heterogeneity
toward the mainstream positions of the Algerian jihad
with regard to the morphing of the GIA, GSPC and AQIM.
These differences were not based on ideological disputes
but on more sordid power conflicts and divergent views on
operational strategies.
Again, compared to Abou Zeid, he seemed to have undertaken
a diametrically opposing path in life. Abou Zeid moved from
smuggling and contraband to jihad, using jihadi ideology
as a tool to frame his rage against Algiers, then using his
expertise to gain momentum and increasing his operational
profile within the organization. Belmokthar, instead, moved
from a more typical jihadi fighter profile to a more pragmatic
jihadi smuggler in which carrying out illicit activities in the
loosely patrolled areas of the Sahara desert allowed him
greater operational autonomy which in turn boosted his role
within the group. This evolution highlights a major feature of
his militant personality: a rather strong degree of flexibility,
that allows him to change priorities, aims and operational
modes quickly and depending on the situations.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is considered to be one of the major
protagonists behind the increased focus of AQIM on the
kidnapping of seemingly hapless Westerners caught in
their midst. The institutionalization of kidnapping as a
key component of AQIM’s strategy is primarily due to his
aggressive initiatives in the Sahara (see Terrorism Monitor,
January 28, 2010). Along with Adrerrezak al-Parà and other
militants, he took part in the spectacular kidnapping of 32
European tourists in 2003. In 2007, members of his group
were allegedly involved in the killings of four French tourists
during the Paris-Dakar rally that led the organizers of the
legendary event to relocate it to Latin America in 2008
(Rue89, September 24, 2010). Additionally he is thought
to be the organizer of the kidnappings of two Canadian
diplomats in late 2008 and of the abduction and killing of
two Frenchmen in Niger (France 24, January 11, 2011). The
kidnapping racket is one of the most rewarding revenue
streams for AQIM. It is also consistent with the group’s
financial, operational and logistical needs and its ideological
compulsion to strike out against infidels.
Recently, Belmokhtar participated in an attention-grabbing
11
interview with a Mauritanian online news agency, vaguely
explaining how AQIM benefited from the war in Libya
by gaining unspecified weapons from the late Mu’ammar
al-Qaddafi’s bountiful arsenals (Agence Nouakchott
d’Information, November 9, 2011). Aside from the arms
assertion, which has been a concern of many Maghreb
analysts, Belmokhtar claimed to be fostering new links with
Islamist fighters in Libya. In the interview, he acknowledged
the diverging views he has with several members of AQIM,
although he downplayed these disagreements to normal
dialogue amongst true believers who genuinely share the
same overall jihadi ethic.
Curiously, according to Algerian security sources quoted
by the local daily Ennahar at the time of this writing,
Belmokhtar has founded a new movement named “Southern
Children’s Movement for Justice.” In this light, he appears
to be detaching himself from AQIM and pursuing his own
agenda through this movement, which will carry out attacks
against foreign targets in the Sahel (Ennahar, December
5, 2011). The article also quoted the words of a member
of the group, a person named “Nemr,” native to Ruwaysat
in the eastern Ouargla Wilayat (Province), who said that
Belmokhtar refused the idea of carrying out attacks against
foreign interests or kidnapping foreign nationals, stressing
instead the need to gain the sympathy of Western countries
and international public opinion for this strangely named
movement. Nemr stated rather inexplicably that this nascent
group has received funding proposals from France, Morocco
and Libya. These entirely contradictory statements sound
eccentric at best. Over the years Belmokhtar has been a
target of counter-intelligence efforts to weaken his position,
claiming either that he has been killed or has surrendered.
It would not come as a surprise that this is yet another such
clumsy attempt by the Algerian government to subvert
Belmokhtar.
Conclusion
Mokhtar Belmokhtar remains one of the main leaders of
AQIM, given his predominant role in the southern theatre
of the operation of the group. His strong knowledge of the
territory and his connections with local gangs allow him
to play a prominent role in the region that has become a
major focal point for AQIM over the past few years as their
agenda has shifted away from the settled center of Algeria’s
north. His predominance in the region, however, has been
challenged by the rise of Abou Zeid, who is closely connected
to Droukdel and whose emergence in the Sahelian/Saharan
region was considered as a move by AQIM central to counter
balance the autonomy of a strident Belmokhtar. The relations
of Belmokhtar with the Kabylie leadership of AQIM are

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
characterized by a certain degree of mistrust and conflict
but these interactions are generally kept fluid in order to
accommodate to specific, changing tactical needs of the
organization as well as to make necessary adjustments to its
changing political center of gravity.
Notes
1. Andrew Black, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian
Jihad’s Southern Amir,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism
Monitor 7 (12), May 8, 2009.
2. For a profile of Abou Zeid, see Militant Leadership
Monitor, October 2011.
3. Geoff Porter, “AQIM’s Objectives in North Africa,” CTC
Sentinel, February 2011.
became involved in existing local smuggling networks that
crisscrossed the Sahara.
Four factors help explain why he evolved from shepherd to
smuggler:
• The scarcity of legitimate job opportunities for young
men in Algeria during the period in question;
• His intimate knowledge of the local desert environment
and pistes (unpaved trail or path);
• The ease of crossing porous borders—Ghadamès,
Libya is approximately 12 miles from the Algerian
border; and
• A strong desire to earn a better living.
Militant Leadership Monitor, December 30, 2011
For Profit Jihad: An In-Depth
Profile of AQIM’s Abou Zeid
Dario Cristiani
One of the key figures in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), al-Qaeda’s North African franchise, is Abou
Zeid. Though there is no agreement on his precise given
name, it has recently emerged that his real name is likely
Mohadem Ghadir, which surfaced among certain Algerian
judiciary sources (Echorouk, Jan 21, 2011). For many years
Abou Zeid was known as Adib Hammadou. On the United
Nations webpage outlining sanctions against AQIM, he is
still referred to as such. [1] Abou Zeid’s birth date, like his
real name, is also unclear. He was born sometime between
1957 and 1958, in the area of Azouz Toureg, in Algeria’s
eastern desert region of DebDeb, in the wilaya (province) of
Illizi, near the juncture of the Tunisian, Libyan and Algerian
borders. Several nomadic families settled near this triple
border region and from one of these, the Mabrouk Ghadir—
part of the large Sulaymi Arab tribe of Chaamba—hailed
Abou Zeid’s family. The physical environment in which
he was raised had a strong impact both on his personality
and the choices he would make later in life. Abou Zeid
never attended a modern school. He briefly attended a local
madrassa where he studied rudimentary Arabic and the
Quran but soon abandoned even that. During his teenage
years he worked with his father in the desert tending to their
family’s camels and rams. [2] In the late 1970s, Abou Zeid
12
He started smuggling bulk quantities of tea and electronics
from Libya into Algeria where he then sold those products
on the black market in the town of al-Oueda. He was initially
wary of smuggling items prohibited by Islamic strictures such
as cigarettes. In his daily work as a smuggler, he regularly
encountered the Algerian gendarmerie on patrol. He was
arrested for the first time in 1984. His subsequent encounters
with the gendarmerie fostered a strong enmity toward local
authorities enforcing the writ of Algiers in the territory
he traversed. This early arrest and future arrests were key
moments in Abou Zeid’s radicalization. As his views towards
security forces hardened, he began a progression that
transformed him from a petty smuggler to radical Islamist
militant. [3]
A mixture of hatred toward the Algerian state and his father’s
death in 1989 pushed a disaffected Abou Zeid further toward
radical Islamist ideology. He joined the ranks of the Front
Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front-FIS) in the late
1980s. He soon became one of the main FIS members of
his local community, running several rallies in the area of
DebDeb. He climbed the ladder within the FIS before he
joined the Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group-
GIA). In the 1990s, he was very close to Kamareddine
Kherbane, the GIA’s external relations delegate at the time. He
also became one of the main collaborators of Amir Belabdi
Derradji and enjoyed good relations with Adrerrezak al-
Parà. In this milieu Abou Zeid was one of the core militants
involved in the creation of the Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat (The Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat-GSPC) in the late 1990s. He accompanied al-
Para during the spectacular kidnapping of 32 European
tourists in 2003. He then became the head of operations in
Zone 5, encompassing the areas of Tébessa, Khenchela and
Batna. Since then he has played a major role in the area (El
Watan, Oct 1, 2010).
Rising to the Top: Abou Zeid and AQIM

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
The GSPC was re-branded between 2006–2007 and declared
itself the local franchise of al-Qaeda after pledging bayat (an
oath) to the late Osama bin Laden. The operational links with
al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan were rather loose
and AQIM enjoyed substantial organizational autonomy.
[4] As mentioned earlier, Abou Zeid operates mainly in the
Sahelian strip, leading the brigade operating in the east of
this area. [5] He is the head of the “Tariq ibn Ziyad” brigade,
named after the Berber general known in Spanish texts as
“Taric al-Tuerto” (Taric the one-eyed) who led the conquest
of Visogothic Spain in the early eighth century.
This strong symbolic meaning is aimed at recalling the epic
deeds of the Islamic empire at the peak of its expansion when
much of the Iberian Peninsula was part of “Dar al-Islam.”
Using such historical terminology is a way of framing the
movement in the Salafi-Jihadi ideological box. [6] AQIM
demonstrated a strong proclivity to act as a normal illegal
business organization rather than as an ideologically-driven
jihadi group. In the past few months there has been a revival
of more traditional terrorist attacks in northern Algeria (see
Terrorism Monitor, September 22, 2011). The operational
trends seem to indicate a different reality. In this context,
Abou Zeid played a rather key role as he is one of the main
men responsible for the change in the movement’s brand
name from GSPC to AQIM, as well as the north to south
shift that occurred in terms of geographical priorities.
Five years ago Algeria was the core focus of AQIM’s wrath
with the Sahel. During that period waging jihad against
Algiers was AQIM’s key strategic aim. Today the situation is
starkly different. The broader region that spans across Niger,
Mali, Algeria and Libya is now the key operational theatre of
AQIM. The most important activity of AQIM is no longer
attacking government targets—though they still carry out
such acts—but rather smuggling weapons and illegal goods
of various kinds along with kidnapping Europeans. The latter
is a way to achieve a financial goal while simultaneously
pursuing a jihadi aim. Kidnapping infidels is consistent with
the jihadi ideology. Savvy AQIM militants roaming the
Sahel are all too well aware that Europeans governments—
unofficially—are more willing than anyone else to pay
ransoms for their kidnapped nationals.
Abou Zeid has been accused of involvement in the abduction
of more than 20 European hostages in the Sahel countries
since 2008—many of them ransomed for millions of Euros.
He also ordered or carried out the executions of Edwin Dyers,
a British hostage, in 2009 and Michel Germaneau, a French
hostage in July 2010 (Afrik, July 26, 2010; L’Expression,
July 25, 2010; Algeria 360, June 4, 2010). Moreover, he was
13
also accused of kidnapping seven workers of the French
uranium mining consortium, Areva, in Niger (Radio France
Internationale, September 21, 2011). Three of the workers
were released after a few months, while the other four are
still believed to be held by AQIM (Reuters, October 4, 2011).
AQIM’s Operational Evolution and Abou Zeid’s
Personality: Is There a Connection?
Throughout his rise through the FIS to the GIA to the GSPC
to today’s AQIM, Abou Zeid has a long history of personal
involvement in the radical Islamism that has bled Algeria for
decades. He joined the FIS in the late 1980s and since then he
has been a key figure of the “Southerners”—those jihadists
originally from southern Algeria and whose theatre of action
was the wider Sahelian area. After dealing with the Algerian
gendarmerie patrols he found radical rhetoric of the 1990s
an apt means of expressing his resentment and rage against
the central government whom he viewed as perpetrators of
oppression.
Abou Zeid’s rise to the upper echelon of Algerian Islamism
occurred at a slow pace. Although he has held several
important roles in these organizations, he became one
of the very top players only in the past six to seven years.
Given his long standing relations with AQIM’s overall amir
Abdelmalek Droukdel—Zeid was one of his main allies
during the 1990s—the increasing role played by Zeid in
the Sahelian and Saharan dimension was also considered
a move supported by Droukdel to counter-balance the
autonomy and the independence of Mokhtar Belmokhtar,
AQIM’s other major leader in southern Algeria. Abou
Zeid and Belmokthar are by far the most important AQIM
personalities in the Sahel region. The two men, however,
have contrasting personal and historical backgrounds. Their
relations are rather complex, if not controversial. Although
Abou Zeid was a smuggler turned jihadi, Belmokthar had
the credentials of an international jihadi fighter from fighting
the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Although he never completed a proper religious education,
Abou Zeid has always tried to live according to his
interpretation of Islamic doctrine. It is for this reason that
he was hesitant to engage in smuggling that could be seen
as contradicting his Islamic principles. Given the type and
volume of goods that AQIM is believed to move through
the Sahel, it seems that for purely pragmatic reasons Abou
Zeid overcame his more idealistic beliefs. The necessity of
finding reliable sources of income to finance AQIM’s exploits
coupled with his strong desire for obtaining wealth may help
to explain as to why he is currently engaged in this rather
un-Islamic business. Trumping his illicit smuggling, the

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
Abou Zeid of today appears to be more focused on AQIM’s
lucrative kidnapping enterprise. He is considered the main
figure responsible for the recent wave of kidnappings of
Westerners afflicting the Sahel. Moreover, his knowledge of
the human terrain in this region—for example, being able to
factor in local and tribal loyalties and support networks—
and his reserved, severe nature makes him the perfect brand
ambassador of Algeria’s present Islamist incarnation in the
form of AQIM.
Conclusion
The operational profile of AQIM that has emerged over the
past few years is consistent with Abou Zeid’s background,
personality and modus operandi. It is therefore extremely
realist and results-oriented tinged with a ruthlessness,
evidenced by the dramatic execution of foreign hostages.
Proper “minor jihad” against the near and the far enemies
remains the most important rhetorical aim of the group.
More concretely, it seems to be one of several goals among
others and not the central and sole goal of the group. The
emergence at the top of the group of a figure like Abou Zeid
who does not have proper “global jihad” credentials like
Belmokhtar—whose Islamic beliefs were built during his
daily life in the desert rather than rooted in a more formal
Islamic education—and was originally a simple tea and
electronics smuggler, could help to explain the increasing
importance that these activities acquired for AQIM.
Moreover, his desire for accumulating personal wealth could
explain why he began engaging himself in haram (nonpermissible
in Islam) traffic. The picture of Abou Zeid is
then that of a brutal, committed and resilient militant whose
jihadi credentials are not quite as strong as those of many
other Algerian jihadi fighters. It was his notion of the group’s
raison d’être combined with his demonstrable leadership
capabilities that elevated him to play a leading role in AQIM
despite his shortcomings in terms of jihadi credentials.
These traits held by Abou Zeid have contributed to the main
operational transformations that have taken place within al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in recent years.
Notes
1. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.
shtml
2. Mohamed Mokaddem, Al Qaida Au Maghreb Islamique.
Contrebande au nom de l’Islam, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010),
pp. 9-15.
3. Ibid, pp.16-24.
4. Geoff Porter, “The Impact of Bin Laden’s Death on AQIM
in North Africa,” CTC Sentinel, May 1, 2011.
5. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “The Many
14
Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Geneva Centre
for Security Policy, Policy Paper Number 15, May 2011.
6. Mathieu Guidere, “The Tribal Allegiance System Within
AQIM,” CTC Sentinel, February 1, 2011.
Militant Leadership Monitor, October 31, 2011
Algerian Leaders of AQIM Reassert
Control with Appointment of New
Saharan Amir
Andrew McGregor
AQIM’s Algerian leadership has appointed al-Vourghan
Brigade leader Jemal Oukacha (a.k.a. Yahya Abu al-
Hammam) as its new Saharan amir (Agence Nouakchott
d’Information, October 4). Al-Hammam’s appointment was
intended to fill a vacancy created when Nabil Makhloufi
(a.k.a. Abu al-Kama) was killed in September, allegedly in a
“car accident” in the desert between Gao and Timbuktu (Le
Temps d’Algerie [Algiers], October 5).
Al-Hammam is a native of Reghaia, a town in Algiers Province
in northern Algeria, and has been involved in the Islamist
militancy since 2000, when he finished an 18-month term
in prison and joined the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication
et le combat (GSPC), which later became al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The young jihadi began to come
into prominence through his participation in several raids
against Mauritanian and Algerian military posts under
Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid. In 2006,
al-Hammam was sentenced to death in absentia in Biskra on
terrorism-related charges. By 2010 he was heavily involved
in the kidnapping of European nationals in the Sahel region
with the Vourghan Brigade (Liberté [Algiers], October 6).
Al-Hammam is believed to be very close to AQIM leader
Abd al-Malik Droukdel (a.k.a. Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadad)
and his appointment can be seen as an attempt by the
Boumerdes-based leadership to reassert their authority in
the wild Sahara/Sahel sector, where movement commanders
have grown used to a large degree of autonomy in their
operations and decision-making.
Al-Hammam’s promotion appears to have come at the
expense of Mulathamin Brigade leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar,

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
who was reported to have been seriously wounded in a clash
with Tuareg rebels earlier this year (see Terrorism Monitor
Brief, July 12). If this is the case, the appointment may well
create new tensions within the movement, but the decision
marks Droukdel’s intention to establish firmer control of the
movement’s southern brigades in anticipation of a major
confrontation with ECOWAS, African Union or Western
forces in northern Mali in the coming months. News of the
appointment was apparently accompanied by orders from
the AQIM leadership to Abd al-Hamid Abu Zaid and others
to respect the decision (El-Khabar [Algiers], October 6). It
has been reported that the division of spoils from AQIM’s
lucrative Saharan kidnapping business has been a recent
source of friction between the movement’s southern amirs.
AQIM’s dominance in the Sahara/Sahel region is now being
challenged by the rival Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (MUJWA), which is attracting large numbers of sub-
Saharan recruits (Jeune Afrique, October 14). A spokesman
for the Mulathamin Brigade denied Algerian reports that
Mokhtar Belmokhtar was injured in a clash between the
AQIM Brigade and MUJWA fighters on September 27 (Le
Temps d’Algerie, October 1). Nonetheless, al-Hammam’s
appointment is in part an effort to reinvigorate AQIM’s
profile in the region.
With an external military intervention in Mali very unlikely
before the end of the year, both AQIM and MUJWA have
an opportunity to rally supporters and prepare an armed
response. MUJWA leader Omar Ould Hamaha has warned
France against adopting an aggressive stance against the
Islamists of northern Mali as well as claiming Mauritania’s
armed forces would be no match for MUJWA fighters,
who he says are more experienced and better armed than
Mauritanian troops (al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], October
6). Algeria appears to be favoring an approach that would
simultaneously encourage dialogue with northern Mali’s
Tuareg rebels (without exclusion) while isolating AQIM and
MUJWA from the local community (Tout sur l’Algerie
[Algiers], October 12).
Terrorism Monitor, October 18, 2012
Ahmad al-Tilemsi: The
15
Commander of MUJWA’s Osama
bin Laden Brigade
Jacob Zenn
The United States Department of State announced on
December 7 that two founding leaders of the Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), Hamad al-Khairy
and Ahmad al-Tilemsi, were Specially Designated Global
Terrorists (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224, which was
signed into law on September 23, 2011 by President George
W. Bush. [1] As a result of the designation, “all property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which the Movement for Unity
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), Khairy, or Tilemsi has
any interest is blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from
engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit.”
Tilemsi, who also uses the name Ahmad Ould Aamari, is
the commander of MUJWA’s Osama bin Laden brigade and
a member of MUJWA’s Majlis Shura. MUJWA split from
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in late 2011—
approximately ten decades to the day of the September 11
attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C.—in rejection
of the Algerian domination of AQIM’s leadership and to
focus on operations in West Africa outside of the Maghreb
region.
In late November, MUJWA ousted the National Movement
for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) from the city of
Ménaka, Gao region, with the support of MUJWA’s allies
in AQIM, Ansar al-Din and Boko Haram (Ménaka is the
final Malian city before the border with Niger). MUJWA
is the leading Islamist militia in Gao, while Ansar al-Din is
the leading Islamist militia in Timbuktu. AQIM is believed
to operate throughout Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which
constitute the three provinces of northern Mali that these
militias call the “Islamic State of Azawad.”
Tilemsi discussed MUJWA’s split from AQIM in early
December in an interview with the Mauritanian al-Akhbar
News Agency that was later featured on jihadist websites. [2]
Other MUJWA leaders had said that MUJWA rejects any
ethnic group exerting superiority over another—whether
Algerians in AQIM over sub-Saharan Africans or the MNLA
asserting Tuareg domination over “black” ethnic groups.
Tilemsi confirmed MUJWA’s core ideology, while also
rebuking the MNLA for its secular ideology and for allegedly
looting Gao after the MNLA initially took control of the city
by expelling the Malian government soldiers from the city
in April.

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
Tilemsi said that:
“[The MNLA] is a movement that declared enmity of the
mujahideen by its refusal of the rulings of the Islamic Shari’a
and its oppression of the Muslims by taking their money
unjustly and murdering them and its differentiation between
the Muslims who are black and have no rights and the whites
who have rights.”
Tilemsi also criticized the MNLA for its former ties to the
Mu’ammar Qaddafi regime in Libya before the regime’s
demise in 2011 and for the MNLA’s willingness to coordinate
with France, Mauritania and the international forces to oust
the Islamist militants MUJWA, AQIM and Ansar al-Din
from “Azawad,” as anticipated through an intervention in
2013. Tilemsi said:
its Islamist credentials to the outside world. Finally, by
denouncing the racism of the MNLA, MUJWA wants to
send a message to potential sub-Saharan African recruits
that MUJWA will represent them (also unlike AQIM which
has a reputation for favoring Arab Algerians). As leader
of the Osama bin Laden brigade of MUJWA, Tilemsi has
learned from al-Qaeda Central’s example that propaganda
messaging and pressure on Western politicians is an effective
strategy when preparing for combat on the battlefield.
Notes
1. “Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity
and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad al-Khairy, and Ahmad
al-Tilemsi,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, D.C., December 7, 2012.
“[The MNLA]” have fought with Qaddafi against the Libyan
people, then they came to the region (northern Mali) by
order from France and coordination with the apostate
Mauritanian government which tried to recruit them in
fighting the mujahideen.”
Despite the friction with AQIM over the split, Tilemsi gave
no impression to al-Akhbar that the split has led to a break in
their broader strategic alliance between MUJWA and AQIM.
The State Department SDGT announcement affirmed that
Tilemsi is a Malian citizen, that he acts as MUJWA’s military
head and that he is “also affiliated with AQIM.” According to
Tilemsi:
“Our relationship is good with the jihadi groups that are
present with us in the field since we are joined by the fraternal
association of faith and jihad and common destiny and we all
aspire to achieve unity and establish an Islamic Emirate in
the region.”
2. “Al-Akhbar News Agency interview with commander
Ahmad Ould Aamir aka Ahmad Al-Talmasi Amir of the
Osama bin Laden brigade and member of Majlis Shura of
Jamaat Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad in West Africa,” https://
ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=43650, December 4, 2012.
Jacob Zenn, December 11, 2012
Bringing Militant Salafism to the
Tuareg: A Profile of Veteran Rebel
Iyad ag Ghali
One of Tilmesi’s biggest concerns, like the rest of MUJWA
commanders, is the impending “international threat” against
MUJWA, which Tilemsi says MUJWA will engage through
“combat and jihad.” To pressure the international forces and
Algerian government from intervening in northern Mali,
MUJWA is exploiting the suffering of the families of hostages
MOJWA has kidnapped. MUJWA threatens to kill them all if
the intervention proceeds.
As for Tilmesi’s interview with al-Akhbar, it appears to
have been MUJWA’s form of public diplomacy. By showing
a united front with AQIM, MUJWA wants to portray the
Islamist militants as united and strong, despite that factions
have emerged within their ranks. By criticizing the MNLA
for being secular and for looting, MUJWA wants to show
16
Andrew McGregor
Operating alongside the long-time Tuareg rebels and heavily
armed veterans of the Libyan military that fill the ranks
of Mali’s Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad
(MNLA) is a smaller Salafist group led by Iyad ag Ghali, once
the most prominent of Mali’s Tuareg rebels. Today, ag Ghali
is leading a new armed group in pursuit of an independent
Islamist state in northern Mali, an ambition that may be
barely more popular with the Muslims of northern Mali than
it is in the national capital of Bamako.
Ag Ghali is a member of the noble Iriyaken clan of the Kel
Ifoghas Tuareg confederation living in the Adrar des Iforas
Mountains of northeastern Mali. His highly independent

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
character has been described in various ways; a Malian
government minister told AFP: “Iyad is a cool customer. He
never panics in the face of a difficult situation;” while a U.S.
diplomat described ag Ghali as “an independent and often
inscrutable leader… there is no indication of anyone either
within the Tuareg hierarchy or the Malian government who
holds sway over him” (AFP, August 18, 2003). [1]
The rebellion of the MNLA is the first in a long time not to be
dominated by members of the noble Ifergoumessen clan of
the Kel Imghad. This new leadership is composed of young
rebels with new agendas, Tuareg deserters from the Malian
officer corps and confident veterans of the Libyan military.
The theme of the rebellion is “now or never,” and they are
unlikely to be deterred by the intercession of elders or
politicians. This new generation of rebels is wary of leaders
with histories of compromise, such as ag Ghali. Thus forced
to the sidelines just as the strongest rebel force assembled yet
in northern Mali was about to take the field, ag Ghali created
his own movement that would reflect his growing interest in
Salafist Islam. The new movement, Ansar al-Din (Supporters
of Religion), has so far taken credit for the capture of the
garrison town of Aguel Hoc and appears to be operating in
cooperation with the MNLA, which has no religious agenda.
Apart from the Tuareg (known locally as Kel Tamashek),
northern Mali is home to the Kunta and Bérabiche Arabs
and members of several African tribes, most notably the Peul
(a.k.a. Fulani) and the Songhai. Like the Tuareg themselves,
some of these tribesmen have joined the rebellion, while
others remain loyal to Bamako. The MNLA has also tried to
broaden participation in the new rebellion to other Tuareg
clans besides the Ifogha.
The Rebellion of 1990
Ag Ghali led the attack on a police station in Menaka that
launched a rebellion in June 1990. His rebel group, the
Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad
(MPLA), was composed largely of Tuareg veterans of
Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion who were demobilized
after Qaddafi’s unsuccessful campaigns in Chad. Reflecting
wide disenchantment in the north with rule from Bamako,
the Tuareg were also joined by numerous Arabs and Songhai.
When the MPLA split into four factions in 1991, ag Ghali
founded the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA),
a mainly Ifogha movement which was more inclined to a
peace settlement with Bamako than the other factions. Ag
Ghali signed a treaty with the central government in January
1991 and the MPA folded in 1996 following a comprehensive
peace agreement with most of the northern rebels.
17
Ag Ghali took a religious turn in 1999 under the influence
of the Tablighi Jama’at, a non-violent South Asian Islamic
revival group whose missionaries were active in Mali and the
Sahel region at the time. The Tuareg leader even travelled to
the Pakistan headquarters of the movement, but his interest
in the highly conservative Tablighi movement was regarded
by his Tuareg neighbors as more of a personal eccentricity
than the start of a new religious trend in Kidal (Think Africa
Press, February 6; Times Higher Education, December 15,
2006).
Beginning in 2003, ag Ghali assumed a new role as the goto
intermediary with kidnapping gangs operating under
the banner of the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le
combat (GSPC), the Algerian forerunner to AQIM.
In 2006, Ag Ghali became General Secretary of the Alliance
Démocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement (ADC),
alongside noted Tuareg rebels Hassan ag Fagaga, Ahmad
ag Bibi and the late Ibrahim ag Bahanga. In May 2006, Iyad
ag Ghali led the ADC in a brief rebellion in Kidal. Most of
the ADC’s demands were met in the Algiers Accord that
followed, but, as in the case of pacts both earlier and later,
the central government made little effort to implement any
of its terms.
The ADC was more representative of the Tuareg clans
in northern Mali than Ibrahim ag Bahanga’s breakaway
movement, the Alliance Touaregue Nord Mali Pour Le
Changement (ATNMC), which was largely based on the
Ifergoumessen clan of the Kel Ifoghas (a.k.a. Kel Adagh).
Nonetheless, the ADC had split along clan lines by the
end of 2006, primarily over dissatisfaction with ag Ghali’s
leadership.
In 2007, ag Ghali was in Bamako, advocating for the creation
of the joint Tuareg/Malian Army units called for in the 2006
Algiers Accords and indicating a readiness to accept a larger
Malian military presence in the north. [2]
Ag Ghali – Diplomat
In November 2007, ag Ghali was appointed to the Malian
consulate in the Saudi city of Jeddah. ag Ghali visited the
U.S. Embassy for confidential discussions in May 2007, just
prior to his departure for a diplomatic appointment to Saudi
Arabia. Embassy officials appeared surprised by the man
who presented himself: “Soft-spoken and reserved, ag Ghali
showed nothing of the cold-blooded warrior persona created
by the Malian press.” The rebel leader said he was “tired of
the problems in the north and tired of being blamed for
them each time they arose.” [3]

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
Ag Ghali’s career as a diplomat appears to have ended
abruptly with his expulsion from Saudi Arabia for association
with “doubtful Islamist circles” (22 Septembre [Bamako],
January 12). Informants told the U.S. Embassy in Bamako
that some Tuareg rebels were “irked at what they view as
ag Ghali’s self-centered decision to abandon northern Mali
during a time of crisis.” [4]
In December, 2008, ag Ghali was being used by Bamako
as a mediator in negotiations with rebel leader Ibrahim ag
Bahanga for the release of Malian soldiers and officers held
prisoner by ag Bahanga’s group. [5] Ag Ghali gradually
became the government’s main intermediary with AQIM
kidnappers Tuareg renegades in the region, allegedly
pocketing a substantial percentage of the ransoms worked
out through his efforts.
Massacre at Aghuel Hoc
The northern garrison town of Aguel Hoc was first taken
by the Tuareg on February 18 after a column of armed 4X4
vehicles attacked the town with mortars and machine-guns,
destroying infrastructure and communications equipment.
Though the Tuareg were driven off by Malian counterattacks
with heavy artillery and helicopter gunships (likely
piloted by Ukrainian mercenaries), they returned a week
later and Aguel Hoc surrendered on January 26 after a relief
force led by Arab militia leader Colonel Meidou was unable
to reach the town (Le Combat [Bamako], January 26). [6]
Malian intelligence sources indicated the attack was led by
Colonel Moussa ag M’Bam (a.k.a. Bamoussa), a deserter
from the Malian Army (Afriqinfos, January 27; Le Courrier
d’Algérie, January 31). Ag Ghali claimed it was Ansar al-Din
that initially took control of Aguel Hoc, promising that this
was “merely a start” (Sahara Media [Nouakchott], January
19). A Malian soldier told reporters that the Tuareg rebels
were more numerous, better armed and possessed better
communications equipment, including satellite phones
(Reuters, February 10).
After the Malian Army reoccupied Aguel Hoc following the
evacuation of the MNLA and Ansar al-Din, they reported
the discovery of the remains of some 82 to 97 soldiers outside
the military camp, many of them displaying the marks of
execution by point-blank gunfire or throat-slitting (Jeune
Afrique, January 26; AFP, February 13). Among the dead was
the garrison’s commander, Captain Sékou Traoré. A Malian
army spokesman said that such an act could only have been
carried out by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an
assertion that was later supported by French Development
Minister Henri de Raincourt, who said the massacre was a
18
tactic resembling those “used by al-Qaeda,” though French
Foreign Minister Alain Juppe was more guarded, saying “it’s
not very clear what role al-Qaeda or AQIM played in these
attacks…” (AFP, February 13). An official statement from the
Malian government decried the “criminal behavior of these
assailants,” consisting of “elements of AQIM, the MNLA
and a group linked to religious fundamentalists [i.e. Ansar
al-Din]” (L’Essor [Bamako], January 30). Government
claims of al-Qaeda involvement rest largely on the claims
of unidentified witnesses that among the assailants were
“bearded men wearing baggy Afghan clothing” (Reuters,
February 10). MNLA sources later claimed that the photos of
massacre victims had been “manipulated” and were actually
old images being used to discredit the movement (Jeune
Afrique, February 19).
Aguelhoc is further from Bamako than the Mississippi is from
Washington and Mali’s small army, drawn mostly from the
Bambara of the south, has a poor record fighting in the alien
wastes of the north. Security there is provided largely by progovernment
Tuareg and Bérabiche Arab militias using the
same tactics as the rebels. The Tuareg militia is led by Colonel
al-Hajj Gamou, a member of the Imghad, traditionally a
vassal clan to the Ifoghas. The Bérabiche Arab militia is led
by Colonel Abdurahman Ould Meidou, who is reported to
have narrowly escaped two recent ambushes (Toumast Press,
February 22). Both militias were instrumental in driving
ag Bahanga’s ATNMC from northern Mali in 2009 (see
Terrorism Focus, February 25, 2009).
Connections to AQIM
One of our best sources for information regarding ag
Ghali’s views on al-Qaeda (at least as they were in 2007),
is a U.S. Embassy cable relating an interview ag Ghali had
with embassy officials while he was still leader of the ADC.
During the discussions, ag Ghali said that AQIM’s extremist
ideology had little to no support in northern Mali. Efforts by
the ADC and other Tuareg to encourage AQIM to leave Mali
were met with assertions the land belonged only “to God.”
Ag Ghali repeatedly urged “targeted special operations” as
the best way to damage AQIM. [7]
While having become a Salafist, there is little evidence that
ag Ghali has become a member of AQIM (Info Matin
[Bamako], January 31). If he had, he would surely be at odds
with the MNLA and many other Tuareg who desire to see
the terrorist group run out of northern Mali. Nonetheless,
ag Ghali’s unusual access to the AQIM leadership was put
to use in October 2010, when ag Ghali was designated the
government’s official mediator with AQIM forces in northern

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
Mali (Le Républicain [Bamako], October 4, 2010).
Several Tuareg associates of ag Ghali were arrested in Mali
in December, 2011 in connection with the kidnapping of
two French nationals in eastern Mali in November. The
kidnappers were also said to be tied to Talib Abdelkrim al-
Targui, a notorious AQIM commander believed by some to
be one of ag Ghali’s many cousins. Al-Targui operates under
AQIM Amir Abdelhamid Abu Zeid (al-Jazeera, January 3).
Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz said ag
Ghali had “established alliances with the terrorist groups,
and it was he who acted as envoy for the payment of ransoms
(Le Monde, February 9).
The MNLA has tried to distance itself from AQIM, saying
their behavior and interpretation of religious texts is foreign
to the Tuareg. The movement suggests instead that the
government is tied to AQIM, pointing to Bamako’s failure
to take action against AQIM bases in northern Mali (AFP,
February 24).
Ansar al-Din
Ag Ghali announced the creation of a new religiouslyoriented
resistance group called Ansar al-Din (Supporters
of Religion) in December 2011 (Tawassoul.net, December
15, 2011). As news of the new armed movement emerged,
Alghabass ag Intalla, leader of the Ifogha and an MP for Kidal,
visited ag Ghali in the latter’s stronghold in the Boureissa
region to sound out ag Ghali’s intentions. Reports emerging
from the meeting suggested ag Ghali was in a radical frame
of mind, but had set conditions for standing down, including
the withdrawal of government troops from Kidal, an end to
the construction of new military barracks and the provision
of a qadi (Islamic judge) alongside each government judge
as a step towards full implementation of Shari’a (Info Matin
[Bamako], February 12; 22 Septembre Bamako], January
12). The formation of the Ansar al-Din may have been Plan
B for ag Ghali, who unsuccessfully put himself forward for
the post of MNLA Secretary-General but was rejected due
to his association with past failures and compromises (Think
Africa Press, February 6).
Possibly trying to cleave ag-Ghali’s group from its alliance
with the MNLA, Bamako offered on January 7 to create a
new qadi for every administrative region in the north and
to provide an imam for every major mosque (Think Africa
Press, February 6). It was not enough to satisfy ag Ghali, and
in mid-January he announced that his movement had begun
operations designed to “spread Islamic Shari’a in the country
and replace the Malian constitution with it” (Sahara Media
[Nouakchott], January 19). The stated goal of Ansar al-Din is
19
the “application of Islamic Shari’a and the rehabilitation of the
ulema (religious scholars),” though ag Ghali has promised a
moderate form of Islamist government in Azawad similar
to that of Tunisia or that advocated by Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood (Le Courrier d’Algérie, January 31).
Even some of ag Ghali’s long-term associates in the rebel
movement are uncertain about his intentions in creating
a Salafist movement in the midst of a population largely
inimical to the trend. One such associate, MNLA spokesman
Hama ag Sid’Ahmad, has said: “I know that Iyad is an
important person in the region and I know that he’s involved
in religious matters. But I cannot believe that he would
completely abandon the tolerance that is part of our Tuareg
culture. Not for one second. Maybe Iyad and others realize
that AQIM has a hold on some of our young people, and
they’re trying to present a different message about Islam that
might possibly win back all those that the Salafists have coopted
into their ranks.” (Think Africa Press, February 6).
Conclusion
The Tuareg have heard endless reasons why an independent
Azawad is impossible, but note that many of these sound
similar to the reasons why an independent South Sudan
was also impossible. There is, however, one difference; the
homeland of the South Sudanese is relatively identical to its
boundaries, while an independent Azawad would border
Tuareg lands in three nations with no interest in seeing
Azawad become a reality. Not unreasonably, these nations
fear that Tuareg irredentism emanating from Azawad would
be an irresistible new political force in the Sahel/Sahara
region.
However, does any of this have any meaning in the context
of Iyad ag Ghali? Do the Ansar al-Din fight for Shari’a or
independence? Or do they fight for a re-invented ag Ghali,
seeking to maintain political influence both in Kidal and
Bamako? Ag Ghali has tied his movement to the fortunes
of the MNLA so far, but Bamako will use the presence of
ag Ghali’s armed Islamists operating side-by-side with the
MNLA to tie the broader rebel movement to AQIM wherever
and whenever possible. The apparent massacre at Aguel Hoc
indicates a movement that is confident enough in its arms
and its timing to make a “no going back” statement, or a
movement that has succumbed to extremism; earlier rebel
movements would almost certainly have taken the garrison
prisoner to use as hostages in the inevitable negotiations.
It is difficult to believe the anti-AQIM MNLA and an
allegedly pro-AQIM Ansar al-Din could be close allies and
ag Ghali has never publicly endorsed al-Qaeda. However,

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
ag Ghali’s own mysterious relations with AQIM cells in
the kidnapping business, similar contacts with Malian
and Algerian government and intelligence officials and his
attempts at spreading Salafism to an unreceptive Tuareg
community in Kidal may make the veteran rebel a costly ally
for the MNLA, both locally and internationally. Though ag
Ghali’s new-found affinity for Salafism and Shari’a may be
an innovative (if locally undesired) approach to the future
of northern Mali, it may not be enough to prevent him from
becoming “yesterday’s man” in the rebellion unless the Ansar
leader can attract foreign support for his campaign to bring
Shari’a to the Sahara/Sahel region.
Notes
1. Wikileaks, U.S. Embassy Bamako, Cable
08BAMAKO824, October 3, 2008, Available at: http://leaks.
hohesc.us/?view=08BAMAKO824.
2. Wikileaks, U.S. Embassy Bamako, Cable
07BAMAKO587, May 31, 2007, Available at: http://leaks.
hohesc.us/?view=07BAMAKO587.
3. Ibid.
4. Wikileaks, U.S. Embassy Bamako, Cable
08BAMAKO824, October 3, 2008, Available at: http://leaks.
hohesc.us/?view=08BAMAKO824.
5. Wikileaks, U.S. Embassy Bamako, Cable 08BAMAKO918,
December l, 2008, Available at: http://wikileaks.org/.
cable/2008/12/08BAMAKO918.html#
6. MNLA Communiqué no. 6, February 15, 2012, Available
at: www.mnlamov.net/actualites.html.
7. Wikileaks, U.S. Embassy Bamako, Cable
07BAMAKO587, May 31, 2007, Available at: http://leaks.
hohesc.us/?view=07BAMAKO587.
Militant Leadership Monitor, February 29, 2012
Regional Neighbors Wary of
Intervention in Mali
Andrew McGregor
With ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) now in
agreement over the formation of a force of 3,300 African
peacekeepers drawn from both ECOWAS and non-
ECOWAS nations, many nations whose support would be
required for the success of such an option have recently
cooled to this plan, while others, such as Algeria, continue
20
to maintain a reserved position. An apparent victory by
one of the Islamist factions occupying northern Mali over
a well-armed Tuareg rebel militia that has offered to join
counterterrorist operations has not inspired confidence in
the ultimate success of the under-size AU force. [1]
Though January 2013 had long been suggested as the starting
date of an international military intervention, UN Special
Envoy for the Sahel Region, former Italian premier Romano
Prodi, said during a visit to Rabat that it would be September
2013 before an intervention could begin (AFP, November 20).
With the intervention receding into the distant future, many
refugees from the fighting in northern Mali are returning
to their homes, unhappy with Islamist rule but unwilling
to wait nearly a year or more for assistance in driving the
Islamists out of the region.
Nigeria’s decision to pledge only 600 troops to the projected
force of 3,300 would seem to imperil a project that was
designed to be built around a larger Nigerian core (Daily
Trust, [Lagos], November 22). Chad, a non-ECOWAS
country, has apparently agreed to join the intervention
force, but the composition of the rest of the force has yet to
be revealed (L’Indépendant [Bamako], November 12). The
EU has dampened earlier expectations that European troops
might supplement African forces in the mission. According
to EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove:
“The European Council held on October 18 and 19 came
out in favor of a military mission to train the Malian Army.
There is no question of European intervention as such. It is
up to Mali to win the north back” (Le Monde, November
12).
Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci reminded
concerned parties that: “Algeria is not convinced that an
exclusively military solution would bring peace and unity to
Mali. Our wish is to convince our partners that the military
path must be oriented toward the fight against terrorism. It
must be accompanied by a political process in the form of a
dialogue between the Malian protagonists” (Jeune Afrique,
November 14). In neighboring Mauritania, national
assembly president Messaoud Ould Boulkheir warned of the
fallout from an intervention: “[Mali] is like a volcano about
to erupt… If this volcano awakens, it will dump incandescent
ashes over its neighbors” (AFP, November 12). A November
14 communiqué from the Tunisian president’s office warned
against an “uncalculated military intervention in Mali”
that could turn the Maghreb into a “hotbed of tension” and
threaten the security of the Maghreb states (Tunisian Press
Agency, November 15).
Libya delivered its opinion on a military intervention in Mali
via Mahfouth Rahim, director in charge of African affairs at

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
the Libyan Foreign Ministry: “We Libyans believe that we
should not focus on military solutions at the moment to
avert escalation which might lead us to what happened in
Afghanistan… The military solution would exacerbate the
crisis as the Tuareg rebels and other Islamist groups would
be forced to seek refuge in other countries such as Libya”
(PANA Online [Dakar], November 14).
Former Malian Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
(1994-2000, parliamentary speaker, 2002-2007) is among
those who have urged caution, noting that the Malian army
needs time to rebuild to counter tactics likely to be used
by the Islamist militants: “The population will be used as a
human shield. Hence the need for extreme care in planning
and skill in implementing an intervention. Military logistics
and intelligence will be crucial with a view to knowing
exactly whom we are dealing with, before saying: ‘Let’s go in,
let’s go in!’” (Le Monde, November 4).
In the north, meanwhile, the defeat of the secular Tuareg rebel
Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) by
Islamist forces demonstrated the latter’s military strength
and the readiness of the Islamist groups to cooperate in the
field. During what has been described as a MNLA attempt
to retake Gao, fighting broke out with forces belonging to
the Islamist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJWA) near Asango on November 16. Asongo is 120
miles west of Menaka, where the MNLA was attempting to
create a base for counterterrorist operations (Jeune Afrique,
November 18; AFP, November 20). Locals suggested that
many of those resisting the MUJWA attack in Asongo were
not MNLA members, including local Tuareg political leader,
Alwabegat ag Slakatou and six of his men who were reported
among the dead (AFP, November 20).
AQIM was reported to have sent some 300 reinforcements
to Gao from Timbuktu, roughly 185 miles to the west
(AFP, November 17; Jeune Afrique, November 18). The
reinforcements were said to belong to AQIM’s Katibat al-
Mulathamin (Veiled Brigade) and the Katibat Osama bin
Laden, led by Abu Walid Sahrawi.
Though MNLA spokesmen described only light casualties
in the clash and described the action as “an initial success,”
reports from the area and Malian security sources described
dozens killed in “a real bloodbath” (Tout sur l’Algérie,
November 17; AFP, November 20). Both sides presented
casualty figures that were likely inflated, with the MNLA
claiming 65 AQIM and MUJWA fighters killed, while
MUJWA announced the death of over 100 members of the
MNLA (AFP, November 20). The MNLA’s chief-of-staff,
Machkanani ag Balla, suffered a serious wound while leading
21
his men in the fight. MUJWA spokesman Walid Abu Sahrawi
said the movement was dedicated to destroying the MNLA:
“In Azawad, we are going to pursue the MNLA wherever
they may still be found. We control the situation” (Jeune
Afrique, November 18). Northern Mali’s three northern
provinces are now conveniently divided between the three
Islamist movements—Gao in MUJWA, Timbuktu in AQIM
and Ansar al-Din in Kidal. The MNLA was expelled from
Gao in June and now operates in rural areas only.
According to MNLA spokesman Hama ag Sid Ahmad,
MUJWA forces setting up new bases on the outskirts of Gao
have been joined by AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar
(who appears to be at odds lately with the rest of the AQIM
leadership—see Terrorism Monitor Brief, November 15)
and various Pakistanis, Egyptians and Moroccans (Tout sur
l’Algérie, November 16).
A spokesman for the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar al-Din
claimed that movement leader Iyad ag Ghali had tried
to prevent the fighting between MUJWA and the MNLA
and remained on the sidelines when the conflict began. In
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré is
now holding joint talks with Ansar al-Din and the MNLA,
rather than meet the two rebel Tuareg groups separately, as
had been the case so far (AFP, November 16). According
to an Ansar al-Din spokesman, if talks go the right way,
“one can foresee ways and means in which one can get rid
of terrorism, drug-trafficking and foreign groups” (AFP,
November 14; PANA Online [Dakar], November 18).
Note
1. The intervention force briefly took the name “Mission
de la CEDEAO [Communauté Economique des États de
l’Afrique de l’Ouest] au Mali” (MICENA - ECOWAS Mission
in Mali) before expanding its base by adopting the new
name “Mission Internationale de Soutien au Mali” (MISMA
- International Support Mission to Mali).
Originally Published as “International Community Cools to
Intervention as Islamists Defeat Tuareg in Northern Mali” in
Terrorism Monitor on November 30, 2012.
Outlook

Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u December 2012
Jacob Zenn
As 2012 comes to close, an intervention in northern Mali
appears to be increasingly likely. However, the composition
of the intervening forces remains unclear, with the current
regime in power in Mali demanding no foreign “boots
on the ground” and Mali, France, the United States and
ECOWAS yet to see eye-to-eye on how best to implement
the intervention. The key to success for the intervention will
have as much to do with the composition and strategy of
the forces as the ability of Mali’s neighbors to close off their
borders with Mali to fleeing Islamist militants. By forcing
the Islamist militants to engage in conventional combat and
reducing their mobility, the intervening forces can negate the
Islamist militants’ key capabilities. AQIM fighters have, for
example, used their mobility and desert hideouts to master
smuggling and kidnapping operations in the Sahel region
and to carry out occasional terrorist attacks, but their fighters
are no match for a conventional force.
Even without an intervention in northern Mali, it appears
that the Islamists will encounter troubles in managing
the populations in the cities they have taken. Without
experienced economists in their ranks, any semblance of
political legitimacy or international relationships, their
ability to govern in the long-term and hold on to the
population is tenuous. A harsh interpretation of Islamic Law,
which amounts to ruling by the power of the gun, may lead
local citizens to rebel against the Islamists, whom they may
see as an occupying force. What could spare the Islamists,
however, is the crafting of a locally oriented ideology, like
MUJWA’s (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa),
which takes into account local histories and narratives. The
international community will have a key role to play in the
intervention even if no foreign boots are on the ground. Yet
they too will have to carefully manage not only the battle
strategy, but also the narrative of the intervention in order
to avoid being perceived by West African Muslims as an
invading force.
22