HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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orism, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld wanted a single headquarters— USSOCOM—to have primary military responsibility for the GWOT. In July 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed USSOCOM to develop a plan to find and deal with the international threat of terrorist organizations. For the next three years, during the tenures of General Holland and his successor, General Brown, USSOCOM would work to win support for its efforts to be the lead unified command for planning and synchronizing the GWOT. This would not be an easy or quick process. Some in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) felt that the command had not been fully used in the GWOT and that it should have assumed the leading role among the GCCs. General Holland had not been given any new authorities, however, and the combatant commanders were reluctant to relinquish some of their prerogatives to USSOCOM. OSD commissioned a study by the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) to evaluate USSOCOM’s strategy for the GWOT. After receiving SOF briefings, IDA reported to Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002 that the command had a viable strategy, and the Secretary then authorized a $7.1 billion plus-up for MFP-11 for the future years defense plan (FYDP) 04-09. Defeating the terrorist networks required the United States to meet two fundamental challenges that had not been addressed before 9/11. First, to close the seams between U.S. government organizations that the 9/11 terrorists had exploited, and second, to build a global counterterrorist network to counter the evolving terrorist threat and networks. These challenges were addressed in the National Military Strategy, various operational plans (OPLANs), and a host of other documents, as well as through reform of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which assigned responsibilities to USSOCOM and the other unified combatant commands. The DOD divided the world into GCCs, where each geographic commander had responsibility and authority for military activities in his area of responsibility (AOR). Under the UCP in effect in September 2001, USSOCOM organized, trained, and equipped SOF, and the geographic commanders employed SOF in their respective areas. In 2001, no single GCC had the lead for countering terrorism, and the 9/11 terrorists had cut across the GCC boundaries by recruiting, planning, and training in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), CENTCOM, and PACOM areas of responsibility. When, in July 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld tasked USSOCOM to develop a plan to deal with terrorist organizations, DOD first had to resolve a number of issues about what USSOCOM’s GWOT authorities would be, and what its relations would be with the other unified commands. How and where was USSOCOM to discharge its new GWOT responsibilities with each GCC already conducting counterterrorism operations in its AOR? How would USSOCOM impact the combatant commanders’ operations and their theater security cooperation programs? How would USSOCOM’s operational role increase, if at all? Over the decades, the GCCs had developed regional expertise and had formed long-term contacts with host nation militaries, all of which would be invaluable in combating terrorism. Rather than trying to recreate the GCCs’ area expertise, USSOCOM explored a number of concepts that would allow the command to act as the lead in countering terrorists around the globe while capitalizing on the GCCs’ capabilites. One option would be for USSOCOM to take command of the TSOCs. This would transfer regional expertise to USSOCOM, but losing the TSOCs would also hamper the GCCs’ efforts to accomplish their regional missions, which also supported the GWOT. The GCCs also had demonstrated expertise in planning and executing operations. Should USSOCOM deploy a headquarters element forward to command and control specific counter terrorist operations, or was there some way to leverage existing warfighting headquarters to command and control counterterrorist operations? Moreover, as USSOCOM became more involved in GWOT operations, could it still perform its service-like functions of organizing, training, and equipping SOF, and managing MFP-11? Should those service-like responsibilities revert back to the services or to some other command to allow USSOCOM to focus on operations? 15
During the review process for the 2004 UCP, the GCCs, Joint Staff, and OSD negotiated these and other points, and the coordination process was long and sometimes difficult. The crux of the issues centered on USSOCOM’s position that it should have authority to compel other combatant commands to recognize the lead role of USSOCOM in GWOT plans. General Holland wrestled with these challenges during his tenure as commander, as would General Brown during his. He did benefit from having worked on many of these issues as deputy commander to General Holland. General Brown knew that the combatant commanders and some on the Joint Staff were not in tune with USSOCOM’s proposed role in the GWOT, and he worked to assuage their concerns. He downplayed the possibility of USSO- COM becoming the supported combatant commander for counterterrorism missions and emphasized decentralized execution of GWOT operations by the GCCs. Eventually, he transferred the requirement to train and maintain a deployable headquarters to the components. When the 2004 UCP was presented to the combatant commanders at the January 2005 Combatant Commanders’ Conference for approval, General Brown proposed that USSO- COM “synchronize” combatant commands’ plans and operations against terrorist networks. The term “synchronize” was important and contentious because USSOCOM would have authority to compel the combatant commands to mesh their counterterrorist plans and operations with USSOCOM’s campaign. With “synchronizing” authority, USSOCOM would be the lead combatant command for GWOT planning and operations. The combatant commanders, however, voted 8 to 1 against this proposal, opting for a version that gave USSOCOM only coordinating authority. After the meeting, Brown convinced General Peter Pace, the Vice Chairman of the JCS, to forward both USSOCOM’s proposal and the one approved by the eight combatant commanders to Secretary Rumsfeld. On 1 March 2005, nearly three and one-half years after 9/11, President George W. Bush signed the 2004 UCP, directing the USSOCOM commander to serve “as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, 16 executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.” Facing a worldwide terrorist threat, the President gave USSOCOM unprecedented authority to control what had traditionally been within the GCCs’ purview, as long as the command coordinated with the other unified commands. The UCP further directed that “CDRUSSOCOM leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise that results in decentralized execution by both USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks.” The USSOCOM commander was to integrate “DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and operations against terrorist networks designated by the Secretary [of Defense]” and plan “campaigns against designated terrorist networks.” Thus, the Secretary of Defense would ensure that USSOCOM focused on the high priority trans-national and trans-regional terrorist threats. Commander, USSOCOM was also responsible for “prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders.” To assist in building counterterrorist networks, UCP 2004 further tasked USSOCOM with “providing military representation to U.S. national and international agencies for matters related to U.S. and multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks, as directed by the Secretary.” USSOCOM would be responsible for “planning operational preparation of the environment (OPE); executing OPE or synchronizing the execution of OPE in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders.” Twice the UCP provided for Commander USSO- COM to be the supported commander, when directed, for
Page 1 and 2: HISTORY 6th Edition
Page 3 and 4: 1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
Page 5 and 6: General James J. Lindsay accepting
Page 7 and 8: Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
Page 9 and 10: USSOCOM Commanders There have been
Page 11 and 12: the impact on its people, the comma
Page 13 and 14: Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
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Page 19 and 20: HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
Page 21 and 22: greatly improved the command’s ab
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Page 25 and 26: USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
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Page 33 and 34: President George W. Bush signed the
Page 35 and 36: Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
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Page 39 and 40: Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
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Page 45 and 46: Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
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of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
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what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
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Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
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No other international donor has ma
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flooded and damaged areas, signific
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government, so the “lead agency
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Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
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ather than target coordinates into
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would prove adequate to both assaul
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100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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coalition forces continued to searc
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the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfec
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inside the helicopter and began tre
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not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Special Forces began training the A
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During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
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east of the city of Khowst. While b
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Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
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their combat operations in southern
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Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
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Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
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line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
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TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
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accordance with his importance, Sad
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Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
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with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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increasing security in Iraq. The ER
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“extra-judicial killings” condu
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Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
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Training in Yemen In December 2005,
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esulting operation known as Balikat
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that template, SOCPAC deployed one
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CTJTF..Counterterrorist Joint Task
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Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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AQIZ: 134, 135 Al Qaim: 127, 136 Al
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Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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