HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)
Senator William Cohen (R-ME)
Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA)
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Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer
organizational focus and chain of command for
special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.
In October 1985, the SASC published the
results of its two-year review of the U.S. military
structure, entitled “Defense Organization: The
Need For Change.” Mr. James R. Locher III, the
principal author of the study, also examined
past special operations and speculated on the
most likely future threats. This influential document
led to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986.
By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced
reform bills in both houses of Congress.
On 15 May, Cohen introduced the Senate bill, cosponsored
by Nunn and others, which called for
a joint military organization for SOF and the
establishment of an office in the Defense
Department to ensure adequate funding and policy
emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special
operations. Daniel’s proposal went even further—he
wanted a national special operations
agency headed by a civilian who would bypass
the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the
Secretary of Defense; this would keep the Joint
Chiefs and the services out of the SOF budget
process.
Congress held hearings on the two bills in
the summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe
Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS), led the Pentagon’s opposition to the
bills. He proposed, as an alternative, a new
Special Operations Forces command led by a
three-star general. This proposal was not well
received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a
four-star general in charge to give SOF more
clout. A number of retired military officers and
others testified in favor of the need for reform.
By most accounts, retired Army Major
General Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling
reasons for change. Scholtes, who commanded
the joint special operations task force
(JSOTF) in Grenada, explained how conventional
force leaders misused SOF during the operation,
not allowing them to use their unique capabilities,
which resulted in high SOF casualties.
After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately
with a small number of senators to elaborate
on the problems that he had encountered in
Grenada.