HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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Since 2004, U.S. SOF and conventional forces have trained and worked with tribal forces to build capacity and capabilities. Although the tribal forces’ tactical offensive strikes received much attention, the real power of tribal engagement, and the subsequent Sons of Iraq program, was creating local tribal security forces that could, with backup from U.S. and Iraqi military forces, defend their local areas against AQI. Their security activities had decisive operational and strategic effects by driving the terrorists and insurgents out of safe havens in Anbar Province. The former Desert Protectors, after returning home, did just that when many joined the local police and continued to enhance local security. Confronted with a brutal AQI occupation, the tribal sheikhs had ample reasons to look for alternatives. By 2006, the U.S. and Iraqi government policy toward the tribes was more sympathetic than it had initially been. In late 2005 and early 2006, U.S. conventional forces in Anbar improved the counterinsurgency operations in several ways. The U.S. military leadership pushed more U.S. forces into Anbar Province, which made the coalition more of a viable long-term force that could win against AQI. Even more important, coalition forces put more emphasis on providing security for local civilians. U.S. conventional and Iraqi security forces fanned out to small outposts in populated areas, where they maintained a presence and backed up the local police and engaging tribal leaders outside Iraq. As tribal engagement gathered momentum and conventional forces in Anbar Province took the lead, SOF shifted to a “connect-the-dots” role of working the seams and pulling together the many local tribal engagement activities across the province and in neighboring provinces. While tribal engagement has helped U.S. and Iraqi forces dramatically improve security in Anbar Province, significant challenges remain. In late 2007, the province still lacked a functioning Iraqi criminal justice system. Though the new police forces can detain or arrest suspects, there was often no functioning court system or prison to hold convicted criminals. Here again the tribal justice system was helpful because a sheikh can pay a “fine” to have the arrested man released. To avoid having to pay a fine repeatedly, the sheikh typically either forced the released detainee to cease his insurgent activities or leave the area. In extreme cases, the tribe may even kill a member who repeatedly brings dishonor on the tribe. Tribal justice was not a complete substitute for a modern legal system, but it helped to fill the gap until a fully functional Iraqi justice system emerged in Anbar Province. As in Afghanistan, the evolution of SOF roles and missions in Iraq continues. SOF will remain at the forefront of targeting specific terrorists in Iraq. While SOF has earned countless accolades for its successes in eliminating specific persons, its chief contribution over time will undoubtedly prove to be its investment in building the Iraqi security forces. As SOF expands the capability of Iraqi units, however, it will increasingly conduct its targeting by, with, and through Iraqi forces. As a combat multiplier, SOF have proven enormously successful in preparing Iraqi units to defeat the insurgency. Continued success would most likely hinge on SOF’s ability to employ this indirect approach: to apply components of FID, IO, and CMO to legitimize specific security and government institutions in Iraq. Further Readings Briscoe, Charles H., et al, All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq, GPO, 2006. USAJFKSWCS, Special Warfare 2003-2008. USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003. USSOCOM, Tip of the Spear, 2003-2008. 137
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sahara Africa (OEF-TS) In 2005, the United States government directed an agency-wide effort called the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorist Initiative (TSCTI). Billed as a 10 to 15 year effort, the initiative would enable nations across the North African Pan-Sahel region to deny physical and ideological sanctuary to terrorist organizations affiliated with al Qaeda. The Joint Chiefs designated the military’s participation in this initiative as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). The Joint Chiefs made the European Command (EUCOM) the supported commander for execution of OEF-TS. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) acts as the executive agent for planning and execution. In 2006, SOCEUR commissioned a detailed assessment of requirements to build the counterterrorist capacity of partner nation forces throughout the Pan-Sahel. Meanwhile, SOF elements from each component continue executing Joint Combined Exchanges for Training (JCETs) and EUCOM sponsored exercises (e.g. FLINTLOCK) to train with select partner nation units. SOCEUR’s foreign internal defense (FID) initiative to support the TSCTI was scheduled to grow in the coming years, including significant advisory assistance in Civil Affairs, Information Operations, and other activities to improve physical and human infrastructures. SOCEUR’s goal was to separate the terrorists from the population. The strategic importance of OEF-TS to both American and North African governments was significant. In August and September 2007, FLINTLOCK 07 focused on training with counterterrorist and other units from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in north and western Africa. The primary purposes of FLINTLOCK was to develop stronger military to military partnerships and establish a functioning multinational coordination cell (MCC). During the exercise, JSOTF-TS conducted an aerial re-supply of a remote Malian military outpost, which demonstrated U.S. support to the Malian government. Besides continuing the partnership with nine African nations, FLINKLOCK also validated the need for a permanent MCC to facilitate sharing intelligence and synchronizing CT efforts across the region, generated positive publicity for OEF- TS, and rehearsed JSOTF-TS deployment and command and control capabilities. OEF-TS remained one of the largest commitments of U.S. government resources to North Africa since World War II. SOF will have an opportunity to shape conditions not only to defeat al Qaedaassociated franchises, but also to establish military to military relationships that support U.S. objectives in North Africa for decades to come. “Special Operations Forces are in Afghanistan and Iraq defending our nation against terrorism on a daily basis. However, it is Special Operation’s unique, but less visible, ability to help establish the conditions to counter and defeat terrorism through Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations, In 2002, Special Foreign Operation Internal Command Defense, Special Reconnaissance, and Civil Affairs that Central will become (SOCCENT) increasingly established vital to our Joint long-term success in the Global War on Terrorism.” Special Operations Task Force – Crisis Response General Bryan D. Brown 138
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HISTORY 6th Edition
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1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
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General James J. Lindsay accepting
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Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
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USSOCOM Commanders There have been
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the impact on its people, the comma
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Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
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Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
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During the review process for the 2
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HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
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greatly improved the command’s ab
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(7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
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USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
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forming its acquisition functions a
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nature were key goals in addition t
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COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
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President George W. Bush signed the
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Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
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The invasion of Panama, known as Op
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Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
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ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
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second pass, one pilot saw movement
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Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
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BLACK elements returned to Albrook
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Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
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joint training with NSWTG small boa
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Special Tactics Teams train during
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Schwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT w
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SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
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In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
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HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
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missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
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Haiti had endured unremitting polit
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of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
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what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
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Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
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second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
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Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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