HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was crucial to the
JUST CAUSE campaign plan because it would
enable the 82nd Airborne Division to come into
the country, while preventing the 2nd PDF
Company and the Panamanian Air Force from
interfering with American operations. The
Torrijos/Tocumen complex formed a target area
about six kilometers long and two kilometers
wide.
The TF RED Commander, Colonel William
F. “Buck” Kernan, gave the mission of capturing
Torrijos/Tocumen to 1st BN, 75th Ranger
Regiment, commanded by LTC Robert W.
Wagner. The Rangers had a tight schedule to
seize this complex—an 82nd Airborne Division
brigade was supposed to jump onto the complex
only 45 minutes after H-hour to start follow-on
missions. First battalion’s three companies were
augmented by Company C, 3rd BN, 75th Ranger
Regiment, PSYOP teams, a CA team, two AH-6
attack helicopters, Air Force Special Tactics
teams, and an AC-130H gunship.
LTC Wagner’s plan called for the helicopters
and AC-130H to attack the PDF positions at H-
hour, just prior to the Ranger parachute assault.
After parachuting in, Company A would seize
the Panamanian Air Force compound and
destroy the aircraft. Company C, reinforced
with a platoon from Company B, would seize the
2nd PDF compound and destroy the PDF
Company. The rest of Company B, reinforced
with 12 gun jeeps and ten motorcycles, would
clear both runways and establish blocking positions
to prevent other PDF forces from interfering
with the battalion’s operations. Finally,
Company C, 3rd BN would clear the smaller
buildings near the Torrijos terminal, isolate the
terminal building, and then enter the terminal
building and destroy PDF resistance there.
Prior to the attack, three combat controllers
(CCTs) and one pararescueman placed navigation
beacons near the end of the runway. The
attack began at 0100, with the AC-130H and
AH-6s opening fire on PDF positions on the airfield.
The AH-6s eliminated three targets while
the AC-130H fired on the 2nd Rifle Company’s
barracks and headquarters building. It should
be remembered that TF GATOR and other units
had attacked the Comandancia in Panama City
15 minutes early, at 0045, which meant the PDF
at Torrijos/Tocumen knew of the invasion prior
Rangers preparing for airborne assault.
to the Rangers’ airdrop. At 0103, the first
jumpers left their aircraft.
Company A received only sporadic fire and
secured all of its objectives within two hours
after capturing virtually the entire Panamanian
Air Force on the ground. The company captured
about 20 Panamanian Air Force personnel hiding
in one of the hangars. Company B also landed
on target and quickly secured its blocking
positions. Like Company A, it received only sporadic
enemy fire and took some prisoners. The
biggest problem Company B had was with
Panamanian vehicles ignoring its warning signs
and barricades and trying to run its blocking
positions. Generally these vehicles turned
around and fled after the Rangers fired warning
shots, but one vehicle had to be disabled by
shooting out its tires. One of the vehicles that
fled the warning shots contained Manuel
Noriega, who had been visiting the Cereme
Military Recreation Center. Company C
assaulted the barracks of the PDF’s 2nd
Company and received only ineffective enemy
fire; they quickly cleared the area, killing one
PDF soldier who had refused to surrender.
Company C, 3rd BN, 75th Ranger Regiment
was to secure the international air terminal, and
this proved to be the only portion of the assault
on Torrijos/Tocumen that was significantly more
difficult than expected. First, one-fourth of the
company landed in ten-foot tall cunna grass to
the west of the runway and took two hours to
join the main body. The depleted Company C
had no trouble securing its objectives outside the
38