the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
heretical (i.e. he holds divergent beliefs on one matter or another), but rather necessarily so, because it is opposed to the very structure and process that produces heretics in the first place. Seen from a structural perspective, heresy is not a quality that naturally inheres in certain ideas, but rather arises the moment another idea is proclaimed orthodox. As such, a heretic does not exist per se, but rather only because he or she has been made one by a certain church body. 696 Weigel was acutely aware of how ideas create social organizations, and, conversely, how social organizations create ideas. In the case of institutional churches, the ideas in question are contained in that church’s doctrinal documents, a doctrine that is articulated and administered by a group of organizers (priests and pastors). Orthodoxy, then, simply means the doctrine particular to that group of organizers. 697 Moreover, heresy can itself become orthodoxy if heresy manages to attain an organized form, sustained by the activity of the splinter group of organizers— and it can then pursue other opposing ideas as heresy, and so on ad infinitum. This schema is, at the very least, a good description of the religious history of the sixteenth century, where the initial schism that Luther provoked did not bring about the once-and-for-all purification of the church that Luther imagined and desired, but rather proved to be only the beginning of a series of schisms. Weigel saw this dynamic very clearly, and dismissed the Formula for creating a false peace by force rather than real peace by consensus. Consequently, he struggled to break through the religious disputes that so destabilized Saxony in the late sixteenth century. However, Weigel makes clear that any attempt to come up with another ultimately authoritiative (and ultimately persuasive) credo or confessional document would only aggravate the situation rather 696 Leszek Kolakowski, Chrétiens sans Église: La Conscience religieuse et le lien confessionel au XVIIe siècle, trans. Anna Posner (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1969), 23. 697 Ibid, 70. 260
than resolve it, because the problem was not that the doctrinal statements produced until that point were in some way defective, but rather the fact of producing them in the first place was mistaken. In other words, Weigel didn’t think it was necessary to bring his material reality into line with his mental life, and so figured out a way of accommodating his divergent beliefs to the ecclesiastical reality that was his milieu. Whereas many historians writing about Weigel read his theology with admiration but dismiss him personally as a coward, one historian, Steven Ozment, attempts to rescue a revolutionary desire in Weigel by imagining that Weigel wrote with the hope that one day, his ideas would be welcomed by the church and acted upon. This revolutionary desire is deduced precisely from Weigel’s interest in Gelassenheit that renders the world utterly irrelevant: “one is above popes and kings, beyond sacraments and laws, immune to worldly praise and condemnation,” such that “even if the experience (or the theory) does not issue in dissent, reform, or revolutionary activity, it uniquely drives home the ideological prerequisite for such, viz. an understanding of the penultimate character of all worldly power and authority.” 698 Thus, “medieval mystical writings uniquely contain the raw material of dissent,” which early modern dissenters (including Weigel, in Ozment’s estimation) “were most adept at exploiting.” 699 However, Weigel did not express a faith to which any future era would in fact be receptive—but rather that all churches necessarily devolve into violence and repressive sectarianism. In light of his pessimistic outlook about ecclesiastical institutions, Weigel proposes that the highest form of religious devotion is not martyrdom but rather the 698 Steven E. Ozment, Mysticism and Dissent: Religious Ideology and Social Protest in the Sixteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 12-13. 699 Ibid. 261
- Page 213 and 214: Names, as the title suggests, is ba
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- Page 269 and 270: Appendix • The Works of Valentin
- Page 271 and 272: BIBLIOGRAPHY Abad, J. M. (1999). Th
- Page 273 and 274: Chenu O.P., M.-D. (1968). In M.-D.
- Page 275 and 276: Eckhart, M. (1993). Werke I (Vol. 1
- Page 277 and 278: Israel, A. (1888). M. Valentin Weig
- Page 279 and 280: MacCulloch, D. (2010). Christianity
- Page 281 and 282: Payne, R. J. (Ed.). (1981). Meister
- Page 283 and 284: Schindling, A., & Ziegler, W. (1990
- Page 285 and 286: Verkamp, B. J. (1975). The Limits u
heretical (i.e. he holds divergent beliefs on one m<strong>at</strong>ter or ano<strong>the</strong>r), but ra<strong>the</strong>r necessarily<br />
so, because it is opposed to <strong>the</strong> very structure and process th<strong>at</strong> produces heretics in <strong>the</strong><br />
first place. Seen from a structural perspective, heresy is not a quality th<strong>at</strong> n<strong>at</strong>urally<br />
inheres in certain ideas, but ra<strong>the</strong>r arises <strong>the</strong> moment ano<strong>the</strong>r idea is proclaimed orthodox.<br />
As such, a heretic does not exist per se, but ra<strong>the</strong>r only because he or she has been made<br />
one by a certain church body. 696 Weigel was acutely aware <strong>of</strong> how ideas cre<strong>at</strong>e social<br />
organiz<strong>at</strong>ions, and, conversely, how social organiz<strong>at</strong>ions cre<strong>at</strong>e ideas. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong><br />
institutional churches, <strong>the</strong> ideas in question are contained in th<strong>at</strong> church’s doctrinal<br />
documents, a doctrine th<strong>at</strong> is articul<strong>at</strong>ed and administered by a group <strong>of</strong> organizers<br />
(priests and pastors). Orthodoxy, <strong>the</strong>n, simply means <strong>the</strong> doctrine particular to th<strong>at</strong> group<br />
<strong>of</strong> organizers. 697 Moreover, heresy can itself become orthodoxy if heresy manages to<br />
<strong>at</strong>tain an organized form, sustained by <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> splinter group <strong>of</strong> organizers—<br />
and it can <strong>the</strong>n pursue o<strong>the</strong>r opposing ideas as heresy, and so on ad infinitum.<br />
This schema is, <strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> very least, a good description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> religious history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
sixteenth century, where <strong>the</strong> initial schism th<strong>at</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r provoked did not bring about <strong>the</strong><br />
once-and-for-all purific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> church th<strong>at</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r imagined and desired, but ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
proved to be only <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> schisms. Weigel saw this dynamic very<br />
clearly, and dismissed <strong>the</strong> Formula for cre<strong>at</strong>ing a false peace by force ra<strong>the</strong>r than real<br />
peace by consensus. Consequently, he struggled to break through <strong>the</strong> religious disputes<br />
th<strong>at</strong> so destabilized Saxony in <strong>the</strong> l<strong>at</strong>e sixteenth century. However, Weigel makes clear<br />
th<strong>at</strong> any <strong>at</strong>tempt to come up with ano<strong>the</strong>r ultim<strong>at</strong>ely authoriti<strong>at</strong>ive (and ultim<strong>at</strong>ely<br />
persuasive) credo or confessional document would only aggrav<strong>at</strong>e <strong>the</strong> situ<strong>at</strong>ion ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
696 Leszek Kolakowski, Chrétiens sans Église: La Conscience religieuse et le lien confessionel au XVIIe<br />
siècle, trans. Anna Posner (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1969), 23.<br />
697 Ibid, 70.<br />
260