HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a fourstar general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict [ASD (SO/LIC)], a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called “SOF checkbook”). The House had conceded on the issue of a new civilian-led agency, but insisted on including MFP-11 to protect SOF funding. The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. For the first time, Congress mandated that the President create a unified combatant command. Congress clearly intended to force the DOD and the Administration to face up to the realities of past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the Administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently had to pass two additional bills to ensure proper implementation. The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, enabling USSOCOM to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the forces assigned to the same command. The establishment of a four-star Commander in Chief (CINC) and an ASD (SO/LIC) eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department. Implementing the provisions and mandates of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, however, was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to surface was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC), whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and low-intensity conflict activities of the DOD. Congress even increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the DOD still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until a suitable replacement was nominated and approved by the Senate. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC). Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a new unified command was to abolish an existing command. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post Goldwater- Nichols era. Its CINC, General James Lindsay, did have some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The DOD activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations C o m m a n d (USCINCSOC). The Senate approved him without debate. U S S O C O M had its activation ceremony on 1 June 1987. Guest speakers included Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV and Admiral Crowe, two men who had opposed the Cohen-Nunn Amendment. Admiral Crowe’s speech at the ceremony advised General Lindsay to integrate the new command into the mainstream military: “First, break down the wall that has more or less come between SOF and the other parts of our military, the wall that some people will try to build higher. Second, educate the rest of the military—spread a recognition and understanding of what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that you do it. Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of our military capabilities.” Putting this advice into action, General Lindsay knew, would pose significant challenges (a “sporty” course, he called it), considering the opposition the Defense Department had shown. 7
USSOCOM Commanders There have been eight Commanders since 1987—Generals James J. Lindsay (16 April 1987-27 June 1990), Carl W. Stiner (27 June 1990-20 May 1993), Wayne A. Downing (20 May 1993-29 February 1996), Henry H. Shelton (29 February 1996-25 September 1997) Peter J. Schoomaker (5 November 1997-27 October 2000), Charles R. Holland (27 October 2000- 2 September 2003), Bryan D. Brown (2 September 2003-9 July 2007), and Admiral Eric T. Olson (9 July 2007 - present). Each CINC- SOC faced unique challenges and opportunities, and each left his mark on the SOF community in the course of responding to significant changes on the military landscape. One constant throughout this period, however, has been change and new challenges for the U.S. military. The demise of the Soviet Union did not lessen the range of threats to the United States. The appearance of new aggressor states, heightened regional instabilities, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and emergence of trans-national terrorism led to an increased use of SOF by the conventional U.S. military, Ambassadors, and other government agencies. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Generals Holland and Brown and Admiral Olson confronted a new Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The greatest challenge for General Lindsay, during his tenure, was to make the command the driving force behind SOF revitalization, without alienating conventional military leaders. This was no mean feat, given the opposition to the command’s mere existence in many military circles. He developed a hierarchy of priorities to get the command functioning: organize, staff, train, and equip the headquarters; establish the relationships necessary to discharge its roles and missions; create MFP-11 to ensure SOF controlled its resourcing; build C2 relationships with the components, work closely with ASD (SO/LIC), and the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs); define worldwide SOF requirements; and plot the future of the command. General Lindsay also faced two major operational tests—Operations EARNEST WILL/ PRIME CHANCE I in the Persian Gulf, and Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. The use of SOF by the theater CINCs (known as the operational tempo, or OPTEMPO) increased significantly during General Lindsay’s tenure. The complex, politically sensitive process of establishing a new unified command extended into General Stiner’s tenure as second CINC- SOC. General Stiner also pushed the command to fulfill the provisions of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment. Perhaps most important, he oversaw the implementation of developing and acquiring “special operations peculiar” equipment, material, supplies, and services. After DESERT STORM, General Stiner devoted much of his time to raising public awareness about SOF’s successes. Supporting the theater CINCs and maintaining SOF combat readiness were General James J. Lindsay USCINCSOC 1987-1990 8 General Carl W. Stiner, USCINCSOC 1990-1993
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
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Page 21 and 22: greatly improved the command’s ab
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In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
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HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
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missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
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Haiti had endured unremitting polit
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of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
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what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
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Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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No other international donor has ma
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flooded and damaged areas, signific
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government, so the “lead agency
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Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
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ather than target coordinates into
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would prove adequate to both assaul
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100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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coalition forces continued to searc
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the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
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inside the helicopter and began tre
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not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Special Forces began training the A
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During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
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east of the city of Khowst. While b
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Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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their combat operations in southern
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Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
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Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
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line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
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TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
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accordance with his importance, Sad
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Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
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with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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increasing security in Iraq. The ER
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“extra-judicial killings” condu
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
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Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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