HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

came alive with people that morning, and they
were soon spotted by some Iraqi children and an
adult. A party of 25 armed villagers, joined by
an Iraqi Army company, moved toward the
team. Calling for CAS and an emergency extraction,
the Americans destroyed their classified
gear, engaged in a short but hot firefight with
the Iraqis, and retreated to better fighting positions.
Using their emergency radio, the team
contacted CAS aircraft, which dropped cluster
munitions and 2,000-pound bombs within 200
meters of the embattled team until nightfall.
During one lull in the air strikes, two members
of the team charged down the canal and eliminated
an Iraqi element. After dark, the team
moved 300 meters from the canal, where a helicopter
extracted them without further opposition.
Another SR mission sent two three-man
teams to monitor an area between the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers. Communications glitches prevented
one team from reporting what they saw,
and the team was picked up early on 27
February. The second team’s reconnaissance
site put it in the midst of Bedouin encampments,
so team members established a hide site along a
drainage canal. At daylight, they discovered
their “hide” site was near a major thoroughfare.
Many Bedouins passed by without noticing
them, but they were soon compromised by a
sharp-eyed little girl. The team fled with armed
Bedouins in hot pursuit. Iraqi soldiers soon
joined the firefight. The team held off the Iraqis
for an hour and a half until F-16s appeared, followed
by a 160th SOAR (A) Blackhawk.
Although riddled by small arms fire, the helicopter
made a dramatic daylight rescue of the team.
From 29 January until 16 February, NSWTG
elements conducted nearshore and offshore
reconnaissance missions in support of
CENTCOM’s deception strategy to fix Iraqi
attention on a potential amphibious invasion by
U.S. Marines. The SR missions resulted in the
collection of information, established a naval
presence along the Kuwaiti coast, and faked the
initial stages of a possible amphibious invasion.
The deception effort culminated in a large-scale
operation on the night of 23-24 February 1991,
the eve of the ground offensive, which simulated
a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation.
The deception campaign prevented Iraqi units at
the beaches from reinforcing those being
attacked in the west.
Direct Action (DA) Missions
During DESERT STORM, General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf, CINCCENT, relied heavily
on allied air power to hit targets that otherwise
would have been SOF DA missions. Even
so, SOCCENT executed some critically important
DA missions. SOF’s first and most important
DA mission involved the destruction of two
Iraqi early warning radar sites guarding the
southwestern approaches to Iraq at the start of
the Air War. Neutralizing these sites allowed
allied aircraft to fly undetected toward the
SCUD complexes in western Iraq.
Colonel Jesse Johnson, the SOCCENT
Commander, turned to AFSOCCENT, his Air
Force component, to plan the operation. The
concept called for MH-53 Pave Low helicopters
to guide AH-64 Apaches to the targeted radar
sites, which the Apaches would destroy. On 14
October, Colonel Johnson assured General
MH-53J Pave Lows led the Apaches to the Iraqi radar
sites.
53
AH-64 Apaches destroyed Iraqi radars prior to H-Hour.