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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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joint training with NSWTG small boats and took<br />

part in a CSAR exercise with USS Nicholas.<br />

During DESERT STORM, the Sawahil provided<br />

an operational platform for coalition forces,<br />

including NSWTG <strong>Special</strong> Boat Unit detachments,<br />

Kuwaiti patrol boats, and SEALs.<br />

Coalition warfare training continued until<br />

the eve of the ground war. The Arab forces in<br />

the east and north faced formidable military<br />

obstacles along their projected areas of advance,<br />

including multiple Iraqi minefields, “fire trenches,”<br />

and above-ground pipelines. An SF team<br />

worked with a Saudi engineer battalion to plan<br />

for clearing invasion lanes through two Iraqi<br />

minefields and over an above-ground pipeline<br />

inside Kuwait. On 22 February, the Saudi engineers<br />

and U.S. <strong>Special</strong> Forces easily cleared six<br />

lanes because the Iraqis, battered for over a<br />

month by allied air power, failed to cover the<br />

minefields with artillery fire. In the north, other<br />

SF teams worked with the Saudis and the<br />

Egyptians to create breaches in the minefields<br />

for the passage of their forces. On 25 February,<br />

the Egyptians drove into Kuwait against sporadic<br />

resistance. The Egyptian corps that the<br />

5th SFG (A) teams supported served as the<br />

hinge for CENTCOM’s huge turning movement.<br />

By the night of 26 February, the Egyptians and<br />

their SF advisors had reached their objectives<br />

near Kuwait City.<br />

The 28 February cease fire marked the end of<br />

most SOCCENT coalition warfare activities. It<br />

had been a huge effort, requiring an entire<br />

<strong>Special</strong> Forces Group, SEALs, <strong>Special</strong> Boat<br />

Units, and support elements. SF teams accompanied<br />

109 allied units, from battalion to corps,<br />

providing CAS and liaison between forces. SOF<br />

eventually trained about 30,000 coalition troops<br />

in 44 subject areas.<br />

Kuwaiti Reconstitution and<br />

Unconventional Warfare<br />

American <strong>Special</strong> Forces units helped to<br />

reconstitute a number of Kuwaiti military<br />

forces, both conventional and unconventional.<br />

As a result of meetings between the SOCCENT<br />

commander, Colonel Jesse Johnson, and the<br />

Kuwaiti Armed Forces Chief of Staff, soldiers<br />

from the 5th SFG (A) began training Kuwaiti<br />

soldiers in mid-September at KKMC. The initial<br />

mission was to form a Kuwaiti SF battalion and<br />

a commando brigade, but the training went so<br />

well that the mission grew to include four additional<br />

Kuwaiti infantry brigades. Eventually,<br />

SOF units trained a total of 6,357 Kuwaitis, who<br />

formed an SF battalion, a commando brigade,<br />

and the Al-Khulud, Al-Haq, Fatah, and Badr<br />

infantry brigades. The instruction included<br />

weapons training, tactics, staff procedures, CAS,<br />

anti-armor operations, and nuclear, chemical<br />

and biological defense.<br />

Colonel Johnson also formed a <strong>Special</strong><br />

Planning Group to conduct specialized unconventional<br />

warfare training for selected members<br />

of the Kuwaiti military. About a month<br />

before the start of the Air War, 17 Kuwaiti military<br />

personnel underwent a rigorous fiveweek<br />

training course, but when DESERT<br />

STORM’s air attack began on 16 January<br />

1991, the Iraqis closed the border, limiting<br />

infiltration options. Out of necessity, training<br />

then concentrated on infiltration methods.<br />

From 14-20 February 1991, SEALs trained<br />

13 Kuwaitis for a maritime infiltration onto a<br />

beach area south of Kuwait City. They conducted<br />

a dress rehearsal on 21 February 1991 and<br />

attempted infiltrating five Kuwaitis on the next<br />

day. SEAL swimmer scouts first reconnoitered<br />

the shoreline and then escorted the Kuwaitis to<br />

the pier. Unable to link up with the friendly<br />

forces, the Kuwaitis signaled for extraction and<br />

were picked up about 500 meters from the<br />

beach. The mission was aborted, and the SEALs<br />

and Kuwaitis returned safely. Post-war examination<br />

of the beach revealed undetected beach<br />

obstacles and heavier Iraqi troop dispositions<br />

than anticipated.<br />

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)<br />

During DESERT SHIELD, SOCCENT established<br />

procedures for CSAR, a mission that planners<br />

expected would be of critical importance,<br />

given the projected losses of coalition aircraft.<br />

Before it would launch a CSAR mission, SOC-<br />

CENT required a visual parachute sighting and<br />

a voice transmission from the downed pilot, as<br />

well as enemy threat analysis. SOCCENT conducted<br />

full scale CSAR exercises before the Air<br />

War started. To support the CSAR mission,<br />

SOCCENT established forward operating bases<br />

50

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