HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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“operations in support of selected USSOCOM-authored DOD GWOT campaign campaigns” and for “selected special plan. The secretary appoved the plan on 28 operations missions.” April. The plan was designed to be reviewed Now, a single agency, USSOCOM, would write global counterterrorism plans and would “synchronize” with the GCCs in developing regional plans that supported its global plans. The 2004 UCP clearly articulated the Secretary of Defense and the President’s decision to designate USSOCOM the lead combatant command periodically as the GWOT campaign evolved, and on 14 February 2007, OSD approved the first revision to the plan. As part of the campaign plan, USSOCOM would “synchronize” the combatant commanders’ regional war on terror plans to ensure that they meet all of USSOCOM’s requirements. The for the GWOT. In April 2005, USSOCOM and coordination was done during global synchronization component commanders designated “synchronize the Global War on Terror” a core USSO- COM mission. conferences. UCP 2004 and related documents and plans resulted in changes to USSOCOM’s mission Secretary Rumsfeld’s July 2002 order for statement. In December 2004, General Brown USSOCOM to develop a plan to deal with terrorist changed it to read: organizations led not only to the overhaul of the UCP, but also marked the start of a collaborative process to write GWOT plans. However, it would take several years to write, coordinate, and win approval for a family of plans and execution orders so that USSOCOM could discharge “USSOCOM plans, directs, and executes special operations in the conduct of the War on Terrorism in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States, its citizens and interests its GWOT responsibilities. worldwide. USSOCOM organizes, trains, Because the GWOT plans would become and equips Special Operations Forces provided DOD’s campaign plan, USSOCOM had to coordinate to Geographic Combatant its plans with the other combatant commands, the Joint Staff and OSD, and also with the interagency departments and agencies. During the writing phase, USSOCOM briefed Commanders, American Ambassadors and their Country Teams.” In May 2005, he shortened it: Secretary Rumsfeld numerous times, apprising him of the plans’ assumptions, mission statements, “USSOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations intent, and revisions. Lieutenant against terrorist networks. USSOCOM General Dell Dailey, CSO Director, also briefed the combatant commands’ staffs on the GWOT trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready Special Operations Forces to combatant plans. The UCP made USSOCOM responsible commands.” for planning OPE, and during the coordination General Brown also changed USSOCOM’s process, some in the interagency arena vision statement because the previous one was expressed concerns over whether this mission too broad for the command’s new GWOT focus. would impinge on their responsibilities. Such In the new vision statement, USSOCOM was: issues were resolved at the Secretary of Defense level. “To be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly During a 2005 Defense Senior Leaders Conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense equipped, and highly motivated: at the Gordon England told the combatant commanders that DOD would use USSOCOM’s GWOT plans as guides for resourcing the combatant right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on Terrorism, accomplishing strategic commands’ GWOT programs. In effect, to get objectives of the United States.” their GWOT plans and programs resourced, the The expansion of USSOCOM’s mission for combatant commanders had to integrate them the GWOT led to dramatic changes in the organization of the headquarters. General Holland with USSOCOM’s efforts. On 29 March 2006, USSOCOM briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the 17
HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006 retained the center structure, but to enable the headquarters to conduct operations more effectively, he transferred the SOOP two-star general to direct a new USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (SCSO). USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (SCSO) evolved from what began as a strategic planning effort by SOF in 2002. This planning effort was combined, over time, with USSOCOM J-2, J-3, and J-5 capabilities to become the USSOCOM war fighting center. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, discussed the greater role USSOCOM would play in the GWOT, when he said at a 7 January 2003 Defense Department News Briefing: “Special Operations Command will function as both a supported and supporting command…. By organizing at SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, as well as at smaller Theater Special Operations Commands in geographic theaters, the Special Operations Command will have the tools it will need to plan and execute missions in support of the global war on terror.” Development of SCSO began under MG Parker, who was tasked by General Brown to consolidate USSOCOM GWOT efforts. MG Parker’s successor, then MG Dailey, continued the progress and SCSO assumed the responsibility for synchronizing the GWOT when UCP 2004 tasked CDR, USSOCOM to be “the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.” When MG Dailey was promoted to LTG, the position was upgraded and he continued as SCSO. In 2007, LTG Fridovich took over as SCSO. His vision for the center was: “SCSO, as part of the USSOCOM team, fully matures as the DOD lead for strategic planning and synchronizing global efforts against terrorist networks, as well as the leading authority on the application of UW/IW.” When General Brown took command, he made more far-reaching changes. In keeping with the command’s new GWOT authorities, General Brown revived the J-staff structure but kept the directorates within the center structure. SOCS, SOAL, and SORR retained the J-1 under SOCS, the J-4 under SOAL, and the J-8 under SORR. The SOIO and SOOP, however, were eliminated, and the personnel were incorporated into the SCSO, encompassing the J-2, J- 3, J-5, and other functions. General Brown also succeeded in making the SCSO director a three- 18
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7 and 8: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 9 and 10: USSOCOM Commanders There have been
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
Page 13 and 14: Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
Page 15 and 16: Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
Page 17: During the review process for the 2
Page 21 and 22: greatly improved the command’s ab
Page 23 and 24: (7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
Page 25 and 26: USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
Page 27 and 28: forming its acquisition functions a
Page 29 and 30: nature were key goals in addition t
Page 31 and 32: COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
Page 33 and 34: President George W. Bush signed the
Page 35 and 36: Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
Page 37 and 38: The invasion of Panama, known as Op
Page 39 and 40: Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
Page 41 and 42: ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
Page 43 and 44: second pass, one pilot saw movement
Page 45 and 46: Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
Page 47 and 48: BLACK elements returned to Albrook
Page 49 and 50: Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
Page 51 and 52: joint training with NSWTG small boa
Page 53 and 54: Special Tactics Teams train during
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Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
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Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
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what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
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Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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No other international donor has ma
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flooded and damaged areas, signific
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government, so the “lead agency
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Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
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ather than target coordinates into
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would prove adequate to both assaul
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100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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coalition forces continued to searc
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the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
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inside the helicopter and began tre
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not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Special Forces began training the A
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During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
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east of the city of Khowst. While b
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Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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their combat operations in southern
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Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
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Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
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line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
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TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
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accordance with his importance, Sad
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Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
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with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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increasing security in Iraq. The ER
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“extra-judicial killings” condu
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
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Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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