HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

assigning SOF the toughest of missions, CFLCC
provided numerous conventional capabilities to
SOF, greatly enhancing its lethality. For example,
the 75th Ranger Regiment assumed TACON
of elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, a
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) platoon, and a tank company team to
execute its missions near Baghdad. SOF also
frequently received the allocation of fixed-wing
CAS to support its missions.
Al Faw–Direct Action Missions
On 20 March 2003, a NSWTG, consisting of
U.S. Navy SEALs, the United Kingdom’s 40
Commando Brigade, and Polish SOF, conducted
one of the largest direct action (DA) missions
conducted in OIF. The goal was to simultaneously
take control of two off-shore oil platforms,
Mina Al Bakr (MABOT) and Khor Al Amaya
(KAAOT), and secure onshore
pipeline support valves for each
platform and their metering and
manifold stations located on the Al
Faw peninsula. By taking control of
these targets before Iraqi forces
could damage them, the NSWTG
would avert an environmental disaster
and preserve the only oil
export capability in southern Iraq.
The missions crossed several
AOs, so planning involved coordination
with the Combined Force
Maritime Component Command
(CFMCC) and CFLCC. A special
operations command and control
element (SOCCE) was also established
to coordinate between conventional
and SOF units operating
in the I MEF’s AOR.
The overall concept for securing
the Al Faw targets and the scheme
of maneuver were settled almost five months
prior to execution. NSWTG forces would conduct
the initial seizure and be relieved by
British Royal Marines (3 Commando Brigade).
The Kuwait Naval Base (KNB) would serve as
the main base of operation. NSWTG forces conducted
countless rehearsals and “sand-table”
exercises for a four-phase operation, which consisted
of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR); pre-assault fires; simultaneous
125
assaults on all objectives; and speedy relief of
NSWTG forces by Royal Marines.
The rehearsals uncovered a vital weak spot
in the Iraqi defenses: reliance on radio communications.
As a result, electronic warfare was
included in the plan to jam Iraqi communications.
Additionally, an IO campaign was initiated
to capitalize on reports that enemy troops suffered
from low morale and high desertion rates.
Thousands of leaflets were dropped with capitulation
instructions as well as phrases dissuading
soldiers and workers from destroying oil facilities
and equipment — “you’re hurting your family’s
livelihood of fishing if you destroy the oil.”
This information was also broadcast across Iraqi
air waves from the USS Constellation (CV-64)
and USS Duluth (LPD-6).
With numerous Iraqi vehicles, fighting positions,
and 130mm artillery guns near its objec-
One of the IO leaflets dropped on Al Faw.
tives on the Al Faw peninsula, the NSWTG fires
cell targeted 24 enemy positions with two FA-
18s, four F-15Es, four British GR-4s, six fighters,
bombers, and AC-130s.
Finally, on the morning of 20 March, the
CFSOCC commander notified NSWTG that the
mission was a “go” for that evening. Just before
sunset, NSWTG forces departed for their targets:
both oil platforms (MABOT and KAAOT)
in the Persian Gulf, and the pipeline (Objective