HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

ather than target coordinates into the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance
system. Later during the battle, AC-130s
were used to contain the enemy. Ultimately,
the NA forces, supported by tank fire, fought
their way into the southern compound. An
American team recovered the body of the
dead American. On 29 November, the last of
the enemy fighters surrendered.
The timing of the enemy uprising suggested
that the Taliban planned to use the
“Trojan Horse” attack to slip armed enemy
soldiers into a lightly defended position near
Mazar-e Sharif. Had the gambit succeeded,
the Taliban could have controlled the main
approach to Mazar-e Sharif and the massive
munitions stockpile at Qala-i Jangi, and
would likely be reinforced by armed enemy
forces pre-positioned nearby. U.S. SOF and NA
efforts at Qala-i Jangi prevented that from taking
place.
The U.S. SOF officer who commanded the
ground force, MAJ Mark Mitchell, received the
first Distinguished Service Cross awarded since
the Vietnam War for his leadership. A Navy
SEAL, BMCS Stephen Bass, received the Navy
Cross for his actions and leadership during this
battle.
During the Mazar-e Sharif and Taloqan-
Konduz campaigns, the NA forces, accompanied
by SOF ODAs and joint tactical air controllers
(JTACs) directing air strikes, liberated six
provinces of Afghanistan. To accomplish this
feat, SF and JTAC personnel had traveled by
horse, all-terrain vehicle, pickup truck, and on
foot along hazardous mountain trails, often at
night and in extremes of weather and terrain.
They did all of this in about a month with only a
few U.S. casualties, while inflicting thousands of
casualties on the enemy and completing the
destruction of Taliban and AQ defensive positions
in the north.
Beside SF and AFSOC, other SOF combat
multipliers made significant contributions to the
liberation of northern and central Afghanistan.
PSYOP leaflets offered rewards for fugitive
Taliban and AQ leaders, informed the Afghan
people about their pending liberation, and
warned them of the dangers of unexploded ordnance
and mines. Civil Affairs teams with TF
DAGGER began assessing humanitarian needs
96
Two SOF operators identify targets.
even as the fighting was winding down in northern
Afghanistan.
Two Approaches to Kandahar
Following the tactical successes in northern
Afghanistan, Kandahar, far to the south, was
the next U.S. objective. The populous city was of
a different ethnic makeup—Pashtuns, not
Tajiks—and was the spiritual and political center
of the Taliban movement.
Two separate SF elements infiltrated into
the region on 14 November, linked up with anti-
Taliban forces, and approached the city from the
north and the south, with the host nation commanders
picking up support along the way.
ODA 574 inserted into Tarin Khowt to support
and protect the emerging choice as
Afghanistan’s future leader, Hamid Karzai.
Only two days later, ODA 574 had to act quickly
to save Karzai’s resistance group from destruction.
Fearing Karzai’s potential power, Taliban
leaders sent 500 soldiers north to crush him. In
response, Karzai deployed his handful of men
and relied on his SF team for CAS. U.S. planes
pounded the Taliban convoy, and the Afghan
opposition fighters repulsed the attack.
On 5 December, the U.S. effort suffered a setback.
While the Special Forces were calling in
CAS, a 2,000-pound JDAM bomb landed in the
middle of their position. The soldiers were literally
blown off their feet. Three Americans were
killed and dozens wounded, along with many of
their Afghan allies.
As the SF teams were recovering from the
bomb accident, Karzai’s negotiators finalized an