HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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cedures to monitor how the budget was executed in accordance with the BOD decisions. In this way, General Schoomaker aligned the dollars to the command’s most important acquisition programs. During Generals Schoomaker’s and Holland’s tenures, the command completed a number of significant resourcing initiatives. SORR completed three important initiatives: the TSOC manpower study that downsized the headquarters to provide personnel to the TSOCs; creating two joint special operations aviation component commands; and keeping two National Guard <strong>Special</strong> Forces (SF) battalions. SORR secured the transfer of 1,687 Army spaces and funding to support a variety of readiness and operational requirements. The USSOCOM POMs maintained SOF readiness while modernizing by using off-the-shelf technology. With OSD, the headquarters staff developed and executed the Defense Financial Accounting System, which managed resources through a joint accounting system. SORR got DOD to identify a service to provide common support, base operations, and management headquarters support for unified commands and the TSOCs. Other initiatives included increasing the size of the 96th CA Battalion by 30 percent (84 billets) and creating the Navy Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. After assuming command in 2007, Admiral Olson made a fundamental shift in USSOCOM’s POM process. In previous POM cycles, the resource sponsors for procurement and acquisition programs were in the USSOCOM headquarters. In addition, the command did not then have an effective process to divest programs that were no longer relevant to SOF. In his guidance for FY 2010-2015 POM, Admiral Olson made the components commanders the resource sponsors for their commands’ procurement and acquisition capabilities and gave them their own total obligation authority (TOA). Thus, the component commanders had to prioritize their programs and the authority to programmatically fund those programs they deem most critical. USSOCOM would provide final oversight for all programmatic changes in order to ensure that USSOCOM’s limited resources would be applied to those capabilities with the greatest operational return. USSOCOM also put into place a process to fund new joint SOF initiatives for emerging missions, force transformation, modernization, and critical needs. Additionally, each component commander had to identify five redundant or obsolete funded programs under his responsibility for divestiture consideration by the Board of Directors (BOD) and to identify items that were not SOF-unique but were service-common items and, therefore, should be service-funded. All these steps were designed to ensure the most effective use of SOF dollars and provide those closest to the war fighters with a greater say in what was required. The shift in focus from major platforms and programs to what the individual SOF warrior needed, which was started by General Brown, continued under Admiral Olson. Before 9/11, the USSOCOM budget stood at just under $4 billion per year. During the Holland and Brown tenures, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and SOF involvement in the GWOT led to a huge increase in 23
USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the USSO- COM budget, including supplemental funding, had nearly doubled to $7.4 billion, and the 2005 QDR and Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directed further increases for the next five years. Recognizing that supplemental funds would not be available in the long-term, USSO- COM used the QDR and the PDM to increase baseline funding. In FY 2008, the USSOCOM budget accounted for only about 1.5 percent of the total budget for DOD. The nation received a remarkable return from the defense budget that went to SOF. With SOF deployed around the world combating terrorism, USSOCOM relied, for the most part, on emergency supplemental funding to meet the increased OPTEMPO and resultant requirements for more equipment and weapon systems. The 2001 QDR was published immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and did not address the GWOT. Not until the QDR process began in early 2005 did DOD systematically address the GWOT requirements, and the resources USSOCOM would need for this longterm commitment. In early 2005, USSO- COM had been designated the lead combatant command for planning and synchronizing the GWOT. By 2005, after several years of intense combat experience, USSOCOM had a clear vision of what was needed in terms of capability and capacity to fight and win the GWOT. With the vast majority of SOF fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the command needed more force structure to prevent terrorist encroachment in other areas around the world. Gaining this additional force structure was one of General Brown’s primary goals entering the QDR process. On 1 March 2005, OSD published the QDR Terms CAPABILITY, CAPACITY, AND THE 2006 QDR An organization or a weapon system provides a capability. Building more copies of existing organizations and systems increases capacity but does not increase capability. During the Cold War, much of the force structure debate centered on capacity issues such as numbers of tanks, planes, and ships. When the Cold War ended, many believed that the U.S. had excess capacity, and debate shifted to new capabilities that might be needed, such as information technologies. The GWOT presented the U.S. with new, adaptive adversaries requiring new capabilities, but sustaining large, longterm deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan also strained U.S. military capacity. To address these two different types of challenges, the 2006 QDR was the first to differentiate between capabilities and capacities. 24 of Reference (TOR) that emphasized special operations more than ever before, and therefore, USSOCOM won approval to be treated like a fifth service during the QDR process. Thus, in key meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM Deputy <strong>Command</strong>er Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson participated as an equal member. This was the first in a series of changes to the QDR process designed to meet the GWOT demands. By the time the QDR report was published in February 2006, not only was USSOCOM being treated as another service, but special operations was addressed as a separate category on a par with air, ground, and maritime operations. The 2006 QDR acknowledged that the GWOT was going to be a “long war” and would extend far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The review provided strategic guidance for U.S. defense planning in the GWOT, addressed other threats to U.S. national security, and continued the DOD transformation. In another departure from previous practice, the 2006 QDR led directly to changes in programs and force structures designed to implement its guidance. These changes were promulgated in the PDM for the FY 2007-2011 Defense Program, and especially in PDM III published on 20 December 2005. The force structure changes included a dramatic increase in the capability and capacity of forces assigned to USSOCOM, including the creation of a new component—MARSOC. Indeed, PDM III directed the largest increase in the authorized personnel strength in USSOCOM’s 20- year history. The AFSOC would receive a squadron of Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and was slated to double the size of the Combat Aviation FID Squadron charged with
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7 and 8: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 9 and 10: USSOCOM Commanders There have been
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
Page 13 and 14: Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
Page 15 and 16: Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
Page 17 and 18: During the review process for the 2
Page 19 and 20: HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
Page 21 and 22: greatly improved the command’s ab
Page 23: (7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
Page 27 and 28: forming its acquisition functions a
Page 29 and 30: nature were key goals in addition t
Page 31 and 32: COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
Page 33 and 34: President George W. Bush signed the
Page 35 and 36: Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
Page 37 and 38: The invasion of Panama, known as Op
Page 39 and 40: Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
Page 41 and 42: ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
Page 43 and 44: second pass, one pilot saw movement
Page 45 and 46: Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
Page 47 and 48: BLACK elements returned to Albrook
Page 49 and 50: Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
Page 51 and 52: joint training with NSWTG small boa
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Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
Page 61 and 62: HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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No other international donor has ma
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flooded and damaged areas, signific
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government, so the “lead agency
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Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
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ather than target coordinates into
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would prove adequate to both assaul
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100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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coalition forces continued to searc
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the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
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inside the helicopter and began tre
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not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Special Forces began training the A
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During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
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east of the city of Khowst. While b
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Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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their combat operations in southern
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Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
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Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
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line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
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TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
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accordance with his importance, Sad
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Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
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with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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increasing security in Iraq. The ER
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“extra-judicial killings” condu
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
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Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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