the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
information found in books is not absorbed by the knowing subject; instead, pre-existing knowledge implanted by God “flows out” into books, which stand not as the source of human knowledge but rather as externalized monuments (excretions, almost) of this preexisting knowledge. 309 Weigel’s discussion circles back to books and reading many times in the course of this treatise, though admittedly focusing on the shortcomings of the written word. In fact, it might be more accurate to describe Der güldene Griff not as a treatise on epistemology but rather a treatise on hermeneutics and exegesis, given that every step of Weigel’s discussion of perception leads into an assessment of the implications it has for one’s reading practice. As for Weigel’s epistemological reflections proper, Weigel distinguishes between natural cognition and supernatural cognition. Natural cognition, he writes, relies on a distinction between the knowing subject and the object known—between the Auge and the Gegenwurff. Beginning with the object known (the Gegenwurff), natural knowledge can only seek to know what Weigel calls finite objects. This category includes all created things, even abstract ideas or non-physical entities. The example that Weigel chooses here to illustrate his point—the Bible—is not idly chosen. The Bible, Weigel writes, is an instance of a finite object, both because it is a book that the reader can touch and see, but also because it is an idea and a message created by God, and the idea of it can be grasped and comprehended (enclosed) in the reader’s mind. Moreover, Weigel knows that it is a finite object because precisely people disagree about its meaning, which, in turn, is 309 “Der halben liget auch die ewige himlische weisheitt in ihme, daraus geschlossen wirdt, das alle erkentnis aller dingen, nicht aus den buchern genommen werde, sondern aus dem Menschen selbest her fliesset in den buchstaben” Ibid, 12. That Weigel demotes the written word from the source of all knowledge set him at odds with many Protestants who, following Luther, placed the utmost importance on scripture (sola scriptura), as the Introduction discussed. 116
further proof for Weigel’s theory that knowledge comes from the subject and not the object. 310 As for the knower, Weigel subdivides natural cognition into three types of perception, the oculo Carnis (which, despite being called an eye, actually includes all five senses), the oculo rationis and the oculo mentis. 311 The oculo Carnis is even further subdivided into sense perception 312 and imagination, which is simply sense perception when the object in question is absent. The three eyes of natural cognition are hierarchically arranged, such that the oculus rationis is above the oculo Carnis, because it can perceive the inner being of things rather than limiting itself to exteriors, and above the eye of reason is the oculus mentis seu intellectus. 313 Weigel identifies the “eye” as the seat of a person’s identity (here Weigel does not mean the physical/outer eye but rather the inner eye) rather than the body, presumably because Weigel uses the word to refer to the higher cognitive faculties. To take Weigel’s example, a blacksmith is who he is because of his knowledge of metalworking, not because his hands are capable of working metal. 314 If the seat of identity is the (inner) eye, the body becomes incidental, and thus, because identity has no anchor in the physical 310 Weigel, Griff, 85. 311 Ibid, 25. 312 And, of course, sense perception is yet again subdivided into the five senses, which are arranged hierarchically: touch, taste, smell, hearing and vision. 313 What the powers of the various eyes are is less important than their arrangement, (proceeding from a weak and crude eye that perceives only exteriors or concrete details all the way up to the most subtle and attuned eye that perceives invisible things, the innermost being of things, and abstract ideas) which follows the same pattern as all creation in containing the lower within the higher. The imagination “encloses and includes” the five senses, reason encloses imagination and the five senses and so on, which for Weigel means that the higher power can perform its perceptive tasks without the help of the lower one. In fact, the lower powers only interfere with the workings of the higher one, and should be “quietened”if one is to perceive more accurately with these higher eyes. Ibid, 31-33. 314 Weigel, Griff, 45. More precisely, a smith is a smith because of his inborn knowledge of metalworking. Though Weigel does not discuss this explicitly in the Griff, presumably the fact that talents and abilities vary from one person to the other (despite having the same epistemological heritage by virtue of having the same indwelling God) is due to which parts of it have been ‘reawakened’ by training or studying. 117
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fur<strong>the</strong>r pro<strong>of</strong> for Weigel’s <strong>the</strong>ory th<strong>at</strong> knowledge comes from <strong>the</strong> subject and not <strong>the</strong><br />
object. 310<br />
As for <strong>the</strong> knower, Weigel subdivides n<strong>at</strong>ural cognition into three types <strong>of</strong><br />
perception, <strong>the</strong> oculo Carnis (which, despite being called an eye, actually includes all five<br />
senses), <strong>the</strong> oculo r<strong>at</strong>ionis and <strong>the</strong> oculo mentis. 311 The oculo Carnis is even fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
subdivided into sense perception 312 and imagin<strong>at</strong>ion, which is simply sense perception<br />
when <strong>the</strong> object in question is absent. The three eyes <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural cognition are<br />
hierarchically arranged, such th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> oculus r<strong>at</strong>ionis is above <strong>the</strong> oculo Carnis, because it<br />
can perceive <strong>the</strong> inner being <strong>of</strong> things ra<strong>the</strong>r than limiting itself to exteriors, and above<br />
<strong>the</strong> eye <strong>of</strong> reason is <strong>the</strong> oculus mentis seu intellectus. 313<br />
Weigel identifies <strong>the</strong> “eye” as <strong>the</strong> se<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> a person’s identity (here Weigel does not<br />
mean <strong>the</strong> physical/outer eye but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> inner eye) ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> body, presumably<br />
because Weigel uses <strong>the</strong> word to refer to <strong>the</strong> higher cognitive faculties. To take Weigel’s<br />
example, a blacksmith is who he is because <strong>of</strong> his knowledge <strong>of</strong> metalworking, not<br />
because his hands are capable <strong>of</strong> working metal. 314 If <strong>the</strong> se<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> identity is <strong>the</strong> (inner) eye,<br />
<strong>the</strong> body becomes incidental, and thus, because identity has no anchor in <strong>the</strong> physical<br />
310 Weigel, Griff, 85.<br />
311 Ibid, 25.<br />
312 And, <strong>of</strong> course, sense perception is yet again subdivided into <strong>the</strong> five senses, which are arranged<br />
hierarchically: touch, taste, smell, hearing and vision.<br />
313 Wh<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various eyes are is less important than <strong>the</strong>ir arrangement, (proceeding from a<br />
weak and crude eye th<strong>at</strong> perceives only exteriors or concrete details all <strong>the</strong> way up to <strong>the</strong> most subtle and<br />
<strong>at</strong>tuned eye th<strong>at</strong> perceives invisible things, <strong>the</strong> innermost being <strong>of</strong> things, and abstract ideas) which follows<br />
<strong>the</strong> same p<strong>at</strong>tern as all cre<strong>at</strong>ion in containing <strong>the</strong> lower within <strong>the</strong> higher. The imagin<strong>at</strong>ion “encloses and<br />
includes” <strong>the</strong> five senses, reason encloses imagin<strong>at</strong>ion and <strong>the</strong> five senses and so on, which for Weigel<br />
means th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> higher power can perform its perceptive tasks without <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lower one. In fact, <strong>the</strong><br />
lower powers only interfere with <strong>the</strong> workings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> higher one, and should be “quietened”if one is to<br />
perceive more accur<strong>at</strong>ely with <strong>the</strong>se higher eyes. Ibid, 31-33.<br />
314 Weigel, Griff, 45. More precisely, a smith is a smith because <strong>of</strong> his inborn knowledge <strong>of</strong> metalworking.<br />
Though Weigel does not discuss this explicitly in <strong>the</strong> Griff, presumably <strong>the</strong> fact th<strong>at</strong> talents and abilities<br />
vary from one person to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r (despite having <strong>the</strong> same epistemological heritage by virtue <strong>of</strong> having <strong>the</strong><br />
same indwelling God) is due to which parts <strong>of</strong> it have been ‘reawakened’ by training or studying.<br />
117