HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

orism, Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld wanted a single headquarters—
USSOCOM—to have primary military responsibility
for the GWOT. In July 2002, Secretary
Rumsfeld directed USSOCOM to develop a plan
to find and deal with the international threat of
terrorist organizations. For the next three
years, during the tenures of General Holland
and his successor, General Brown, USSOCOM
would work to win support for its efforts to be
the lead unified command for planning and synchronizing
the GWOT. This would not be an
easy or quick process.
Some in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) felt that the command had not
been fully used in the GWOT and that it should
have assumed the leading role among the GCCs.
General Holland had not been given any new
authorities, however, and the combatant commanders
were reluctant to relinquish some of
their prerogatives to USSOCOM. OSD commissioned
a study by the Institute of Defense
Analysis (IDA) to evaluate USSOCOM’s strategy
for the GWOT. After receiving SOF briefings,
IDA reported to Secretary Rumsfeld in
December 2002 that the command had a viable
strategy, and the Secretary then authorized a
$7.1 billion plus-up for MFP-11 for the future
years defense plan (FYDP) 04-09.
Defeating the terrorist networks required
the United States to meet two fundamental challenges
that had not been addressed before 9/11.
First, to close the seams between U.S. government
organizations that the 9/11 terrorists had
exploited, and second, to build a global counterterrorist
network to counter the evolving terrorist
threat and networks. These challenges were
addressed in the National Military Strategy,
various operational plans (OPLANs), and a host
of other documents, as well as through reform of
the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which
assigned responsibilities to USSOCOM and the
other unified combatant commands.
The DOD divided the world into GCCs,
where each geographic commander had responsibility
and authority for military activities in
his area of responsibility (AOR). Under the UCP
in effect in September 2001, USSOCOM organized,
trained, and equipped SOF, and the geographic
commanders employed SOF in their
respective areas. In 2001, no single GCC had
the lead for countering terrorism, and the 9/11
terrorists had cut across the GCC boundaries by
recruiting, planning, and training in the U.S.
European Command (EUCOM), CENTCOM,
and PACOM areas of responsibility.
When, in July 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld
tasked USSOCOM to develop a plan to deal with
terrorist organizations, DOD first had to resolve
a number of issues about what USSOCOM’s
GWOT authorities would be, and what its relations
would be with the other unified commands.
How and where was USSOCOM to discharge its
new GWOT responsibilities with each GCC
already conducting counterterrorism operations
in its AOR? How would USSOCOM impact the
combatant commanders’ operations and their
theater security cooperation programs? How
would USSOCOM’s operational role increase, if
at all?
Over the decades, the GCCs had developed
regional expertise and had formed long-term
contacts with host nation militaries, all of which
would be invaluable in combating terrorism.
Rather than trying to recreate the GCCs’ area
expertise, USSOCOM explored a number of concepts
that would allow the command to act as
the lead in countering terrorists around the
globe while capitalizing on the GCCs’ capabilites.
One option would be for USSOCOM to
take command of the TSOCs. This would transfer
regional expertise to USSOCOM, but losing
the TSOCs would also hamper the GCCs’ efforts
to accomplish their regional missions, which also
supported the GWOT.
The GCCs also had demonstrated expertise
in planning and executing operations. Should
USSOCOM deploy a headquarters element forward
to command and control specific counter
terrorist operations, or was there some way to
leverage existing warfighting headquarters to
command and control counterterrorist operations?
Moreover, as USSOCOM became more
involved in GWOT operations, could it still perform
its service-like functions of organizing,
training, and equipping SOF, and managing
MFP-11? Should those service-like responsibilities
revert back to the services or to some other
command to allow USSOCOM to focus on operations?
15