the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
cultivation of an attitude of indifference. Indifference, for Weigel, is a principled nonparticipation in the earthly ecclesiastical body, in which Weigel consents to the selflimitation of a life lived in secret for the sake of other people—for his family, for his congregation, for other like-minded Christians, for the unity of the truly catholic Church. Weigel wrote admiringly of the Holy Family persecuted by Herod in Bethlehem, who slipped away quietly at night, to give the infant Christ time to perform his earthly mission. 700 Unlike the Holy Family, Weigel could not slip away because, as an ordained minister of the Lutheran Church, he had put himself in a position of responsibility, ministering to his congregation; though he had lost faith in the church he belonged to, he nonetheless felt bound by his oath. He could, however, slip away in spirit—which is what I have discussed under the term indifference in this dissertation. One form of anticonfessional indifference Weigel is interested in is Eckhartian Gelassenheit, the attainment of which silences human intellectual faculties, preventing them from stubbornly inventing subjective interpretations of the Bible, and then, once they have been hardened into doctrinal statements, foisting these onto other Christians. Instead, the soul is united to God, and allows God to interpret God’s own self in man. The indifference of Gelassenheit can be attained only because God is indwelling in man in the ground of the soul, the most precious legacy given to Adam at creation. Apophasis is another form of anticonfessional indifference that plays a key role in Weigel’s works, because it offered him a way of speaking about God that does not produce doctrine. Unlike the writing of doctrine, which is a way of doing theology that 700 Valentin Weigel, Kirchen- und Hauspostille, in Sämtliche Schriften, ed. Horst Pfefferl, vol. 12.1, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 2010), 71-77. 262
parcels God, who by rights is supremely One, into a series of articles and propositions that can be analyzed and catechized. Moreover, Lutheran theology functioned on the fundamental division of God’s Law from Gospel, what was referred to as orthotomia. In Weigel’s view, God’s unity is further fractured when assent to these propositions is made the condition of salvation—how could God ever be irrevocably lost to man if man relates to God simply by virtue of existing? By using indifferent signification, Weigel thus declines to consider doctrine as either an important activity for the church or indeed a condition of salvation, and his writing thus becomes an irenic—a way of using language that brings about peace. Because Weigel considered God to be radically unknowable and unnameable, truth about God always slips away in the process of articulating it, and as a result, neither doctrine nor Scripture can function as the basis of a truly Christian church: no institution can say what is true and what is not. Salvation cannot be allocated on the basis of spoken or written words because it must be universally and naturally available, otherwise God must be cruel for denying it to some by not letting them hear his saving words, and thus his saving Word. The church cannot be only in Rome or in Wittenberg, and so it must be both nowhere and everywhere—which is another way of saying that people are not in fact sinners (not really, even though they do indeed do evil), and that they have no need of religion because they always have God. In discussing Weigel’s writings, I have shown that the idea of indifference, though it is a term has negative connotations for many modern readers, is in fact key to understanding his oeuvre as a whole. Rather than simply dismissing Weigel’s failure to speak out about his divergent religious beliefs as cowardice, unravelling the complex 263
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- Page 269 and 270: Appendix • The Works of Valentin
- Page 271 and 272: BIBLIOGRAPHY Abad, J. M. (1999). Th
- Page 273 and 274: Chenu O.P., M.-D. (1968). In M.-D.
- Page 275 and 276: Eckhart, M. (1993). Werke I (Vol. 1
- Page 277 and 278: Israel, A. (1888). M. Valentin Weig
- Page 279 and 280: MacCulloch, D. (2010). Christianity
- Page 281 and 282: Payne, R. J. (Ed.). (1981). Meister
- Page 283 and 284: Schindling, A., & Ziegler, W. (1990
- Page 285 and 286: Verkamp, B. J. (1975). The Limits u
parcels God, who by rights is supremely One, into a series <strong>of</strong> articles and propositions<br />
th<strong>at</strong> can be analyzed and c<strong>at</strong>echized. Moreover, Lu<strong>the</strong>ran <strong>the</strong>ology functioned on <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental division <strong>of</strong> God’s Law from Gospel, wh<strong>at</strong> was referred to as orthotomia. In<br />
Weigel’s view, God’s unity is fur<strong>the</strong>r fractured when assent to <strong>the</strong>se propositions is made<br />
<strong>the</strong> condition <strong>of</strong> salv<strong>at</strong>ion—how could God ever be irrevocably lost to man if man rel<strong>at</strong>es<br />
to God simply by virtue <strong>of</strong> existing? By using indifferent signific<strong>at</strong>ion, Weigel thus<br />
declines to consider doctrine as ei<strong>the</strong>r an important activity for <strong>the</strong> church or indeed a<br />
condition <strong>of</strong> salv<strong>at</strong>ion, and his writing thus becomes an irenic—a way <strong>of</strong> using language<br />
th<strong>at</strong> brings about peace.<br />
Because Weigel considered God to be radically unknowable and unnameable,<br />
truth about God always slips away in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> articul<strong>at</strong>ing it, and as a result, nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
doctrine nor Scripture can function as <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> a truly Christian church: no institution<br />
can say wh<strong>at</strong> is true and wh<strong>at</strong> is not. Salv<strong>at</strong>ion cannot be alloc<strong>at</strong>ed on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> spoken<br />
or written words because it must be universally and n<strong>at</strong>urally available, o<strong>the</strong>rwise God<br />
must be cruel for denying it to some by not letting <strong>the</strong>m hear his saving words, and thus<br />
his saving Word. The church cannot be only in Rome or in Wittenberg, and so it must be<br />
both nowhere and everywhere—which is ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> saying th<strong>at</strong> people are not in fact<br />
sinners (not really, even though <strong>the</strong>y do indeed do evil), and th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong>y have no need <strong>of</strong><br />
religion because <strong>the</strong>y always have God.<br />
In discussing Weigel’s writings, I have shown th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> indifference,<br />
though it is a term has neg<strong>at</strong>ive connot<strong>at</strong>ions for many modern readers, is in fact key to<br />
understanding his oeuvre as a whole. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than simply dismissing Weigel’s failure to<br />
speak out about his divergent religious beliefs as cowardice, unravelling <strong>the</strong> complex<br />
263