the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ... the mystical theology of valentin weigel - DataSpace at Princeton ...
Erkentnus und Liebe”). 287 This “something” is what allows the union of the soul with God, rather than either knowing God or loving God (“an Erkentnus und Liebe”) as other theologians have taught. 288 Although the BT and Weigel call it “ein Ding,” what follows makes it clear that Eckhart is not talking about any ordinary kind of thing, since he immediately denies it any of the attributes of a thing: “das erkennet selber nichts noch hat nichts lieb...diß hat weder vor noch nach und es wartet keines zukunfftigen Dinges, denn diß mag weder gewinnen noch verliehren.” This “something” is a relic of the soul’s existence before creation and thus shares certain divine attributes, namely that it is eternal and perfect. 289 Later in this same tract, Weigel makes an interesting editorial interpolation that demonstrates he has understood the logic of Eckhartian Gelassenheit. Here, Weigel quotes from another Eckhart sermon, making the now familiar argument that the soul must detach itself from all created things. Weigel then inserts a clause into this sentence that is not found either in the critical edition of the Eckhart sermon or the Basel Tauler edition before resuming the Eckhart quotation (I have put the words that Weigel added in Italics): “Der Mensch, der sich allzumal liese einen Augenblick inn gelassener 287 Weigel, Zwene nützliche Tractat, 64; BT, CCCVIIva. Unfortunately, the BT gives this lines as “ein Ding” rather than as “einez,” because of course Eckhart took pains earlier in the sermon to emphasize that God is no thing, neither this nor that. Although the sentences that follow immediately contradict the conclusion that God is a thing, calling it an einez is perhaps the best way of talking about this thing-that-isno-thing. Elsewhere Eckhart uses the indefinite pronoun ‘ein’ to refer to something that is indistinct rather than a particular something. This becomes particularly important in Eckhart’s Christology, where the distinction between ein Sohn and der Sohn expresses the idea that Christ took human nature upon himself (see note 12, above). Actually, since Eckhart is referring to the no-thing that is God and the intellect, perhaps a better translation for einez would be, not “something” but rather an “any” or a “one” in the soul, even though this is not grammatically correct in English. As an indefinite pronoun, einez belongs to a small group of grammatical categories that Eckhart deems particularly suitable to theological discourse. For example, adverbs belong to this group, because they are wholly dependent on the verb for their meaning, and, like the Bild in relation to its Urbild, or the image in relation to the mirror, cannot exist without it. V1, 112:24-114:7. 288 Weigel, Zwene Tractat, 63. BT, CCCVIIrb. 289 Ibid, 64; BT, CCCVIIrb 108
Gelassenheit, das ist, das er nicht wuste, das er sich gelassen hette, dem wurden alle Ding gegeben.” 290 The person who receives the greatest reward is one who abandons himself in “gelassener Gelassenheit,” clarifying that this doubling of Eckhart’s term designates the height of Gelassenheit, when a person does not even know that he has attained Gelassenheit. That this second-order Gelassenheit becomes the title of this small work is an indication of how important Eckhart’s conception of spiritual poverty is to Weigel. Nevertheless in this early work, Weigel does not spell out why he is so interested in Gelassenheit, or why Gelassenheit is so relevant to the problems he detects in his milieu at the time he was writing. In the following section, I discuss a slightly later work by Weigel in which Gelassenheit plays a prominent role, this time as a response to the conflicts plaguing Saxony that Weigel greatly laments: Weigel observed that the religious and secular government of Saxony had grown closer and closer together, and that theological disputes were increasingly being resolved by political means (dissenting ministers and theologians were being arrested and exiled, for instance). Nevertheless, Weigel does not believe that the answer is to debate these theological issues ever more fiercely, drawing upon the force of secular government to prevail if necessary. Instead, Weigel identifies the cause of confessional conflict as individuals asserting their own interpretations of the Bible, and therefore believes himself able to offer the appropriate (if unexpected) pacifying solution: cut out the interpreting individual altogether. 291 To this 290 Weigel, Zwene nüztliche Tractat, 75. 291 Simpson, writing about 16 th century England, has investigated the negative consequences (paranoia and persecution) of the Protestant Reformation’s affirming the primacy of the individual reader (what Simpson terms fundamentalism) above a communal tradition-bound reading practice anchored in the Catholic church. This fundamentalist reading, even as it affirms the individual, is faced with a thorny problem should individuals readers disagree, with no means of adjudicating between two interpretations, other than resorting to the idea of ‘inspired reading’ (where one reader claims that the Holy Spirit has guided his 109
- Page 61 and 62: PART I • VALENTIN WEIGEL AND MEIS
- Page 63 and 64: investigating his early modern read
- Page 65 and 66: was a devilish heretic to others (
- Page 67 and 68: his neglect of Eckhart. 158 For ins
- Page 69 and 70: “unheilvolle Kompliziertheit”).
- Page 71 and 72: and Jerome (wearing what looks like
- Page 73 and 74: title page, as mentioned above, des
- Page 75 and 76: of a respectable though not fanatic
- Page 77 and 78: himself, but rather cultivated part
- Page 79 and 80: church that Luther, Melanchthon and
- Page 81 and 82: kan”), and specifically the role
- Page 83 and 84: soul become convinced that nothing
- Page 85 and 86: that salvation can be attained thro
- Page 87 and 88: more importantly, a theology that a
- Page 89 and 90: Mit Recht der Meister genannt: Mode
- Page 91 and 92: These role-reversal dialogues were
- Page 93 and 94: As this chapter has shown, Eckhart
- Page 95 and 96: philosophers from Hegel and Schopen
- Page 97 and 98: CHAPTER 2 • GELASSENE GELASSENHEI
- Page 99 and 100: the relationship between Tauler and
- Page 101 and 102: e “as it was when it was not.”
- Page 103 and 104: Eckhart agree that spiritual povert
- Page 105 and 106: one-of-a-kind thing, or the best ki
- Page 107 and 108: einvaltig stille), an uncreated lig
- Page 109 and 110: e as free of willing and desiring a
- Page 111: nestling inside the soul, but rathe
- Page 115 and 116: (necessarily inferior) knowledge pr
- Page 117 and 118: context is that he picks up on Eckh
- Page 119 and 120: he begins to steer the discussion a
- Page 121 and 122: further proof for Weigel’s theory
- Page 123 and 124: understood that the mind cannot pos
- Page 125 and 126: wait in stiller Gelassenheit, recei
- Page 127 and 128: truth as an educated theologian or
- Page 129 and 130: ungewisser”) and finds that his f
- Page 131 and 132: die Blinden an ein ander gehetzett,
- Page 133 and 134: gesagett das ist er selber und ist
- Page 135 and 136: Gelassenheit for the Bible, which i
- Page 137 and 138: that the kind of Gelassenheit Weige
- Page 139 and 140: indifference that allows Weigel to
- Page 141 and 142: teacher. 366 However, the turning p
- Page 143 and 144: Weigel gives the passage an unexpec
- Page 145 and 146: Murren”)—and they do this “in
- Page 147 and 148: and all the more so since he saw li
- Page 149 and 150: the strength of the intellectual re
- Page 151 and 152: CHAPTER 3 • DIONYSIUS, WHOEVER HE
- Page 153 and 154: demonstrated for Eckhart, I will de
- Page 155 and 156: destroyer that Dionysius is most of
- Page 157 and 158: ears good news to the church.” 39
- Page 159 and 160: points out, with a purification, a
- Page 161 and 162: served as cornerstones in defences
Gelassenheit, das ist, das er nicht wuste, das er sich gelassen hette, dem wurden alle<br />
Ding gegeben.” 290 The person who receives <strong>the</strong> gre<strong>at</strong>est reward is one who abandons<br />
himself in “gelassener Gelassenheit,” clarifying th<strong>at</strong> this doubling <strong>of</strong> Eckhart’s term<br />
design<strong>at</strong>es <strong>the</strong> height <strong>of</strong> Gelassenheit, when a person does not even know th<strong>at</strong> he has<br />
<strong>at</strong>tained Gelassenheit.<br />
Th<strong>at</strong> this second-order Gelassenheit becomes <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> this small work is an<br />
indic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> how important Eckhart’s conception <strong>of</strong> spiritual poverty is to Weigel.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less in this early work, Weigel does not spell out why he is so interested in<br />
Gelassenheit, or why Gelassenheit is so relevant to <strong>the</strong> problems he detects in his milieu<br />
<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> time he was writing. In <strong>the</strong> following section, I discuss a slightly l<strong>at</strong>er work by<br />
Weigel in which Gelassenheit plays a prominent role, this time as a response to <strong>the</strong><br />
conflicts plaguing Saxony th<strong>at</strong> Weigel gre<strong>at</strong>ly laments: Weigel observed th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> religious<br />
and secular government <strong>of</strong> Saxony had grown closer and closer toge<strong>the</strong>r, and th<strong>at</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ological disputes were increasingly being resolved by political means (dissenting<br />
ministers and <strong>the</strong>ologians were being arrested and exiled, for instance). Never<strong>the</strong>less,<br />
Weigel does not believe th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> answer is to deb<strong>at</strong>e <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong>ological issues ever more<br />
fiercely, drawing upon <strong>the</strong> force <strong>of</strong> secular government to prevail if necessary. Instead,<br />
Weigel identifies <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> confessional conflict as individuals asserting <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bible, and <strong>the</strong>refore believes himself able to <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong> appropri<strong>at</strong>e (if<br />
unexpected) pacifying solution: cut out <strong>the</strong> interpreting individual altoge<strong>the</strong>r. 291 To this<br />
290 Weigel, Zwene nüztliche Tract<strong>at</strong>, 75.<br />
291 Simpson, writing about 16 th century England, has investig<strong>at</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> neg<strong>at</strong>ive consequences (paranoia and<br />
persecution) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Protestant Reform<strong>at</strong>ion’s affirming <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual reader (wh<strong>at</strong> Simpson<br />
terms fundamentalism) above a communal tradition-bound reading practice anchored in <strong>the</strong> C<strong>at</strong>holic<br />
church. This fundamentalist reading, even as it affirms <strong>the</strong> individual, is faced with a thorny problem<br />
should individuals readers disagree, with no means <strong>of</strong> adjudic<strong>at</strong>ing between two interpret<strong>at</strong>ions, o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
resorting to <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> ‘inspired reading’ (where one reader claims th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> Holy Spirit has guided his<br />
109
Change language