HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ences in support of U.S. objectives in areas that crossed GCC boundaries. The JMISC operates by, with, and through the GCCs, and works closely with the interagency to identify how best to reach out to certain segments of the foreign population. The JMISC consisted of functional, cultural, and geographical personnel who brought a “combined arms” approach to tackling the information war. To assist in synchronizing operational efforts between the JMISC and the Joint Information Operations Warfighting Center (JIOWC), Strategic Command (STRATCOM) assigned a liaison officer (LNO) to JMISC for 2007. The LNO was instrumental in identifying overlaps and gaps in each of the organizations’ missions and enhanced cooperation between the two commands. The JMISC also directly supported the GCCs by providing personnel to assist in current and future planning, and, at times, augments GCC staffs for extended periods of time. In 2007, to reduce operational OIF and OEF PSYOP staff shortfalls, JMISC personnel augmented the following units: the IO Task Force (IOTF) in Iraq; the CENTCOM Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) in Qatar; and a SOF Task Force in Iraq. The JMISC also supported the GWOT missions of USSOCOM, the GCCs, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassadors, and the interagency by providing personnel support and sophisticated strategic PSYOP products. Since October 2004, first the JPSE and then the JMISC developed several programs to support the GWOT. Examples of those programs follow: (1) Developed and coordinated an expanded Trans-Regional PSYOP Program (ETRP) that increased the authorities, objectives and audiences of the Trans-Regional PSYOP (TRP) Program. The GCCs and USSOCOM, when the supported commander, could conduct PSYOP in support of DOD GWOT activities. (2) On 5 April 2007, the Secretary of Defense approved the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI), authorizing the GCCs to establish web sites tailored to foreign audiences. The JPSE and USSOCOM developed and coordinated a centrally-managed web site architecture where GCCs’ counterterror and theater security cooperation web sites were located in order to achieve cost efficiencies and enhance quality and synchronization. JMISC facilitated the establishment of a MNF-I web site to counter extremist ideology and promote security and stability within Iraq. The site became operational on 1 October 2007. JMISC served as the transregional synchronizer for all content for TRWI web sites. (3) JMISC executed activities in support of USCENTCOM efforts that were designed to reduce the flow of foreign fighters and bombmaking material into Iraq and Afghanistan. JMISC also worked to deter the spread of extremist idologies. JMISC was developing a proof of concept prototype for GCCs to use as their template to launch web sites to counter extremist ideology under the auspices of TRWI. (4) JMISC provided GCCs with quarterly regional magazines for foreign audiences. These magazines support GCCs counterterrorism and theater security goals and objectives, which included countering violent extreme organizations, diminishing trans-regional activities such as piracy, WMD proliferation, promoting global security and stability, synchronizing the global CT message, and building support for U.S. actions and policies. Three editions of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) magazine, titled Dialogo, have been published and distributed. The USCENTCOM magazine, Unipath, and the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) magazine, Agora, were to be published and distributed by April 2008. (5) Since 2004, JMISC and its predecessors provided a long-range short-wave radio capability to support USCENTCOM’s requirement to broadcast daily programming in support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. (6) CJCS funded a Mali documentary. The CJCS funded $1.5 million to provide assistance in developing a documentary that captures the moderate, tolerant tenets of Islam through hand-written manuscripts passed down from Imam to Imam for the past 400 years. The National Endowment for Democracy and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were championing the completion of this project with an objective of getting the documentary into Muslim theaters in fall 2008. 21
(7) JMISC continued to provide PSYOP planning and prototype support to both SOUTHCOM and the State Department Western Hemisphere Desk to influence strategic change in the AOR. (8) JMISC commissioned a study to identify and catalog the most frequently used extremist propaganda images and associated themes for quick reference. This information is currently published and posted on West Point’s CTC web site. The USSOCOM most recent component—the Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC)—was established on 4 February 2006. Headquartered at Camp Lejeune, the Marine Corps component of USSO- COM started with approximately 1,400 Marines, sailors, and civilian employees and was commanded by a U.S. Marine Corps two-star general. MARSOC includes five subordinate commands: the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), two Marine Special Operations battalions, the Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine Special Operations School. MARSOC was projected to grow to about 2,500 by fiscal year (FY) 2010. The U.S. Marine Corps was a full participant in the special operations community. Budget and POM Development The creation of MFP-11 was an important priority for both General Lindsay and Congress. Although the Cohen-Nunn Amendment had created MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the wording of the law permitted varying interpretations, and some Defense Department officials argued that the new command should not submit its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM). General Lindsay and Ambassador Whitehouse, the ASD (SO/LIC), argued just the opposite and worked extremely hard to win approval of a POM and budget for the command. This debate lingered until September 1988, when Senators Nunn and Cohen clarified congressional intent, saying that the sponsors of the law “fully intended that the commander of the Special Operations Command would have sole 22 responsibility for the preparation of the POM.” Congress enacted Public Law 100-456 that same month, which directed USCINCSOC to submit a POM directly to the Secretary of Defense. On 24 January 1989, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft signed a memorandum giving USCINCSOC budgetary authority over MFP-11. Soon afterwards, OSD gave USSOCOM control of selected MFP-11 programs effective 1 October 1990 and total MFP-11 responsibility in October 1991. For the first time, a CINC was granted authority for a budget and POM. The command needed to create a new planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) process to structure a POM and budget for SOF. Even with a congressional mandate, the command found it difficult to establish MFP- 11. Because of a staff shortfall, the command took a measured approach to assuming these tasks. The POM was the first step, with the initial one completed and submitted in 1988 through the Department of the Air Force. Based on Secretary Taft’s directive, the command assumed budget execution authority by October 1990. In 1991, under General Stiner, the command began to submit fully-supported POMs: this was the first time USSOCOM researched SOF mission requirements and developed the analysis for the POM justification instead of “crosswalking” requirements, which the individual services had developed in previous years. The establishment of MFP-11 set up a more focused resource process and ensured a balanced review of special operations requirements and programs. General Downing directed the creation of the strategic planning process to allocate the command’s resources in the most effective ways. While the prioritization and allocation process has continued, subsequent commanders have made changes. General Schoomaker made significant changes in how the command allocated its resources by ending the competition for scarce dollars and melding the headquarters and components into one team. This meant that the priorities decided upon by CINCSOC and his component commanders (the so-called Board of Directors or “BOD”) would be executed without changes being made by subordinate commands. Second, charged by the CINC to ensure “fidelity” in the resourcing process, SORR developed pro-
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7 and 8: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 9 and 10: USSOCOM Commanders There have been
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
Page 13 and 14: Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
Page 15 and 16: Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
Page 17 and 18: During the review process for the 2
Page 19 and 20: HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
Page 21: greatly improved the command’s ab
Page 25 and 26: USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
Page 27 and 28: forming its acquisition functions a
Page 29 and 30: nature were key goals in addition t
Page 31 and 32: COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
Page 33 and 34: President George W. Bush signed the
Page 35 and 36: Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
Page 37 and 38: The invasion of Panama, known as Op
Page 39 and 40: Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
Page 41 and 42: ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
Page 43 and 44: second pass, one pilot saw movement
Page 45 and 46: Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
Page 47 and 48: BLACK elements returned to Albrook
Page 49 and 50: Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
Page 51 and 52: joint training with NSWTG small boa
Page 53 and 54: Special Tactics Teams train during
Page 55 and 56: Schwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT w
Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
Page 61 and 62: HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
Page 69 and 70: In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
Page 71 and 72: what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
Page 73 and 74:
Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
Page 75 and 76:
Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
Page 77 and 78:
In conjunction with the UN, the Org
Page 79 and 80:
Special Forces soldiers train Niger
Page 81 and 82:
Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
Page 83 and 84:
second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
Page 85 and 86:
Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
Page 87 and 88:
In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
Page 89 and 90:
No other international donor has ma
Page 91 and 92:
flooded and damaged areas, signific
Page 93 and 94:
government, so the “lead agency
Page 95 and 96:
Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
Page 97 and 98:
ather than target coordinates into
Page 99 and 100:
would prove adequate to both assaul
Page 101 and 102:
100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
Page 103 and 104:
coalition forces continued to searc
Page 105 and 106:
the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
Page 107 and 108:
inside the helicopter and began tre
Page 109 and 110:
not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
Page 111 and 112:
Special Forces began training the A
Page 113 and 114:
During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
Page 115 and 116:
east of the city of Khowst. While b
Page 117 and 118:
Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
Page 119 and 120:
their combat operations in southern
Page 121 and 122:
Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
Page 123 and 124:
Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
Page 125 and 126:
line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
Page 127 and 128:
TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
Page 129 and 130:
accordance with his importance, Sad
Page 131 and 132:
Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
Page 133 and 134:
with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
Page 135 and 136:
increasing security in Iraq. The ER
Page 137 and 138:
“extra-judicial killings” condu
Page 139 and 140:
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
Page 141 and 142:
Training in Yemen In December 2005,
Page 143 and 144:
esulting operation known as Balikat
Page 145 and 146:
that template, SOCPAC deployed one
Page 147 and 148:
CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
Page 149 and 150:
Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
Page 151 and 152:
AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
Page 153 and 154:
Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
Page 155 and 156:
47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
Page 157:
United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
show all

HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?