HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

He walked over to a flower
bed near a concrete patio
and pointed at a patch of
ground. He started scratching
the dirt with his shoe.
While some assaulters
began searching this area
for a bunker, another SOF
team moved westward into
the orchard. It cleared several
small buildings and
then patrolled to the south,
but did not find Saddam. Meanwhile, those SOF
at the compound questioned the enabler, and he
once again walked over to the flower bed and
began scratching at the dirt with his shoe. All of
a sudden, he uncovered a rope handle. The SOF
element recalled the other assaulters, and soon,
everyone had gathered around the rope loop.
Two of the assaulters grabbed hold of the
handle, and just as they were ready to heave
upward, the caretaker began screaming,
“Saddam is in there! Saddam is in there!” They
easily pulled up the styrofoam block. The
assaulters pointed their guns and flashlights
into the hole, and a few moments later a pair of
hands emerged from the hole. An assaulter
pulled the man out of the hole, and then four
assaulters grabbed him and got quite a surprise
when they saw Saddam’s face. They finally had
their quarry.
By approximately 2030 hours, the assault
element notified the SOF commander that they
had detained Saddam. The SOF commander
ordered the assaulters to take Saddam, the
detainee, and enabler to Tikrit. A SOF team
Entryway to Saddam Hussein’s hideout.
Cash totalling $750,000 was found with Saddam Hussein
at the time of his capture.
secured an HLZ in a nearby field,
and a helicopter landed and
picked up Saddam.
The capture of Saddam
Hussein culminated six months
of painstaking targeting efforts.
These forces had steadily eliminated
BL #1’s support mechanism
by capturing and interrogating
enablers. Equally important
to the capture of Saddam
was the integration of tactical
intelligence and operations between SOF and
conventional forces. Intelligence personnel and
interrogators performed key roles in tracking
down Saddam. Both conventional and SOF
leaders emphasized the need for more interrogators,
interpreters, and human intelligence capabilities.
The 4th ID and SOF leaders agreed that
their experience in capturing Saddam should be
studied as a model for future joint operations.
Both sides benefited from the capabilities that
the other force brought to the fight, validating
the tenets of joint warfare.
Combatting the Insurgency
By late 2003, however, there were growing
signs that an insurgency was building among
the Iraqi Sunnis who had been Saddam’s most
loyal supporters. To meet this new challenge,
SOF built up forces and developed a sustainable
rotation plan to continue OIF into the indefinite
future. When 10th SFG (A) took over the
CJSOTF-AP in January 2004, it brought two
FOBs (one from 10th SFG (A) and one from 5th
SFG (A)). One FOB remained near Baghdad.
The second FOB, however, deployed to Mosul to
increase the SOF in areas north and west of
Baghdad where the insurgency was rapidly
growing in strength. In February, the SEAL
contingent also increased to a NSWTG with
forces located in Baghdad, Mosul, and Haditha.
While the CJSOTF would have preferred to
conduct combined operations with Iraqi forces,
few such elements existed in early 2004. The
Iraqi Army had disintegrated and been disbanded.
Thus, SOF focused primarily on unilateral
DA missions to capture or kill members of
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