HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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2004, and if Sadr had not surrendered, they would have stormed his hiding place. In September 2004, the ICTF and the commandos conducted offensive operations in Samarra, and in the November 2004 battle to retake Fallujah, 36th Commando assaulted an insurgent stronghold within a hospital. Had the latter operation been conducted by U.S. forces, the enemy could have easily exploited anticipated collateral damage for propaganda. As the two Iraqi units grew in size and scope, it became necessary to build a stronger command and support structure. With SOF assistance, the Iraqi Army created the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade in July 2005. The 36th Commando became the 1st Battalion of the ISOF Brigade, and the ICTF became the 2nd Battalion of the ISOF Brigade. The brigade had both training and support battalions, giving it a total of four. In 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister, with MNSTC- I and MNF-I concurrence, decided to expand the ISOF Brigade to other regions of the country, requiring four additional Commando Battalions. By December 2007, the ISOF Brigade had two new Commando Battalions operational and two still scheduled. In December 2007, the ISOF Brigade was transferred from the MOD to the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Command. ISOF remained arguably the most effective Iraqi forces, and perhaps, the most impressive success story in the American-led effort to build new Iraqi security forces. Training and Advising Conventional Forces SOF’s training and advisory mission did not stop with the ISOF Brigade. Conventional forces took the lead in training and organizing Iraqi police and conventional military forces. American commanders, however, recognized SOF’s enormous experience in organizing and training foreign forces. As a rule, SOF not only trained forces, but accompanied them during operations to provide continuing advice, assistance, and assessment. To meet the training needs of the broader Iraqi Army, the multinational command subsequently requested the CJSOTF’s assistance in training conventional Iraqi forces in 2004. Thus, SOF grew increasingly involved in training a variety of Iraqi units. When 10th SFG (A) replaced 5th SFG (A) in command of the CJSOTF-AP in December 2004, SOF began partnering with local Iraqi security forces in their AOs. CJSOTF-AP instructed each operational detachment to build partnership relationships with the most effective Iraqi forces in its AO. Usually these units were from the Iraqi National Guard (later re-designated Iraqi Army units), but in some places SOF worked BATT personnel conducting combined operation with Iraqi soldiers and U.S. conventional forces. 131
with Iraqi police units. SOF have continually trained and accompanied into combat a host of Iraqi conventional units, significantly improving their effectiveness. SOF’s most pronounced effort in training conventional Iraqi forces occurred from June to December 2005. During this 5th SFG (A) rotation, the CJSOTF-AP force structure increased from two to three FOBs to augment the conventional force training capabilities. At that time, conventional forces provided embedded Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) for the Iraqi Army units in their area. Due to force constraints in the United States, the U.S. Army could not provide the MiTTs needed to train forces in northern Iraq. USASOC filled the gap by deploying a third FOB to Iraq. The SOF training elements were called Battalion Augmentation Training Teams (BATTs) to distinguish them from the conventional MiTTs. Consisting primarily of single ODAs, the BATTs enhanced security across a large part of northern Iraq. During the battles for Tal Afar, the BATTs, Iraqi Army units, and the U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment worked together in liberating and securing that city. The integration among SOF, Iraqi forces, and U.S. conventional forces proved essential to success. SOF Foreign Internal Defense activities also included training the new Iraqi Air Force. Members of AFSOC’s “FID Squadron,” the 6th Iraqi SWAT Training SOS, started training Iraqi airmen in 2004. The Iraqi Air Force started with few aircraft and personnel. Using light, inexpensive, and easy to maintain aircraft, the 6th SOS enhanced the capabilities of Iraqi forces to conduct ISR missions. Combat aviation advisors from 6th SOS not only taught the Iraqis to fly and maintain their aircraft, but to plan and conduct effective joint and combined missions. Training and Advising Iraqi Police SOF also trained the renowned Hillah SWAT element, one of the most effective police units in Iraq. Located in Babil Province, Hillah lay south of Baghdad in a relative hot bed of insurgent activity. An ODA first linked up with the Hillah SWAT team in March 2004, and U.S. SOF has had an outstanding working relationship with Hillah SWAT ever since. In August 2004, when Muqtada Sadr’s militia attacked SOF training Hillah SWAT. 132
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HISTORY 6th Edition
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1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
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General James J. Lindsay accepting
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Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
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USSOCOM Commanders There have been
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the impact on its people, the comma
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Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
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Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
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During the review process for the 2
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HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
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greatly improved the command’s ab
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(7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
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USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
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forming its acquisition functions a
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nature were key goals in addition t
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COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
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President George W. Bush signed the
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Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
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The invasion of Panama, known as Op
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Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
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ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
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second pass, one pilot saw movement
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Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
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BLACK elements returned to Albrook
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Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
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joint training with NSWTG small boa
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Special Tactics Teams train during
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Schwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT w
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SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
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In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
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HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
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missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
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Haiti had endured unremitting polit
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of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
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In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
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what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
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Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
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Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
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In conjunction with the UN, the Org
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Special Forces soldiers train Niger
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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