the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
CONCLUSION • INDIFFERENCE AND HERESY The writings of Meister Eckhart and Dionysius the Areopagite, two of the principle writers from the tradition of negative theology, were not, in fact, lost to history between the Middle Ages and the modern era, but were indeed read in the sixteenth century. Moreover, both authors had a significant and substantial influence on the writer who is the subject of this dissertation, Valentin Weigel. Weigel was interested in Eckhart and Dionysius because both writers express ideas—Gelassenheit in the case of Eckhart, apophasis in the case of Dionysius—that can be described under the heading of what I have termed indifference. Both Gelassenheit and apophasis are rooted in a strong belief in the absolute unity of God and therefore God’s radical unknowability and radical unnameability. Gelassenheit is the affective correlate of a belief in divine unity. Rather than recommending ascetic practices or suffering to his spiritual charges, Eckhart taught that the soul should strive to attain a state of complete detachment that will bring about full union with God. In Gelassenheit, the soul must surrender more than its attachment to material things and to self-will, and must, above all, give up its attachment to any knowledge, image, names or concept about God. The soul must even forgo calling God “good” or “truth,” because even these lofty concepts belong to the realm of created things and therefore do not do justice to God as he was before the act of creation, the ground of 256
all being. In relinquishing any created thing so as not to fracture God’s perfect unity, Gelassenheit is about achieving a state of indifference that mirrors the Godhead’s own undifferentiation. Apophasis refers to the breakdown of speech that must occur when one tries to apply created language to God. Whereas Eckhartian Gelassenheit refers primarily to the union between God and soul, Dionysian apophasis grows out of his conviction that all created things participate in God. It was therefore appropriate to name God using language drawn from all creation, but that because these created things are by definition imperfect and limited, these names must also then be denied of God. In a final step, one must also deny that the denials say anything more true about God, which leaves nothing to do but lapse into silence. On this account, because God is both unnameable and omninameable, any name for God is just as correct or incorrect as any other: created language, in other words, is applied to God indifferently. Indifference was not an abstract interest for Weigel but a way of answering an urgent question with important practical consequences for him: is one obliged to risk martyrdom by speaking up and defending one’s beliefs? Weigel asked this question because, in Saxony in the sixteenth century, Church and State had joined forces and attempted to purify doctrine by publishing doctrinal statements requiring subscription, backed up by secular power for those who refused to sign. Weigel disagreed with both the practice of producing confessional documents and with much of the theological content of the document he was asked to sign, the Formula Concordiae—but he signed it all the same. A central theme in Weigel’s writings is how to relate to a church in which he was an ordained minister, one whose theology had formed him, and one that he had 257
- Page 209 and 210: apart, he suggested that true Chris
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- Page 269 and 270: Appendix • The Works of Valentin
- Page 271 and 272: BIBLIOGRAPHY Abad, J. M. (1999). Th
- Page 273 and 274: Chenu O.P., M.-D. (1968). In M.-D.
- Page 275 and 276: Eckhart, M. (1993). Werke I (Vol. 1
- Page 277 and 278: Israel, A. (1888). M. Valentin Weig
- Page 279 and 280: MacCulloch, D. (2010). Christianity
- Page 281 and 282: Payne, R. J. (Ed.). (1981). Meister
- Page 283 and 284: Schindling, A., & Ziegler, W. (1990
- Page 285 and 286: Verkamp, B. J. (1975). The Limits u
all being. In relinquishing any cre<strong>at</strong>ed thing so as not to fracture God’s perfect unity,<br />
Gelassenheit is about achieving a st<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> indifference th<strong>at</strong> mirrors <strong>the</strong> Godhead’s own<br />
undifferenti<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Apophasis refers to <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>of</strong> speech th<strong>at</strong> must occur when one tries to<br />
apply cre<strong>at</strong>ed language to God. Whereas Eckhartian Gelassenheit refers primarily to <strong>the</strong><br />
union between God and soul, Dionysian apophasis grows out <strong>of</strong> his conviction th<strong>at</strong> all<br />
cre<strong>at</strong>ed things particip<strong>at</strong>e in God. It was <strong>the</strong>refore appropri<strong>at</strong>e to name God using<br />
language drawn from all cre<strong>at</strong>ion, but th<strong>at</strong> because <strong>the</strong>se cre<strong>at</strong>ed things are by definition<br />
imperfect and limited, <strong>the</strong>se names must also <strong>the</strong>n be denied <strong>of</strong> God. In a final step, one<br />
must also deny th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> denials say anything more true about God, which leaves nothing<br />
to do but lapse into silence. On this account, because God is both unnameable and<br />
omninameable, any name for God is just as correct or incorrect as any o<strong>the</strong>r: cre<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
language, in o<strong>the</strong>r words, is applied to God indifferently.<br />
Indifference was not an abstract interest for Weigel but a way <strong>of</strong> answering an<br />
urgent question with important practical consequences for him: is one obliged to risk<br />
martyrdom by speaking up and defending one’s beliefs? Weigel asked this question<br />
because, in Saxony in <strong>the</strong> sixteenth century, Church and St<strong>at</strong>e had joined forces and<br />
<strong>at</strong>tempted to purify doctrine by publishing doctrinal st<strong>at</strong>ements requiring subscription,<br />
backed up by secular power for those who refused to sign. Weigel disagreed with both<br />
<strong>the</strong> practice <strong>of</strong> producing confessional documents and with much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological<br />
content <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> document he was asked to sign, <strong>the</strong> Formula Concordiae—but he signed it<br />
all <strong>the</strong> same. A central <strong>the</strong>me in Weigel’s writings is how to rel<strong>at</strong>e to a church in which<br />
he was an ordained minister, one whose <strong>the</strong>ology had formed him, and one th<strong>at</strong> he had<br />
257