HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Since 2004, U.S. SOF and conventional
forces have trained and worked with tribal
forces to build capacity and capabilities.
Although the tribal forces’ tactical offensive
strikes received much attention, the real power
of tribal engagement, and the subsequent Sons
of Iraq program, was creating local tribal security
forces that could, with backup from U.S. and
Iraqi military forces, defend their local areas
against AQI. Their security activities had decisive
operational and strategic effects by driving
the terrorists and insurgents out of safe havens
in Anbar Province. The former Desert
Protectors, after returning home, did just that
when many joined the local police and continued
to enhance local security.
Confronted with a brutal AQI occupation,
the tribal sheikhs had ample reasons to look for
alternatives. By 2006, the U.S. and Iraqi government
policy toward the tribes was more sympathetic
than it had initially been. In late 2005
and early 2006, U.S. conventional forces in
Anbar improved the counterinsurgency operations
in several ways. The U.S. military leadership
pushed more U.S. forces into Anbar
Province, which made the coalition more of a
viable long-term force that could win against
AQI. Even more important, coalition forces put
more emphasis on providing security for local
civilians. U.S. conventional and Iraqi security
forces fanned out to small outposts in populated
areas, where they maintained a presence and
backed up the local police and engaging tribal
leaders outside Iraq.
As tribal engagement gathered momentum
and conventional forces in Anbar Province took
the lead, SOF shifted to a “connect-the-dots” role
of working the seams and pulling together the
many local tribal engagement activities across
the province and in neighboring provinces.
While tribal engagement has helped U.S.
and Iraqi forces dramatically improve security
in Anbar Province, significant challenges
remain. In late 2007, the province still lacked a
functioning Iraqi criminal justice system.
Though the new police forces can detain or
arrest suspects, there was often no functioning
court system or prison to hold convicted criminals.
Here again the tribal justice system was
helpful because a sheikh can pay a “fine” to have
the arrested man released. To avoid having to
pay a fine repeatedly, the sheikh typically either
forced the released detainee to cease his insurgent
activities or leave the area. In extreme
cases, the tribe may even kill a member who
repeatedly brings dishonor on the tribe. Tribal
justice was not a complete substitute for a modern
legal system, but it helped to fill the gap
until a fully functional Iraqi justice system
emerged in Anbar Province.
As in Afghanistan, the evolution of SOF roles
and missions in Iraq continues. SOF will remain
at the forefront of targeting specific terrorists in
Iraq. While SOF has earned countless accolades
for its successes in eliminating specific persons,
its chief contribution over time will undoubtedly
prove to be its investment in building the Iraqi
security forces. As SOF expands the capability of
Iraqi units, however, it will increasingly conduct
its targeting by, with, and through Iraqi forces.
As a combat multiplier, SOF have proven enormously
successful in preparing Iraqi units to
defeat the insurgency. Continued success would
most likely hinge on SOF’s ability to employ this
indirect approach: to apply components of FID,
IO, and CMO to legitimize specific security and
government institutions in Iraq.
Further Readings
Briscoe, Charles H., et al, All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq,
GPO, 2006.
USAJFKSWCS, Special Warfare 2003-2008.
USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003.
USSOCOM, Tip of the Spear, 2003-2008.
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