HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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SOKF-J-9 (Futures) also integrated IW concepts into joint and service war games and experiments that address capability requirements in future operating environments. The war games and experiments were used to validate IW concepts that would shape DOD’s response to the irregular threats that jeopardized our strategic national interests. In June 2007, CDRUSSOCOM established an IW Directorate (J-10) in SOKF to maintain the momentum in IW planning and policy and provide continuous focus on IW-related issues cutting across all operational and programmatic lines. Scheduled to reach full operational capability in October 2008, the J-10 planned to leverage the IW efforts already completed and collaborate with the IW community to facilitate the application of IW strategies in support of U.S. national objectives. Interagency Task Force: Winning the GWOT required the full participation of the entire Inter-Agency community. In April 2006, USSOCOM’s Center for Special Operations (CSO) stood up an Interagency Task Force (IATF) to expand USSOCOM’s global synchronization effort to include agencies outside the Department of Defense. The IATF acted as a catalyst to rapidly facilitate CT collaboration within DOD and across the interagency (IA) against trans-regional terrorist organizations with strategic level focus against terrorist strengths and weakness. When possible, the IATF would support other U.S. agencies and host nations during crises across the world. In this process, the IATF assisted in the development of strategic and operational concepts and plans to facilitate action by the most appropriate combination of DOD, IA organizations, or partner nation organizations. All the major interagency partners (as well as the combat support agencies) were represented in the task force. By design, the IATF could be the lead for SOF objectives, or could support other U.S. agencies’ goals. The IATF focused on CSO priority efforts such as countering the global foreign terror network and collaborating on strategic communications initiatives. The foundation for interagency interaction was built on three fundamental principles: (1) the accumulation of knowledge on specific strategic level problem sets; (2) the development of communities of interest in which collaboration, analysis, and information sharing occurred; and (3) the linking of this knowledge, analysis, and operational recommendations to decision makers across the interagency. The IATF also provided direct support and leadership to the USSOCOM Crisis Action Planning Team in support of the Command’s Time Sensitive Planning process and mission. 1987 EARNEST WILL- MH-60 Blackhawk landing on Hercules. 2006 OEF - A Predator UAV sits in a maintenance bunker in Afghanistan. 31
President George W. Bush signed the UCP which codified USSOCOM’s authorities and responsibilities as the lead command in the GWOT. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was instrumental in granting USSOCOM new missions and authorities. Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, presided over the QDR. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Dec 2007 - present CJCS General Richard Myers Oct 2001 - Sep 2005 CJCS General Peter Pace Sep 2005 - Oct 2007 CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen Oct 2007 - present 32
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7 and 8: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 9 and 10: USSOCOM Commanders There have been
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
Page 13 and 14: Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
Page 15 and 16: Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
Page 17 and 18: During the review process for the 2
Page 19 and 20: HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
Page 21 and 22: greatly improved the command’s ab
Page 23 and 24: (7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
Page 25 and 26: USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
Page 27 and 28: forming its acquisition functions a
Page 29 and 30: nature were key goals in addition t
Page 31: COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
Page 35 and 36: Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
Page 37 and 38: The invasion of Panama, known as Op
Page 39 and 40: Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
Page 41 and 42: ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
Page 43 and 44: second pass, one pilot saw movement
Page 45 and 46: Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
Page 47 and 48: BLACK elements returned to Albrook
Page 49 and 50: Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
Page 51 and 52: joint training with NSWTG small boa
Page 53 and 54: Special Tactics Teams train during
Page 55 and 56: Schwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT w
Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
Page 61 and 62: HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
Page 69 and 70: In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
Page 71 and 72: what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
Page 73 and 74: Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
Page 75 and 76: Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
Page 77 and 78: In conjunction with the UN, the Org
Page 79 and 80: Special Forces soldiers train Niger
Page 81 and 82: Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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No other international donor has ma
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flooded and damaged areas, signific
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government, so the “lead agency
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Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
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ather than target coordinates into
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would prove adequate to both assaul
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100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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coalition forces continued to searc
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the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
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inside the helicopter and began tre
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not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Special Forces began training the A
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During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
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east of the city of Khowst. While b
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Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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their combat operations in southern
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Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
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Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
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line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
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TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
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accordance with his importance, Sad
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Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
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with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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increasing security in Iraq. The ER
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“extra-judicial killings” condu
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
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Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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