HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command
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joint training with NSWTG small boats and took<br />
part in a CSAR exercise with USS Nicholas.<br />
During DESERT STORM, the Sawahil provided<br />
an operational platform for coalition forces,<br />
including NSWTG <strong>Special</strong> Boat Unit detachments,<br />
Kuwaiti patrol boats, and SEALs.<br />
Coalition warfare training continued until<br />
the eve of the ground war. The Arab forces in<br />
the east and north faced formidable military<br />
obstacles along their projected areas of advance,<br />
including multiple Iraqi minefields, “fire trenches,”<br />
and above-ground pipelines. An SF team<br />
worked with a Saudi engineer battalion to plan<br />
for clearing invasion lanes through two Iraqi<br />
minefields and over an above-ground pipeline<br />
inside Kuwait. On 22 February, the Saudi engineers<br />
and U.S. <strong>Special</strong> Forces easily cleared six<br />
lanes because the Iraqis, battered for over a<br />
month by allied air power, failed to cover the<br />
minefields with artillery fire. In the north, other<br />
SF teams worked with the Saudis and the<br />
Egyptians to create breaches in the minefields<br />
for the passage of their forces. On 25 February,<br />
the Egyptians drove into Kuwait against sporadic<br />
resistance. The Egyptian corps that the<br />
5th SFG (A) teams supported served as the<br />
hinge for CENTCOM’s huge turning movement.<br />
By the night of 26 February, the Egyptians and<br />
their SF advisors had reached their objectives<br />
near Kuwait City.<br />
The 28 February cease fire marked the end of<br />
most SOCCENT coalition warfare activities. It<br />
had been a huge effort, requiring an entire<br />
<strong>Special</strong> Forces Group, SEALs, <strong>Special</strong> Boat<br />
Units, and support elements. SF teams accompanied<br />
109 allied units, from battalion to corps,<br />
providing CAS and liaison between forces. SOF<br />
eventually trained about 30,000 coalition troops<br />
in 44 subject areas.<br />
Kuwaiti Reconstitution and<br />
Unconventional Warfare<br />
American <strong>Special</strong> Forces units helped to<br />
reconstitute a number of Kuwaiti military<br />
forces, both conventional and unconventional.<br />
As a result of meetings between the SOCCENT<br />
commander, Colonel Jesse Johnson, and the<br />
Kuwaiti Armed Forces Chief of Staff, soldiers<br />
from the 5th SFG (A) began training Kuwaiti<br />
soldiers in mid-September at KKMC. The initial<br />
mission was to form a Kuwaiti SF battalion and<br />
a commando brigade, but the training went so<br />
well that the mission grew to include four additional<br />
Kuwaiti infantry brigades. Eventually,<br />
SOF units trained a total of 6,357 Kuwaitis, who<br />
formed an SF battalion, a commando brigade,<br />
and the Al-Khulud, Al-Haq, Fatah, and Badr<br />
infantry brigades. The instruction included<br />
weapons training, tactics, staff procedures, CAS,<br />
anti-armor operations, and nuclear, chemical<br />
and biological defense.<br />
Colonel Johnson also formed a <strong>Special</strong><br />
Planning Group to conduct specialized unconventional<br />
warfare training for selected members<br />
of the Kuwaiti military. About a month<br />
before the start of the Air War, 17 Kuwaiti military<br />
personnel underwent a rigorous fiveweek<br />
training course, but when DESERT<br />
STORM’s air attack began on 16 January<br />
1991, the Iraqis closed the border, limiting<br />
infiltration options. Out of necessity, training<br />
then concentrated on infiltration methods.<br />
From 14-20 February 1991, SEALs trained<br />
13 Kuwaitis for a maritime infiltration onto a<br />
beach area south of Kuwait City. They conducted<br />
a dress rehearsal on 21 February 1991 and<br />
attempted infiltrating five Kuwaitis on the next<br />
day. SEAL swimmer scouts first reconnoitered<br />
the shoreline and then escorted the Kuwaitis to<br />
the pier. Unable to link up with the friendly<br />
forces, the Kuwaitis signaled for extraction and<br />
were picked up about 500 meters from the<br />
beach. The mission was aborted, and the SEALs<br />
and Kuwaitis returned safely. Post-war examination<br />
of the beach revealed undetected beach<br />
obstacles and heavier Iraqi troop dispositions<br />
than anticipated.<br />
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)<br />
During DESERT SHIELD, SOCCENT established<br />
procedures for CSAR, a mission that planners<br />
expected would be of critical importance,<br />
given the projected losses of coalition aircraft.<br />
Before it would launch a CSAR mission, SOC-<br />
CENT required a visual parachute sighting and<br />
a voice transmission from the downed pilot, as<br />
well as enemy threat analysis. SOCCENT conducted<br />
full scale CSAR exercises before the Air<br />
War started. To support the CSAR mission,<br />
SOCCENT established forward operating bases<br />
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