HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chief of Staff and
Command Support Center (SOCS) included the
personnel directorate (J-1) and the special staff
offices. This headquarters reorganization promised
to strengthen the resourcing functions of
USSOCOM—and, ultimately, support to SOF,
the theater CINCs, and American ambassadors.
In September 1999, General Schoomaker
directed the headquarters to continue its transformation
by further integrating staff functions.
The centers reevaluated how their existing procedures
supported the command’s core Title 10
responsibilities of equipping, training, and sustaining
SOF. The review led the headquarters
to transfer its Materiel Requirements Division
from SORR to SOOP, aligning it with the validation
function. SORR established an experimentation
and a joint processes divisions. The
Experimentation Division coordinated the testing
of new warfighting concepts within USSO-
COM and inserted SOF scenarios into Joint
Forces Command exercises. The Processes
Division served as the clearinghouse for USSO-
COM submissions on issues discussed within
joint staff forums, such as the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and the Joint Resources
Oversight Council. SOIO began consolidating
its functions in 1998 and continued restructuring
in 2000 and 2001, all the while retaining its
core missions of Intelligence, IO, and C4I (command,
control, communications, computers, and
intelligence). In 1998, it merged the communications
and computer support staffs from the
former J-2, J-3, and J-6 directorates to form a
single C4I infrastructure support team. Also in
1998, SOAL became the sole program manager
for C4I system acquisitions, with SOIO providing
technical support. By January 2001, the
center had completed its evolution from a J-staff
structure, with a Chief Information Officer
(CIO) coordinating information technology and a
Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) managing the
command’s intelligence and information security
programs. USSOCOM led DOD in developing
tests and exercises to ensure no Y2K (year 2000)
problems interfered with SOF weapons systems.
Streamlining operations allowed the headquarters
to transfer 27 of its personnel billets to
the TSOCs and provided a core staff for another
new initiative, the Joint Special Operations
University (JSOU). The original charter stated
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that “JSOU is a direct reporting, unified, subordinate
element of USSOCOM and shall be
organized to facilitate Title 10 responsibilities of
the CINC to conduct specialized courses of
instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned
officers and to monitor the professional
military education of SOF officers.” In establishing
JSOU, General Schoomaker noted that the
school would leverage and enhance existing joint
and service professional military education
(PME) programs. Accordingly, JSOU assumed
operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Air
Force Special Operations School and Naval
Postgraduate School resident special operations
curricula, and also provided educational materials
to SOF faculty members at professional military
education (PME) institutions.
Since 2005, JSOU has published over 30
studies. During the 2007 academic year, JSOU
provided 60 iterations of 19 separate courses to
the Joint SOF community. Faculty members
also supported senior level PME programs and
the educational requirements of numerous U.S.
and international organizations.
JSOU provided education to U.S. SOF and to
the people who enable the SOF mission in a joint
environment. In addition to the regular courses
taught at Hurlburt Field, Florida JSOU conducted
both regular and tailored activities for SOF
units worldwide, by means of remote on-site
instruction and video “tele-instruction.”
During General Holland’s tenure the USSO-
COM mission statement changed to:
“Provide special operations forces to the
Secretary of Defense, regional Combatant
Commanders, and American Ambassadors
and their country teams for successful conduct
of worldwide special operations, civil
affairs, and psychological operations during
both peace and war.”
Holland wanted the command to fix manpower
and equipment deficiencies, and add to the force
structure. For example, OEF highlighted the
need for more PSYOP and CA forces in the
active component.
The 9/11 attacks and the GWOT would result
in the most far-reaching changes in
USSOCOM’s mission and organization. To
effectively prosecute DOD’s efforts against ter-