HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and insurgents tion and a deterrent to the insurgency. The
throughout the first year of the war.
Operations in urban areas again validated
coalition command turned to SOF to organize,
train, equip, and advise the new Iraqi 36th
the benefits of the joint approach. Urban warfare
Commando Battalion. The initial recruits were
was particularly intense in 2004 with major
battles for control of Fallujah, Najaf, and other
drawn in equal numbers from each of the five
most prominent Iraqi political parties at the
cities. During the battle for Fallujah in April time.
2004, coalition forces had relied almost entirely
on conventional light infantry to retake the city,
The 36th Commando Battalion got off to a
rocky start when some of the recruits sent by the
but the infantry suffered heavy losses. A few political parties showed up with ping-pong paddles
months later, Muqtada al Sadr and his Shiite
militia took over the holy city of Najaf. To drive
Sadr out of Najaf, coalition forces changed tactics.
The conventional commanders requested a
SOF contingent of SEALs and ODAs from FOB
51 and employed a sophisticated mixture of
SOF, light infantry, tanks, and other armored
because they had been told they were going
to a sports camp. But once the recruits who did
not want to be commandos were weeded out,
SOF training and leadership quickly turned
them into an effective unit. In early 2004, when
many units of the new Iraqi police and military
forces broke under insurgent pressure, 36th
vehicles. SOF conducted reconnaissance and Commando consistently retained its cohesion
surgical raids, while conventional forces and fought effectively.
destroyed large pockets of enemy resistance. In late 2003, CJSOTF-AP began building
The integration of SOF into the operation helped another Iraqi element, the Iraqi Counter
defeat Sadr and other radical Shiite elements in Terrorism Force (ICTF). Whereas the 36th
tough urban combat. American forces received Commando was a light infantry strike force, the
far fewer casualties than in Fallujah.
ICTF would be an even smaller, more clandestine
counterterrorist and hostage rescue force
Training and Employing
with robust intelligence capability. The
Iraqi Forces
CJSOTF planned to place the 36th Commando
Despite the great attention it earned, DA in a supporting role to the ICTF, and to eventually
was not the only SOF mission in Iraq. SOF
organize a premier counterinsurgency capa-
units were among the first to train and equip bility around the two forces. ICTF training was
Iraqi forces for combat. In late 2003, the conducted initially both within and outside Iraq.
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) wanted to
create a small but highly effective, multi-ethnic
unit as both an example of inter-ethnic coopera-
By February 2006, appropriate facilities had
been built in Iraq, and subsequent ICTF training
was conducted strictly in that country.
The 36th Commando
Battalion staged its first combat
operations in April 2004, and the
ICTF entered combat in May. As
the best units in the Iraqi military,
they quickly took a prominent
role in operations throughout
Iraq. In addition to operations
to eliminate terrorists and
insurgents, they also took on
extremely sensitive missions,
where political considerations
dictated that the assaults assume
an Iraqi face.
The ICTF and 36th
Commando played a vital role in
U.S. and Iraqi SOF returning from a combined operation in Baghdad. the battle for Najaf in August of
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