HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

In the early 1990s, rival ethnic states within
Yugoslavia declared their independence and
used force to align their borders to encompass all
their ethnic population in neighboring states.
The intensity of the fighting and “ethnic cleansing”
shocked the UN and NATO into action.
From 1992 to 1995, both of these organizations
sent forces to the region to force a peace settlement
in the former Yugoslavia. But, not until
NATO aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb targets
(Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, August-
September 1995) did the warring factions agree
to a cease fire in October. This cease fire, in
turn, led to the Dayton Peace Accords (21
November 1995) and the Paris Peace Agreement
(14 December 1995).
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
For Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
(December 1995-December 1996), the implementation
of the peace agreement, NATO’s missions
included peace enforcement (separating the warring
factions, establishing demilitarized zones,
and maintaining security) and support for the
withdrawal of UN forces from the former
Yugoslavia. NATO vested command and control
in the Commander in Chief, Implementation
Force, and his assigned forces, known as the
Implementation Force (IFOR).
Special Operations Command,
Europe (SOCEUR) initially became
involved in these peace efforts in
February 1993 when it established
the Joint Special
Operations Task Force 2
(JSOTF2). Located at San Vito
Air Station, near Brindisi, Italy,
JSOTF2 had the following missions:
CSAR; fire support; and
visit, board, search and seizure.
To support the 1995 peace agreement,
SOCEUR provided forces
to establish the Special
Operations
Command
Implementation Force (SOCIF-
OR) and superimposed it over
JSOTF2 at San Vito. SOCIFOR
Balkans Operations
1995-Present
had several missions, but its most notable one
was to provide SOF to the NATO and non-NATO
forces in Bosnia. Like DESERT STORM and
Somalia before, the emphasis was on SOF’s
capabilities to interact with foreign military
forces. Other missions included personnel recovery
and fire support.
All SOF “in the box” (inside of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) were assigned to Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), the
SOF component to the land forces component,
Commander, Allied Command Europe Rapid
Reaction Corps (COMARRC). A British officer
commanded the CJSOTF with an American SOF
officer as his deputy. Beneath the CJSOTF,
SOCIFOR established a U.S. SOF headquarters
(known as FOB 101) using 1st BN, 10th SFG (A)
assets.
Each of COMARRC’s three divisions [called
multinational divisions (MNDs)] had a Special
Operations Command and Control Element
(SOCCE) assigned, which worked for the division
commanders, controlled SOF in the divisions’
areas, and reported to FOB 101. The
SOCCE coordinated SOF activities with the conventional
forces; advised the division commander
on SOF capabilities and employment options;
and provided secure and reliable communications
(this last capability was so critical that
COMARRC would have delayed the transfer of
SOF and Romanian engineer battalion counterparts meet.
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