the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
God is neither here nor there (“nec est hic et ibi”), nor is he everywhere (“non enim esset ubique”); he is neither today nor tomorrow (“nec est hodie aut cras”), nor is he eternity (“non enim esset aeternus”). Weigel, in fact, explicitly acknowledges at this point that he had read Dionysius and, in particular, had taken his teaching on negating the negations to heart: “Coincidunt et vere affirmatnur de DEO, DEUS lux est. DEUS est tenebrae. Et Affirmationes et Negationes, in divinis non contrariuntur sibi invicem. Sed de his consule Dionysius Areopagitam, De Mystica Theologia.” Referring his reader to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology Weigel comments that affirmations and negations do not contradict each other when referring to God. 613 Moreover, whereas Boethius strives to refer the imperfect shadow of particular goods upwards to their perfect exemplar, Weigel (via Dionysius) is keen to emphasize the reverse, namely that the perfect exemplar is nevertheless in all particular things, even if imperfectly. We have encountered this passage before, in which Dionysius argues that God is both perfectly transcendent (“in his total unity he rises above all limitation”) and perfectly immanent (“nothing in the world lacks its share of the One”). 614 God, as Weigel paraphrases Dionysius, “est unum, non collectione ex pluribus, sed unitissima et fontali unitate unum est, et ipsum est ante omne unum, et ante omnem multitudinem.” 615 Taking up Dionysius’ analogy, Weigel writes that all numbers, no matter how big or how small, are all based on the number one: “nihil existentium est expers unius, ut numerus omnis unitatis est particeps, et binarius dicitur...unus et denarius, et dimidia, cujusvis rei pars 613 Dionysius closes the MT with the idea in question: “[The Cause of all] is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial.” MT, 1048B. 614 DN, 977B and 977C. 615 Weigel, De vita beata, 58. 226
dicitur una.” 616 The stress that Weigel lays on the participation of all things in the One, as is the case in Dionysius, is in service of a belief in the real and unbreakeable bond between creature and Creator. As he notes, not even a gnat or a fly could exist outside of God. 617 The basis for this participation is Weigel’s creation narrative, which, like Dionysius’ narrative, imagines a series of processions flowing outward from the One and simultaneously leading back to it. The universe that God created, according to Weigel, is three-fold (“ita tres sunt Coeli seu Mundi”, “TRes numerantur Mundi”). 618 The highest world (“Supremus”) is the incomprehensible God, followed by the middle world (variously called Heaven, Medius or intellectualia) which is the domain of the angels, and finally the lowest one, the material and sensible world (Machina visibilis or sensibilibus). 619 However, the various processions (or worlds, as Weigel calls them) remain inextricably bound together, tied to each other both above and below, as well as to their creator: the Angels, for instance, contain the material world enfolded within them (“totam mundi machinam in se complicat”) and God in turn contains the angels and the created world enfolded in his abyss (“omnia in suo abysso complicet”). 620 The mutual enfolding of all levels of creation means that man at least can both ascend and descend the processions down to the lowest reaches of the material world and up to the angels in the intellectual world—and even beyond matter, mind and anything created, to union with God himself in the highest world. 616 Weigel, De vita beata. The relevant passage in Dionysius is DN, 977C. 617 Weigel, De luce et caligine divina, 115. “Deinde dicitur Lux, quod omnia ex tenebris, seu ex nihilo in lucem vocet, et omnia Entia de non esse, ad esse producat, hinc vocatur in literis pater luminum, quod omnia Entia dependeant a DEO, et extra DEUM, nec culex aut musca degere possit.” 618 Weigel, De vita beata, 61. 619 Ibid. 620 Ibid. 227
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- Page 275 and 276: Eckhart, M. (1993). Werke I (Vol. 1
- Page 277 and 278: Israel, A. (1888). M. Valentin Weig
- Page 279 and 280: MacCulloch, D. (2010). Christianity
dicitur una.” 616 The stress th<strong>at</strong> Weigel lays on <strong>the</strong> particip<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> all things in <strong>the</strong> One, as<br />
is <strong>the</strong> case in Dionysius, is in service <strong>of</strong> a belief in <strong>the</strong> real and unbreakeable bond<br />
between cre<strong>at</strong>ure and Cre<strong>at</strong>or. As he notes, not even a gn<strong>at</strong> or a fly could exist outside <strong>of</strong><br />
God. 617 The basis for this particip<strong>at</strong>ion is Weigel’s cre<strong>at</strong>ion narr<strong>at</strong>ive, which, like<br />
Dionysius’ narr<strong>at</strong>ive, imagines a series <strong>of</strong> processions flowing outward from <strong>the</strong> One and<br />
simultaneously leading back to it. The universe th<strong>at</strong> God cre<strong>at</strong>ed, according to Weigel, is<br />
three-fold (“ita tres sunt Coeli seu Mundi”, “TRes numerantur Mundi”). 618 The highest<br />
world (“Supremus”) is <strong>the</strong> incomprehensible God, followed by <strong>the</strong> middle world<br />
(variously called Heaven, Medius or intellectualia) which is <strong>the</strong> domain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> angels,<br />
and finally <strong>the</strong> lowest one, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>at</strong>erial and sensible world (Machina visibilis or<br />
sensibilibus). 619 However, <strong>the</strong> various processions (or worlds, as Weigel calls <strong>the</strong>m)<br />
remain inextricably bound toge<strong>the</strong>r, tied to each o<strong>the</strong>r both above and below, as well as to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir cre<strong>at</strong>or: <strong>the</strong> Angels, for instance, contain <strong>the</strong> m<strong>at</strong>erial world enfolded within <strong>the</strong>m<br />
(“totam mundi machinam in se complic<strong>at</strong>”) and God in turn contains <strong>the</strong> angels and <strong>the</strong><br />
cre<strong>at</strong>ed world enfolded in his abyss (“omnia in suo abysso complicet”). 620 The mutual<br />
enfolding <strong>of</strong> all levels <strong>of</strong> cre<strong>at</strong>ion means th<strong>at</strong> man <strong>at</strong> least can both ascend and descend<br />
<strong>the</strong> processions down to <strong>the</strong> lowest reaches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>at</strong>erial world and up to <strong>the</strong> angels in<br />
<strong>the</strong> intellectual world—and even beyond m<strong>at</strong>ter, mind and anything cre<strong>at</strong>ed, to union<br />
with God himself in <strong>the</strong> highest world.<br />
616 Weigel, De vita be<strong>at</strong>a. The relevant passage in Dionysius is DN, 977C.<br />
617 Weigel, De luce et caligine divina, 115. “Deinde dicitur Lux, quod omnia ex tenebris, seu ex nihilo in<br />
lucem vocet, et omnia Entia de non esse, ad esse produc<strong>at</strong>, hinc voc<strong>at</strong>ur in literis p<strong>at</strong>er luminum, quod<br />
omnia Entia dependeant a DEO, et extra DEUM, nec culex aut musca degere possit.”<br />
618 Weigel, De vita be<strong>at</strong>a, 61.<br />
619 Ibid.<br />
620 Ibid.<br />
227
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