HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

nature were key goals in addition to focusing on
safe, reliable, and sustainable UAS capabilities.
More recently, USSOCOM has used the urgent
deployment acquisition process to acquire the
mine resistant ambush protected vehicles to
counter the widespread threat of improvised
explosive devices.
The GWOT has altered pre-9/11 procurement
strategies in order to reprogram funds to
enhance SOF warfighting capabilities. USSO-
COM funded improved maritime systems with
common infrared sensors, advanced armor protection,
and improved creature comforts. The
most significant system improvement was the
installation of the combatant craft forward looking
infrared (CCFLIR) system on all maritime
surface mobility platforms from 2006 through
2007. CCFLIR provided a day and night high
resolution infrared imaging and camera capability
that greatly enhanced SOF maritime crew
situational awareness. Also, USSOCOM funded
the afloat forward staging base (AFSB) proof of
concept by using a commercial High Speed vessel
(HSV), modified to support special operations,
to serve as a base for SOF operations in
littoral areas. Later, other commercial vessels
were used as AFSBs, providing additional lessons
learned. USSOCOM continued to work
with the Navy to develop a Joint Capabilities
Document (JCD), which would articulate the
capabilities required in a SOF AFSB. By early
2008, although the exact form of a future AFSB
for SOF had not yet been defined, it was clear
that a suitable platform would enhance SOF
capabilities in littoral areas. USSOCOM programmed
for the personnel and equipment needed
for a fourth battalion for USASOC’s 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)
(Airborne). USSOCOM also equipped its newest
component, the Marine Special Operations
Command.
In 2004, General Brown shifted the command’s
emphasis on SOF acquisition toward
personal equipment critical to the SOF Warrior
and on vertical lift capability. In the SOF
Warrior System Program Executive Office
(PEO), he consolidated more than 90 acquisition
programs related to personnel equipment and
ranked it over other systems. These included
global positioning systems, night vision and
optical devices, individual weapons, and body
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armor. Consolidating these acquisitions under a
single program office ensured that vital and relatively
low cost items were not overlooked or
underfunded. In this way, USSOCOM continued
to “equip the man.” To provide greater focus on
vertical lift, General Brown split the Maritime
and Rotary Wing PEO to create a separate
Rotary Wing PEO. This new office provided the
management oversight and vision for transforming
the SOF rotary wing fleet while supporting
operations in the GWOT. These shifts in emphasis,
accompanied by an unprecedented increase
in SOF funding, resulted in a force that is not
only more experienced, but also better trained
and better equipped. Admiral Olson has continued
the pursuit of increased capabilities for
SOF, making “Sustain and Modernize the Force”
one of his three priorities.
OPTEMPO and Quality People
There has been a steady increase in SOF
deployments since USSOCOM’s inception,
measured by both personnel deployments and
the number of countries visited. At varying
times during the 1990s, certain “high
demand/low density” specialties within Special
Operations, PSYOPs, and CA forces endured
repeated, long deployments. Concerns arose
within the DOD about the long-term impact
these absences were having on retention and
readiness. During FY 1993, USSOCOM averaged
2,036 personnel deployed away from home
station per week; by FY 1996 the average had
more than doubled, climbing to 4,613. In FY
1999, the number reached 5,141. From 1998 to
2001, SOF had deployed to an average of 150
countries per year. What caused this dramatic
increase?
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War resulted in (to use General
Lindsay’s term) a more “violent peace”— regional
destabilization, a new round of terrorism, and
an increased availability of weapons of mass
destruction. The changed military threat made
SOF’s capabilities more relevant to the national
military strategy.
Why were SOF used so often as an instrument
of national policy? SOF were versatile,
ready, and uniquely capable of operating in all
politico-military environments, skilled at peacetime
training, FID, and nation assistance opera-