HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Both the House and Senate passed SOF
reform bills, and these went to a conference committee
for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees
forged a compromise. The bill called for a
unified combatant command headed by a fourstar
general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict [ASD (SO/LIC)], a coordinating
board for low-intensity conflict within the
National Security Council, and a new Major
Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called
“SOF checkbook”). The House had conceded on
the issue of a new civilian-led agency, but insisted
on including MFP-11 to protect SOF funding.
The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987
Defense Authorization Act, amended the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law
in October 1986.
For the first time, Congress mandated that
the President create a unified combatant command.
Congress clearly intended to force the
DOD and the Administration to face up to the
realities of past failures and emerging threats.
The DOD and the Administration were responsible
for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently
had to pass two additional bills to
ensure proper implementation.
The legislation promised to improve SOF in
several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11
provided SOF with control over its own
resources, enabling USSOCOM to modernize the
force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice
cooperation: a single commander for all SOF
promoted interoperability among the forces
assigned to the same command. The establishment
of a four-star Commander in Chief (CINC)
and an ASD (SO/LIC) eventually gave SOF a
voice in the highest councils of the Defense
Department.
Implementing the provisions and mandates
of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, however, was
neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues
to surface was appointing an ASD (SO/LIC),
whose principal duties included monitorship of
special operations activities and low-intensity
conflict activities of the DOD. Congress even
increased the number of assistant secretaries of
defense from 11 to 12, but the DOD still did not
fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress
directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to
carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until a suitable
replacement was nominated and approved
by the Senate. Not until 18 months after the legislation
passed did Ambassador Charles
Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).
Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM
provided its own measure of excitement. A quick
solution to manning and basing a new unified
command was to abolish an existing command.
U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with
an often misunderstood mission, did not appear
to have a viable mission in the post Goldwater-
Nichols era. Its CINC, General James Lindsay,
did have some special operations experience. On
23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
recommended to Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger that USREDCOM be disestablished
to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM.
President Ronald Reagan approved the
establishment of the new command on 13 April
1987. The DOD activated USSOCOM on 16
April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be
the first Commander in Chief Special Operations
C o m m a n d
(USCINCSOC).
The Senate
approved him without
debate.
U S S O C O M
had its activation
ceremony on 1
June 1987.
Guest speakers
included Deputy
Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV and
Admiral Crowe, two men who had opposed the
Cohen-Nunn Amendment. Admiral Crowe’s
speech at the ceremony advised General Lindsay
to integrate the new command into the mainstream
military: “First, break down the wall
that has more or less come between SOF and the
other parts of our military, the wall that some
people will try to build higher. Second, educate
the rest of the military—spread a recognition
and understanding of what you do, why you do
it, and how important it is that you do it. Last,
integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of
our military capabilities.” Putting this advice
into action, General Lindsay knew, would pose
significant challenges (a “sporty” course, he
called it), considering the opposition the Defense
Department had shown.
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