HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
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On 13 November, Daoud met his first heavy<br />
resistance, and after receiving both heavy direct<br />
and indirect fire, the SF element repositioned to<br />
a different OP, called in air strikes, and helped<br />
to repel a Taliban counterattack. Daoud relied<br />
on U.S. air attacks to weaken the Taliban, and<br />
for the next ten days, the ODAs and their TACPs<br />
called in air support<br />
to pound<br />
Taliban forces<br />
near Khanabad<br />
and Konduz.<br />
Daoud initiated<br />
talks with the<br />
enemy in Konduz,<br />
and the Taliban<br />
leaders agreed to<br />
surrender on 23<br />
November.<br />
Qala-i Jangi<br />
The Trojan Horse<br />
As part of the<br />
terms, the Taliban<br />
and foreign fighters would capitulate on 25<br />
November, and the Northern Alliance would<br />
incarcerate them in Qala-i Jangi fortress,<br />
Dostum’s former headquarters. But on 24<br />
November, at a checkpoint near the Mazar-e<br />
Sharif airport, NA forces stopped an armed<br />
enemy convoy and accepted the surrender of the<br />
enemy force, a day early and 100 miles west of<br />
the agreed upon capitulation site. Despite warnings<br />
by the American <strong>Special</strong> Forces soldiers, the<br />
NA did not search the prisoners and, instead,<br />
only simply told them to lay down their arms.<br />
The prisoners were taken to the Qala-i Jangi<br />
fortress, meaning “house of war.” This<br />
huge, nineteenth century fortress on the<br />
western outskirts of Mazar-e Sharif was<br />
divided in half by a 20-foot high mud-brick<br />
wall. The enemy prisoners were housed in<br />
the southern compound, which contained a<br />
storage area for ammunition and weapons<br />
and an underground bunker.<br />
As the prisoners were unloaded at the<br />
fortress, NA guards attempted to search<br />
them, and one prisoner exploded a grenade<br />
in a suicide attack, killing himself, two<br />
other prisoners, and two NA officers. Later<br />
An Aerial View of Qala-i Jangi.<br />
95<br />
the same evening, prisoners carried out a second<br />
grenade suicide attack against the guards,<br />
whom they outnumbered four to one. The next<br />
day, two CIA agents went to the fortress to question<br />
the prisoners. While they questioned prisoners,<br />
the enemy attacked and overpowered<br />
their guards, seizing control of the southern<br />
compound along<br />
with its stockpile<br />
of ammunitions<br />
and<br />
weapons. They<br />
killed one of the<br />
A m e r i c a n s ,<br />
Mike Spann,<br />
and the second<br />
American narrowly<br />
escaped<br />
but remained<br />
pinned down<br />
inside the<br />
fortress.<br />
The Battle<br />
of Qala-i Jangi<br />
lasted from 25<br />
to 29 November, and U.S. SOF assisted the NA<br />
forces in quelling this revolt. The ad hoc reaction<br />
force—consisting of American and British<br />
troops, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) linguists,<br />
and local interpreters—established overwatch<br />
positions, set up radio communications,<br />
and had a maneuver element search for the<br />
trapped CIA agent. The agent escaped on the<br />
25th. The next day, as the SOF reaction force<br />
called in air strikes, one bomb landed on a parapet<br />
and injured five Americans, four British, and<br />
killed several Afghan troops. The pilots had<br />
inadvertently entered friendly coordinates<br />
U.S. SOF and NA on the northwest parapet of the<br />
Qala-i Jangi Fortress.