the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
Of course, Weigel does not turn to Eckhart because he thinks that, in a state of Gelassenheit, Christians might thereby receive any more accurate doctrinal information with which to win any doctrinal argument. Indeed, the conception of Gelassenheit that Weigel absorbed from Eckhart could not properly serve as a plumb line or a yardstick to judge true doctrine. As I described earlier, Gelassenheit leads beyond language, beyond distinction and beyond knowledge—hardly a firm foundation for a confessional document, since there would be nothing to write about and no words with which to write it. Moreover, if God is without distinction, it would be impossible to describe God in a series of articles of faith, since language necessarily introduces distinctions that would mar God’s perfect unity. That is, Weigel is not trying to get hold of a bigger stick with which to beat his enemies, so to speak, but rather he is seeking to disengage from the battle entirely. Weigel makes it clear that this is the only way for people to achieve concord and agreement, by the ultimate cessation of their minds and eyes—not by some kind of consensus reached by open discussion or by a better knowledge of facts, least of all by a document to be signed under duress. 327 Weigel repositions Eckhart’s idea of the spiritually poor person surrendering his individuality in a confessional context, so that it becomes a way of circumventing a Lutheran ecclesiastical institution that, in his eyes, had become as corrupt as the Catholic one it was meant to replace. Furthermore, because illumination from God occurs by replacing the self with God, not by the self receiving anything, all believers receive the same illumination and therefore all believers believe the same thing—and furthermore, no one person is especially qualified to testify to the truth, since all believers are equally illuminated. In practical terms, a simple layperson has as much claim to preaching the 327 Weigel, Griff, 50. 122
truth as an educated theologian or an ordained minister. Collapsing the duality between subject and object, and between self and God (in the spirit of Eckhartian Gelassenheit), eliminates any disagreement about doctrine or Scriptural interpretation by definition, because there are no individuals to disagree, and nothing about which to disagree—there is only God’s serene concord with Himself. Confessional documents were not the only written words that were relegated as insignificant by Weigel’s understanding of the Gelassenheit attained in supernatural cognition; Scripture is the next document Weigel targets. Scripture (so precious to Luther) is demoted to mere paper, and worse, Weigel writes that the Bible is symptomatic of sin and would not have existed had Adam not taken the apple from Eve. 328 Weigel’s professed skepticism about the role of written books in theological matters leaves him in rather sparse company, given both the importance of the written word in the centurieslong Christian tradition as a whole, as well as the emphasis in the Reformation movement on the return to Scripture in its many guises (translating and editing the text, private Bible reading, Bible reading in Church services, and preaching) that placed the spoken and written word at the very centre of Christian life, both individual and communal. The foundation of Weigel’s theory about biblical interpretation is to be found in his epistemological dictum “die erkenntnis fliesset nicht aus dem gegenwurff sondern aus dem auge,” which in turn depends on his speculations about man’s two-fold conception and God’s continued presence in the ground of the soul. As a consequence, books are no longer the cause of knowledge but rather demoted to being the external manifestation of 328 After all, the Angels in Heaven do not need to read the Bible, or go to Church. Weigel repeats this argument often throughout his work, but see also for instance Valentin Weigel, Von Betrachtung des Lebens Christi, in Sämtliche Schriften, ed. Horst Pfefferl, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog, 1997), 25. 123
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Of course, Weigel does not turn to Eckhart because he thinks th<strong>at</strong>, in a st<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Gelassenheit, Christians might <strong>the</strong>reby receive any more accur<strong>at</strong>e doctrinal inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
with which to win any doctrinal argument. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> conception <strong>of</strong> Gelassenheit th<strong>at</strong><br />
Weigel absorbed from Eckhart could not properly serve as a plumb line or a yardstick to<br />
judge true doctrine. As I described earlier, Gelassenheit leads beyond language, beyond<br />
distinction and beyond knowledge—hardly a firm found<strong>at</strong>ion for a confessional<br />
document, since <strong>the</strong>re would be nothing to write about and no words with which to write<br />
it. Moreover, if God is without distinction, it would be impossible to describe God in a<br />
series <strong>of</strong> articles <strong>of</strong> faith, since language necessarily introduces distinctions th<strong>at</strong> would<br />
mar God’s perfect unity. Th<strong>at</strong> is, Weigel is not trying to get hold <strong>of</strong> a bigger stick with<br />
which to be<strong>at</strong> his enemies, so to speak, but ra<strong>the</strong>r he is seeking to disengage from <strong>the</strong><br />
b<strong>at</strong>tle entirely. Weigel makes it clear th<strong>at</strong> this is <strong>the</strong> only way for people to achieve<br />
concord and agreement, by <strong>the</strong> ultim<strong>at</strong>e cess<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir minds and eyes—not by some<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> consensus reached by open discussion or by a better knowledge <strong>of</strong> facts, least <strong>of</strong><br />
all by a document to be signed under duress. 327<br />
Weigel repositions Eckhart’s idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritually poor person surrendering his<br />
individuality in a confessional context, so th<strong>at</strong> it becomes a way <strong>of</strong> circumventing a<br />
Lu<strong>the</strong>ran ecclesiastical institution th<strong>at</strong>, in his eyes, had become as corrupt as <strong>the</strong> C<strong>at</strong>holic<br />
one it was meant to replace. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, because illumin<strong>at</strong>ion from God occurs by<br />
replacing <strong>the</strong> self with God, not by <strong>the</strong> self receiving anything, all believers receive <strong>the</strong><br />
same illumin<strong>at</strong>ion and <strong>the</strong>refore all believers believe <strong>the</strong> same thing—and fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<br />
no one person is especially qualified to testify to <strong>the</strong> truth, since all believers are equally<br />
illumin<strong>at</strong>ed. In practical terms, a simple layperson has as much claim to preaching <strong>the</strong><br />
327 Weigel, Griff, 50.<br />
122
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