HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s battalion-level
headquarters responsible for RCs South and
West. (In 2007, the CJSOTF started referring to
its subordinate battalions as “SOTFs” rather
than “FOBs” because conventional forces were
using the term “FOB” to refer to a place rather
than a headquarters.) To enable SOTF 71 to
conduct offensive operations in Helmand, in
addition to operations across RC West and RC
South, CJSOTF-A reinforced SOTF 71 with a
Marine Special Operations Company (MSOC)
and a UAE SOF task force. SOTF 71 committed
an AOB, several ODAs, the MSOC, the UAE
SOF, and partnered ANA forces to supporting
the UK forces in Helmand Province.
In northern Helmand Province, the Taliban
attempted to hold the agricultural land along
the Helmand River and its tributaries. Rather
than attempting to break contact, the enemy
would frequently reinforce to hold an area,
allowing SOTF 71’s forces to bring the full
weight of coalition firepower to bear, and thereby
inflicting severe losses on the enemy. To sustain
the long firefights that ensued, CJSOTF-A
airdropped additional ammunition and fuel to
the troops in contact. During its rotation, SOTF
71 killed more than 3,000 Taliban fighters, and
the Taliban stronghold of Musa Qalah fell to
ISAF and CJSOTF forces in December 2007.
The Taliban also stepped up its combat operations
in Kandahar and Oruzgan Provinces in
the summer of 2007. The Canadians and Dutch
forces focused attention on the population centers,
designating them Afghan Development
Zones (ADZs). The ADZ concept was to concentrate
security and reconstruction efforts on the
ADZs and turn them into models of peace and
prosperity. The Taliban put much of its effort
into the rural areas and the seams along provincial
borders. CJSOTF-A forces fought the enemy
in the rural areas to prevent them from interfering
with progress in the ADZs.
The fighting in these more remote areas of
RC South was unusually intense in 2007, and in
northeast Oruzgan Province, the enemy
attacked firebase Anaconda near the village of
Deh Afghan. The ODA, its attached CA and
PSYOP forces, partnered ANA troops, and coalition
airpower defeated all Taliban assaults on
their firebase. Coalition SOF ground troops
broke the siege and ended enemy’s 2007 effort to
capture the firebase.
When ISAF took over responsibility for all of
Afghanistan in October 2006, CFC-A was dismantled
a few months later. CJTF-76 became
the regional headquarters in charge of RC East.
CJSOTF-A remained OPCON to CFSOCC, and
became TACON for FID to CJTF 76. In 2007,
the 82nd Airborne Division took over the CJTF
and renamed it CJTF-82.
In 2007, ISAF stood up a SOF component
under the ISAF headquarters in Kabul. The
coalition units assigned to the CJSOTF-A has
declined as NATO allies began placing their
SOF elements in Afghanistan under ISAF
rather than the CJSOTF. To continue to
enhance its close relationship with NATO,
SOCEUR deployed an ODB and five ODAs from
1st BN 10th SFG (A) to Afghanistan in late 2007
to serve under the ISAF SOF component.
In 2008, the Taliban increased its attacks
on U.S. and ISAF forces and on Afghan civilians.
The Coalition forces have inflicted heavy casualites
on the enemy. The enemy retained safe
havens in Pakistan. Afghanistan will remain a
challenging battlefield requiring the full spectrum
of SOF operations and capabilities, and
SOF stand ready to meet new challenges and
obstacles in Afghanistan.
Further Readings
Briscoe, Charles H., et al, Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan, Fort. Leavenworth, KS,
CSI Press, 2001.
Stewart, Richard, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM: The United States Army in Afghanistan
October 2001-March 2002, CMH Pub 70-83-1, 2004.
USAJFKSWCS, Special Warfare, 2002 - 2008
USASOC, Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History, 2005 - present
USSOCOM, Tip of the Spear, 2002 - 2008.
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