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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehicle at the U.S.<br />

Embassy in Brazzaville, June 1997.<br />

forces at the airport, proceed to the embassy,<br />

and assess the embassy’s security. Arriving at<br />

Maya-Maya Airfield amidst heavy gunfire, the<br />

ESAT unloaded the aircraft, and French paratroopers<br />

put 56 evacuees on the MC-130. The<br />

team moved to the embassy and began to harden<br />

their areas and improve living conditions at<br />

the embassy. During their nine days in<br />

Brazzaville, LTC David Mamaux led the team<br />

on multiple trips outside the compound to<br />

retrieve needed supplies and sensitive materials,<br />

and to coordinate with the French military.<br />

On 18 June, the team loaded the 12 remaining<br />

embassy personnel, their baggage, all sensitive<br />

items, and one dog, onto a chartered DC-3.<br />

The ESAT members and one Peace Corps volunteer<br />

departed Brazzaville later that same day.<br />

The assessment team provided crucial assistance<br />

to the U.S. Ambassador when rebel forces<br />

attacked Brazzaville. The team conducted route<br />

reconnaissance, coordinated with the French<br />

military, provided communications support, and<br />

organized the embassy staff for the NEO.<br />

Amidst considerable violence and looting, this<br />

SOF team insured the safe evacuation of 69<br />

Americans.<br />

FIRM RESPONSE proved again the obvious<br />

value of engagement, area orientation, and<br />

situational awareness. FIRM RESPONSE<br />

also illustrated the good and bad of command<br />

and control. CINCEUR directed that this<br />

would be a low profile mission. The decision to<br />

deploy only an augmented ESAT on a single<br />

aircraft constrained how the SOF ground commander<br />

conducted the operation and, ultimately,<br />

put SOF at risk on the ground.<br />

Moreover, BG Lambert had to accept responsibility<br />

for the mission but gave up control to<br />

EUCOM J-3. In stark contrast to EUCOM’s<br />

handling of this operation, BG Lambert picked<br />

the team leader for all the right reasons—experience,<br />

time in Africa, and warrior and diplomatic<br />

skills. And, he empowered him to operate in<br />

the fluid circumstances in Brazzaville.<br />

Lambert’s trust and confidence in his subordinates<br />

paid off.<br />

Operation FIRM RESPONSE demonstrated<br />

what SOF brought to the “fight”—rapid planning<br />

and force sizing; an integrated package of<br />

air, ground, and maritime capabilities; mature,<br />

motivated, and well-trained military personnel;<br />

and an ability to operate in an ambiguous environment.<br />

FIRM RESPONSE exposed the dilemmas<br />

and opportunities confronting SOF leaders<br />

and operators as they faced the complex battlespace,<br />

which characterized the post-Cold War<br />

era and the early twenty-first century. It had a<br />

“classic merging of all levels—tactical, operational,<br />

strategic and diplomatic,” where a bullet<br />

or a word or a gesture could have had ramifications<br />

far beyond Brazzaville.<br />

ESAT team leader coordinates with French Legionnaires at Brazzaville. Amidst considerable violence and looting, this<br />

SOF team, in the words of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “played a vital role . . . in ensuring the safe<br />

evacuation of scores of official and non-official Americans. It is a testament to their superb training and talents that this<br />

operation was successfully carried out with no American casualties.”<br />

84

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