HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the USSO-
COM budget, including supplemental funding,
had nearly doubled to $7.4 billion, and the 2005
QDR and Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM) directed further increases for the next
five years. Recognizing that supplemental funds
would not be available in the long-term, USSO-
COM used the QDR and the PDM to increase
baseline funding. In FY 2008, the USSOCOM
budget accounted for only about 1.5 percent of
the total budget for DOD. The nation received a
remarkable return from the defense budget that
went to SOF.
With SOF deployed around the world combating
terrorism, USSOCOM relied, for the most
part, on emergency supplemental funding to
meet the increased OPTEMPO and resultant
requirements for more equipment and weapon
systems. The 2001 QDR was published immediately
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and did not
address the GWOT. Not until the QDR process
began in early 2005 did DOD systematically
address the GWOT requirements, and the
resources USSOCOM would need for this longterm
commitment.
In early 2005, USSO-
COM had been designated
the lead combatant command
for planning and
synchronizing the GWOT.
By 2005, after several
years of intense combat
experience, USSOCOM
had a clear vision of what
was needed in terms of
capability and capacity to
fight and win the GWOT.
With the vast majority of
SOF fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the command
needed more force
structure to prevent terrorist
encroachment in
other areas around the
world. Gaining this additional
force structure was
one of General Brown’s
primary goals entering the
QDR process.
On 1 March 2005, OSD
published the QDR Terms
CAPABILITY, CAPACITY, AND
THE 2006 QDR
An organization or a weapon system
provides a capability. Building
more copies of existing organizations
and systems increases capacity but
does not increase capability.
During the Cold War, much of the
force structure debate centered on
capacity issues such as numbers of
tanks, planes, and ships. When the
Cold War ended, many believed that
the U.S. had excess capacity, and
debate shifted to new capabilities
that might be needed, such as information
technologies. The GWOT
presented the U.S. with new, adaptive
adversaries requiring new capabilities,
but sustaining large, longterm
deployments to Iraq and
Afghanistan also strained U.S. military
capacity. To address these two
different types of challenges, the
2006 QDR was the first to differentiate
between capabilities and capacities.
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of Reference (TOR) that emphasized special
operations more than ever before, and therefore,
USSOCOM won approval to be treated like a
fifth service during the QDR process. Thus, in
key meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, USSOCOM Deputy Commander Vice
Admiral Eric T. Olson participated as an equal
member. This was the first in a series of
changes to the QDR process designed to meet
the GWOT demands. By the time the QDR
report was published in February 2006, not only
was USSOCOM being treated as another service,
but special operations was addressed as a
separate category on a par with air, ground, and
maritime operations.
The 2006 QDR acknowledged that the
GWOT was going to be a “long war” and would
extend far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The
review provided strategic guidance for U.S.
defense planning in the GWOT, addressed other
threats to U.S. national security, and continued
the DOD transformation.
In another departure from previous practice,
the 2006 QDR led directly to changes in programs
and force structures
designed to implement its
guidance. These changes
were promulgated in the
PDM for the FY 2007-2011
Defense Program, and especially
in PDM III published
on 20 December 2005. The
force structure changes
included a dramatic
increase in the capability
and capacity of forces
assigned to USSOCOM,
including the creation of a
new component—MARSOC.
Indeed, PDM III directed
the largest increase in the
authorized personnel
strength in USSOCOM’s 20-
year history.
The AFSOC would receive
a squadron of Predator
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) and was slated to
double the size of the
Combat Aviation FID
Squadron charged with