HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

accordance with his importance, Saddam was
designated the number one target on the Black
List (BL #1) developed by national intelligence
agencies. The coalition employed a host of forces
and capabilities in its effort to track Saddam and
the persons who could provide clues to his
whereabouts. In July 2003, SOF and elements
from the 101st Airborne Division conducted an
operation in Mosul to capture or kill Saddam’s
sons, Qusay and Uday (BL #2 and #3). After
numerous assaults on their well-fortified hideout,
the U.S. forces took the objective and found
Qusay’s and Uday’s bodies. But Saddam
remained elusive.
By July 2003, both SOF and the 4th ID leadership
concluded that capturing persons on the
original Black List would not lead to BL #1. The
key to finding Saddam was uncovering the family-tribal
ties of those Iraqis who had long-standing
relations with him. Both SOF and the 1st
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th ID developed
link analysis based on information gathered
from numerous operations in Baghdad and the
surrounding area. The analysis showed which
families were supporting Saddam and the insurgency.
These families were largely concentrated
in and around the Tikrit area where Saddam
retained a loyal following. SOF and the 1/4th
BCT believed that targeting specific individuals
within these families would yield information on
Saddam. Once the importance of the tribal or
familial tie was established, the U.S. forces targeted
the patriarchs of these families.
This systematic approach to finding
“enablers” who could identify Saddam worked.
In mid-October, a SOF team captured an individual
who provided essential information concerning
the locations of additional members
within Saddam’s inner circle. Based on these
individuals’ subsequent interrogations, SOF and
4th ID units hit a series of targets in December.
These raids led to a substantial find in Baghdad
on 12 December. Here, SOF detained four individuals,
and upon questioning, one turned out to
be the person who would lead SOF and conventional
forces to Saddam’s hide-out.
The source first reported that Saddam was
hiding west of Tikrit. SOF alerted COL James
B. Hickey, 1st BCT/4th ID Commander, and the
two forces prepared to act on the information.
By 1300 on 13 December, the individual had
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changed his story and now claimed that Saddam
was hiding southeast of Tikrit. He stated that
Saddam would be located at one of two locations
near the town of Ad Dawr, southeast of Tikrit.
The first location—code-named WOLVERINE
I—was the home of Saddam’s cook. The second
was a nearby farm, designated WOLVERINE II.
A SOF team reconnoitered the area.
By mid-December, SOF and conventional
forces had perfected their battle drills for cordon
and search operations. The SOF commander
would control the immediate target area, including
assaulters, SOF helicopters, and an AC-130.
1/4th BCT typically sealed the outer perimeter
to prevent interference from resistance forces.
To execute the WOLVERINE targets, COL
Hickey committed a battalion-sized TF to offset
any chance of a fight with Saddam loyalists. G
Troop, 10th Cavalry would be TACON to SOF to
establish inner cordons at the two objectives.
The 4-42nd Field Artillery (FA) occupied the
outer cordon to stop enemy reinforcements and
keep BL #1 from escaping. The 2-99th Engineer
Battalion would establish observation posts and
screen along the west bank of the Tigris River.
Attack helicopters (AH-64s) from A/1-4 Aviation
would orbit on the west side of the river to support
the outer cordon forces and screen Highway
1 for possible Iraqi reinforcements.
Just after 2000 hours, as the convoy passed
the northern outskirts of Ad Dawr, 4-42nd FA
setup an outer cordon and checkpoints. The convoy
made a right turn, heading toward
Wolverine I. The lead elements—SOF and 1st
Platoon, G Troop—continued on toward the
farm, Wolverine II. The trail elements—SOF
and 2nd Platoon, G Troop—peeled off from the
convoy and rolled directly into an assault on
Wolverine I. The assaulters rushed into the
house and found four individuals: the cook, his
wife, and two children.
About halfway between Wolverine I and II,
the SOF and 1st BCT headquarters elements
setup the C2 node. The assault element for
Wolverine II proceeded toward its objective.
From the lead vehicle, the enabler directed the
assaulters to a grove of trees and then a compound
surrounded by a six-foot high wall. The
assault began immediately. After the target was
secure and one Iraqi caretaker was detained,
SOF elements led the source into the compound.