HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

training foreign air forces. Each Army Ranger
battalion would receive a fourth company of
Rangers and a reconnaissance platoon. Every
active duty SFG would receive a fourth SF battalion
while the Army National Guard (ARNG)
SFGs were slated to grow by almost 20 percent.
PDM III directed that Army CA would grow by
almost 20 percent and Army PSYOP would
increase by more than 50 percent. USSOCOM
would retain active duty CA and PSYOP units,
and the reserve component CA and PSYOP
would be transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve.
PDM III increased NAVSPECWARCOM
force structure by 536 personnel, including an
increase in the size of the Naval SOF UAV program,
additional non-SEAL divers to facilitate
SEAL operations, and more personnel for
Special Boat Units. The headquarters staffs of
NSW units would be increased to meet the
GWOT workload and incorporate IO and other
capabilities. The PDM directed a study of the
desired capabilities for afloat forward staging
bases (AFSBs) to support SOF. Once procured,
the AFSBs would be a major expansion of NSW
capability.
To provide C2 for these additional forces, the
TSOCs would grow by almost 25 percent, and
USSOCOM headquarters would also expand to
handle its GWOT responsibilities over the longterm.
Finally, USSOCOM and subordinate elements
would oversee an expansion in military
construction to accommodate the programmed
growth.
As the terrorists changed their tactics and
targets often, USSOCOM had to be equally flexible.
UCP 2004, the GWOT campaign plan, QDR
2006, and PDM III, all helped move DOD past
crisis management and into a resourced longterm
war against terrorism. But, the GWOT
would continue to require adjustments to plans,
policies, and force structures to meet the evolving
threats posed by an adaptive enemy.
General Brown promised not to lower standards
during the growth of force structure. If subsequent
experience showed that the PDM III force
structure was not ideal, then USSOCOM would
request changes. As of FY09, HQ USSOCOM
had 1,976 authorized billets, while all SOF had
grown to 55,890 personnel.
Systems Acquisitions and Force
Modernization
A primary rationale for establishing the command
was the services’ failure to modernize SOF
systems. Keen congressional interest in this
area continued after the command was activated,
and a 17 November 1987 conference report
criticized DOD for the lack of progress in procuring
“SOF-peculiar equipment.” Some on Capitol
Hill labeled this lack of progress as “malicious
implementation” of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment.
The Congress enacted an additional piece of legislation
on 4 December 1987 that authorized
CINCSOC to function as a “Head of Agency” for
SOF acquisition programs, an authority normally
reserved for the service secretaries.
The command took another major step forward
when the Deputy Secretary of Defense
approved the establishment of the Special
Operations Research, Development, and
Acquisition Center (SORDAC) on 10 December
1990. By early 1991, SORDAC had started per-
25