HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehicle at the U.S.<br />
Embassy in Brazzaville, June 1997.<br />
forces at the airport, proceed to the embassy,<br />
and assess the embassy’s security. Arriving at<br />
Maya-Maya Airfield amidst heavy gunfire, the<br />
ESAT unloaded the aircraft, and French paratroopers<br />
put 56 evacuees on the MC-130. The<br />
team moved to the embassy and began to harden<br />
their areas and improve living conditions at<br />
the embassy. During their nine days in<br />
Brazzaville, LTC David Mamaux led the team<br />
on multiple trips outside the compound to<br />
retrieve needed supplies and sensitive materials,<br />
and to coordinate with the French military.<br />
On 18 June, the team loaded the 12 remaining<br />
embassy personnel, their baggage, all sensitive<br />
items, and one dog, onto a chartered DC-3.<br />
The ESAT members and one Peace Corps volunteer<br />
departed Brazzaville later that same day.<br />
The assessment team provided crucial assistance<br />
to the U.S. Ambassador when rebel forces<br />
attacked Brazzaville. The team conducted route<br />
reconnaissance, coordinated with the French<br />
military, provided communications support, and<br />
organized the embassy staff for the NEO.<br />
Amidst considerable violence and looting, this<br />
SOF team insured the safe evacuation of 69<br />
Americans.<br />
FIRM RESPONSE proved again the obvious<br />
value of engagement, area orientation, and<br />
situational awareness. FIRM RESPONSE<br />
also illustrated the good and bad of command<br />
and control. CINCEUR directed that this<br />
would be a low profile mission. The decision to<br />
deploy only an augmented ESAT on a single<br />
aircraft constrained how the SOF ground commander<br />
conducted the operation and, ultimately,<br />
put SOF at risk on the ground.<br />
Moreover, BG Lambert had to accept responsibility<br />
for the mission but gave up control to<br />
EUCOM J-3. In stark contrast to EUCOM’s<br />
handling of this operation, BG Lambert picked<br />
the team leader for all the right reasons—experience,<br />
time in Africa, and warrior and diplomatic<br />
skills. And, he empowered him to operate in<br />
the fluid circumstances in Brazzaville.<br />
Lambert’s trust and confidence in his subordinates<br />
paid off.<br />
Operation FIRM RESPONSE demonstrated<br />
what SOF brought to the “fight”—rapid planning<br />
and force sizing; an integrated package of<br />
air, ground, and maritime capabilities; mature,<br />
motivated, and well-trained military personnel;<br />
and an ability to operate in an ambiguous environment.<br />
FIRM RESPONSE exposed the dilemmas<br />
and opportunities confronting SOF leaders<br />
and operators as they faced the complex battlespace,<br />
which characterized the post-Cold War<br />
era and the early twenty-first century. It had a<br />
“classic merging of all levels—tactical, operational,<br />
strategic and diplomatic,” where a bullet<br />
or a word or a gesture could have had ramifications<br />
far beyond Brazzaville.<br />
ESAT team leader coordinates with French Legionnaires at Brazzaville. Amidst considerable violence and looting, this<br />
SOF team, in the words of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “played a vital role . . . in ensuring the safe<br />
evacuation of scores of official and non-official Americans. It is a testament to their superb training and talents that this<br />
operation was successfully carried out with no American casualties.”<br />
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