HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Afghanistan In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government determined that Usama bin Laden (UBL) and his al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network were responsible. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan harbored UBL and his supporters, and President Bush demanded that the Taliban hand them over to U.S. authorities. When the Taliban refused, the President ordered U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to eliminate Afghanistan as a sponsor and safe haven for international terrorists. The primary objective was to destroy the al Qaeda terrorist network and capture or kill UBL. Afghanistan is a land-locked country about the size of Texas with a population of around 24 million. The massive mountain ranges and remote valleys in the north and east contrasted with the near desert-like conditions of the plains to the south and west. Road and rail networks were minimal and in disrepair. The rough terrain would challenge any U.S. military effort, especially moving large numbers of conventional troops. Because bombing and cruise-missile attacks, which could be launched quite soon, would probably not be decisive, and because a ground invasion might be decisive, but could not begin for some time, even conventional staff officers realized that an unconventional option could fill the gap between the conventional courses of action. In September 2001, CENTCOM did not have an unconventional warfare (UW) plan for 91 Afghanistan. Initially, CENTCOM only tasked the Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) with Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), but SOCCENT planners, nonetheless, developed a plan for a UW campaign for Afghanistan in September. Late that month, after SOCCENT briefed its UW campaign plan, the CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, said, “Okay. Do it.” Thus, SOF would be his main effort against the Taliban. The Taliban (taken from “Tulaba,” referring to students of Islam) was a Sunni Islamic, pro-Pashtun movement that ruled most of the country from 1996 until 2001, except for some small areas held by Northern Alliance forces northeast of Kabul and in the northwest of the country. U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine described seven phases of a U.S. sponsored insurgency: psychological preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat operations, and demobilization. Other government agencies, such as the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), took the lead role in the first three phases. U.S. SOF and DOD would typically take the leading role in the next three phases: organizing the insurgent forces; buildup (training and equipping the insurgent forces); and conducting combat operations with the insurgents. The final phase would be demobilization, which would involve a variety of U.S. agencies and the newly-installed Operation RESOLUTE EAGLE After 9/11, the first SOF counterterrorism operations were not conducted in Afghanistan or even in the Middle East, but in Europe. Islamic extremists had transited the Balkans for years and had been involved in ethnic warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late September 2001, U.S. SOF learned that Islamic extremists with connections to Usama bin Laden were in Bosnia. SOCEUR forces quickly put together Operation RESOLUTE EAGLE to capture them. U.S. SOF surveilled the terrorists, detained one of the groups, and facilitated the capture of another group by coalition forces. These raids resulted in the capture of all the suspected terrorists and incriminating evidence for prosecution and intelligence exploitation.
government, so the “lead agency” for demobilization would vary depending on the situation. The use of indigenous Islamic, anti-Taliban forces (ATF) would undermine Taliban legitimacy and reinforce that the fight was between Afghans, and not a U.S.-led war against Afghanistan or Islam. In September 2001, the only insurgency opposing the Taliban was the beleaguered Northern Alliance (NA), which controlled about ten percent of Afghanistan. To execute the plan, SOCCENT would stand up Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs), the first of which would be established in Uzbekistan and would focus on CSAR and then UW. Beginning on 5 October, Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF- N) stood up CSAR operations (under command of Col Frank Kisner) at Karshi-Kanabad (K2), Uzbekistan, and the bombing of Afghanistan began on 7 October. The 5th SFG (A), under the command of COL John Mulholland, deployed to K2 and formed the core of this JSOTF, more commonly known as Task Force (TF) DAGGER. UW became DAGGER’s principal mission. This task force included aviators from the 160th SOAR (A) and Special Tactics personnel from AFSOC. Map of Afghanistan displaying terrain and major cities. 92 Operations in Northern Afghanistan—Mazar-e Sharif The UW plan called for SF Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs), augmented with tactical air control party (TACP) members, to land deep in hostile territory, contact members of the NA, coordinate their activities in a series of offensive operations, call U.S. airpower to bear against Taliban and AQ forces, and help Unconventional Warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. . . . Special operations Forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia 16 July 1997
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HISTORY 6th Edition
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1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
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General James J. Lindsay accepting
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Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
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USSOCOM Commanders There have been
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the impact on its people, the comma
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Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
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Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
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During the review process for the 2
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HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
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greatly improved the command’s ab
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(7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
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USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
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forming its acquisition functions a
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nature were key goals in addition t
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COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
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President George W. Bush signed the
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Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
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The invasion of Panama, known as Op
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Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
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Page 51 and 52: joint training with NSWTG small boa
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Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
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Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
Page 69 and 70: In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
Page 71 and 72: what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
Page 73 and 74: Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Page 87 and 88: In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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Page 91: flooded and damaged areas, signific
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Page 101 and 102: 100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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Page 109 and 110: not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Page 113 and 114: During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
Page 115 and 116: east of the city of Khowst. While b
Page 117 and 118: Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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Page 125 and 126: line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
Page 127 and 128: TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
Page 129 and 130: accordance with his importance, Sad
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Page 133 and 134: with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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Page 139 and 140: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
Page 141 and 142: Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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