HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

agreement for the surrender of the Taliban
forces and the city of Kandahar. On 6
December, the force began moving again toward
the now open city.
Meanwhile, to the southeast of Kandahar
near the Pakistan border, on the night of 18
N o v e m b e r ,
another SF element
from TF
DAGGER, ODA
583, infiltrated
and joined the
local anti-
Taliban leader,
Gul Agha
Sherzai, the former
governor of
Kandahar. His
force was heavily
outnumbered by
the local Taliban
and in a vulnerable
position. The
SF team moved
quickly to provide weapons and food to support
his army of close to 800 tribesmen.
In late November, the ODA’s CAS calls
drove the Taliban out of the Takrit-e Pol area,
and Sherzai’s forces seized the town and the
main highway from Spin Boldak to Kandahar.
These successes allowed Sherzai’s forces to man
an OP overlooking Kandahar Airfield, and for
the next week, ODA 583 directed CAS on
Taliban positions. On 7 December, as his forces
moved to attack the airfield, Sherzai learned of
the surrender terms Karzai had negotiated.
Sherzai gathered his personal security detail
and, along with members of 583, sped into the
city toward the governor’s mansion, his former
home. The city had fallen without a shot, and
Karzai subsequently confirmed Sherzai as the
governor of the city.
Tora Bora
In mid-November 2001, the CIA began
receiving reports that a large contingent of AQ,
to include UBL, had fled from the area around
Kabul to Nangahar Province. Subsequent
reporting corroborated AQ presence in the vicinity
of Jalalabad and to its south along the Spin
Ghar Mountain Range. Analysts within both
97
the CIA and CENTCOM correctly speculated
that UBL would make a stand along the northern
peaks of the Spin Ghar Mountains at a place
then called Tora Gora. Tora Bora, as it was redubbed
in December, had been a major stronghold
of AQ for years and provided routes into
Pakistan. The
mountainous complex
sat between
the Wazir and
Agam valleys and
amidst 12,000-
foot peaks, roughly
15 kilometers
north of the
Pakistan border.
AQ had developed
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ,
stockpiled with
weapon systems,
ammunition and
food within the
jagged, steep terrain.
The terrorists
had improved their positions over many
years, digging hundreds of caves and refuges
and establishing training camps. UBL knew the
terrain from the time of the Soviet invasion and
chose it, undoubtedly, as a place to make a stand
prior to the onset of winter and to defeat
American attempts both to capture senior leaders
and destroy the organization. Estimates of
AQ troop strength ranged widely from 250 to
2,000 personnel. With large numbers of wellsupplied,
fanatical AQ troops dug into extensive
fortified positions, Tora Bora appeared to be an
extremely tough target.
Moreover, the local ATF of the Eastern
Alliance [also dubbed Opposition Group (OG)
forces], under the command of Generals Hazarat
Ali and Haji Zaman, were even more disorganized
than those of the NA. Not only were OG
forces divided into mutually hostile factions
competing for control of Nangahar Province, but
each group was also deeply distrustful of
American aims. Ali was especially reluctant to
ally himself overtly to U.S. forces, given his fears
that he would be blamed for introducing foreign
occupying troops into eastern Afghanistan.
Based on estimates, Ali and Zaman may have
had up to 2,000 men, but whether this force
Hamid Karzai (middle row, third from left)and Special Forces.