HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

increasing security in Iraq. The ERU’s growing
ability to handle the toughest targets, specifically
SOF had made significant progress against
AQIZ until April 2004, when all coalition forces
eliminating those terrorists attacking police, were pulled out of Fallujah. The absence of
had the potential to heighten the security of all
Iraqi police forces. Moreover, other police units
would then be free to target less dangerous individuals
against whom they were more effective.
The ERU has conducted many successful
combat operations with SOF assistance and
coalition forces in Fallujah provided terrorists a
safe haven. Later the coalition determined that
it had to control the city to counter both the
insurgency in general and AMZ specifically. In
the fall, coalition forces reentered that city. SOF
provided significant assistance to conventional
advice. In May 2006, the ERU conducted an forces in destroying the Fallujah safe havens in
effective raid in central Baghdad during which it
captured members of two IED cells working out
of a university. The ERU detained seven additional
November 2004.
Terrorists subsequently shifted their efforts
north to Mosul in late 2004. SOF operations in
individuals, including three foreign fight-
Mosul increased dramatically to meet the
ers. Most impressively, the raid resulted in minimal
damage and disruption to the university
and innocent students. The impressive performance
of the ERU on this mission led the NSWTU
commander to affirm: “ERU did an excellent job
tonight . . . the operation was well-controlled and
threat, and more SOF were sent there. In conjunction
with conventional forces, SOF established
enough security to facilitate the January
2005 elections in Mosul. The effort to eliminate
the AQ terrorists, however, was particularly
long and difficult. In summer 2005, SOF finally
efficient. ERU treated the dorm and students captured Abu Talha, the leading terrorist in
respectfully. There was virtually no damage Mosul. Later that year SOF was able to break
done inside the dorm.” The ERU conducted follow-on
operations to reduce the enemy’s ability
to target coalition and Iraqi security forces.
While conducting combined combat operations
with the Iraqis, SOF detachments made
on-the-spot corrections and remedied any weaknesses
the back of the existing terrorist network in
Mosul.
Meanwhile, terrorist activity spread to western
Iraq and along the Euphrates River, as foreign
suicide bombers moved into Baghdad. The
fight in the west intensified in early 2005 as
in Iraqi planning or execution. The train-
additional SOF deployed into the area. The
ing cycle was continuous. SOF evaluated the fighting in the Euphrates River Valley climaxed
effectiveness of the training that the Iraqis
received and incorporated appropriate corrective
in the fall of 2005 when SOF and conventional
forces finally defeated the foreign-fighter networks.
measures prior to the next operation. SOF
The west and Baghdad remained hotly
assisted the Iraqis with their intelligence collection,
contested into 2006.
analysis, and targeting. Subsequent com-
SOF maintained the lead in attacking AMZ
bat operations proved or disproved the validity
of the intelligence and the effectiveness of Iraqi
targeting and planning processes.
Hunting of Zarqawi
SOF units were also targeting terrorists, to
include members of the AI and the network of
and his network, but finding AMZ proved difficult
as did penetrating the AQIZ network.
Relying on a tight-knit network, AMZ and his
associates could move about more easily than
had Saddam before his capture. This ease of
mobility made it very difficult initially to eradicate
AQIZ and the terrorist networks associated
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ). Prior to OIF, with it.
AMZ had built an alliance between AQ and AI in SOF had tracked down Saddam by targeting
northern Iraq. After Baghdad fell to coalition his facilitators, and this methodology nearly led
forces, AMZ built his network, al Qaeda in Iraq to AMZ’s capture in early 2005. To expedite the
(AQIZ), into a deadly terrorist organization. targeting process, SOF made several key
AMZ’s ultimate goals were to foment a civil war changes. SOF expanded its ISR capacity and its
between Sunnis and Shiites, use that civil war to analytical capacity. SOF conducted operations
drive out the coalition forces, and create a fundamentalist
“Caliphate” in Iraq.
to drive the acquisition of intelligence. Perhaps
most importantly, SOF brought to bear an inter-
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