HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

SEALs remained with the DPVs until they could
be extracted later that day.
The Al Faw missions succeeded because of
detailed planning, exhaustive rehearsals, use of
overwhelming force, and an IO plan that diminished
the enemy’s desire to fight. Most important,
decentralized execution allowed tactical
commanders to make quick and unhindered
decisions in seizing the objectives.
Seizing Other Infrastructure
SOF also conducted ground and airborne
assaults to seize infrastructure, including airfields,
oil fields, and dams. On 1 April, 3/75th
Ranger Battalion (RGR BN) seized the Haditha
Dam to thwart Saddam loyalists who planned to
destroy the facility and create a disaster downstream.
Ordered to hold the dam by General
Franks, the Rangers repelled Iraqi counterattacks
and endured heavy shelling. By occupying
this objective, 3/75th RGR BN effectively cut the
LOC running west out of Baghdad along the
Euphrates River.
The 1/75th RGR BN quickly followed the
mission at Haditha by interdicting and cutting
the LOC running north out of Baghdad along the
Tigris River. The remaining LOC into Baghdad
was to the south, and this route was being used
by the main coalition invasion forces. When
1/75th RGR BN cut the LOC running north, it
helped to isolate Baghdad and facilitated the
eventual capture of Iraqi troops and leaders trying
to flee the city. In mid-April when Iraqi
Army units tried to escape Baghdad, the tanks
and Bradleys supporting SOF operations proved
to be beneficial during fighting along both the
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. This combined
arms effort kept the LOC open for assaulting
Tanks and special operations vehicles refuel at H-1
Airfield.
U.S. conventional forces. By 20 April, maneuver
units from 3rd ID linked up with the Rangers
along both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
SOF could now turn its attention to capturing
high-priority individuals.
The fall of Baghdad and the collapse of the
Iraqi Army led to a deceptive period of calm in
Iraq in mid-2003, and most of the SOF in Iraq
redeployed in May and June 2003. CJSOTF-N
was deactivated, and CJSOTF-W was re-designated
CJSOTF-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-
AP), having moved to Baghdad in April. By July
2003, CJSOTF-AP had drawn down to the 5th
SFG (A) Headquarters, consisting of one Naval
Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU) and one
FOB. The FOB commanded 14 ODAs, few of
them at full strength. The bulk of these forces
remained in Baghdad with outstations covering
Al Qaim, Ramadi/Fallujah, Najaf/Nasiriyah,
Hillah, Kut/Amarah, Tikrit, Balad, Samarra,
and Kirkuk. CJSOTF-AP planned more forces
reduction in early 2004.
Chasing High Value Targets
SOF and conventional forces integrated their
capabilities as never before during OIF. Both
elements cooperated remarkably well at the tactical
level by providing forces to the other, often
without direction from higher headquarters.
The two elements contributed according to their
strengths: conventional forces conducted the
“heavy lifting,” and SOF provided the “surgical”
capability.
Reliable intelligence remained the key to
counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations,
and SOF took the lead in improving coalition
intelligence about the enemy in Iraq. SOF
provided a disproportionate amount of the intelligence
collected by coalition forces and shared
targeting information with the coalition. While
SOF provided vital intelligence for conventional
forces, conventional forces frequently provided
combat power to secure and pacify joint objectives.
Saddam’s Capture
SOF and conventional integration would also
prove essential to the capture or elimination of
several key persons of interest. Initially, the
ultimate target was Saddam Hussein al-Majid
al-Tikriti, the deposed President of Iraq. In
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