HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

combined command post for the governor and
the commanders of the UAE SOF and FOB 33.
The Taliban attempted to spread misinformation
about the operation, but the governor
refuted enemy claims. His radio messages, both
live and pre-recorded, got accurate information
to the population and soon silenced enemy propaganda.
The ground forces coming from the
north and south received air support from A-10s
and B-1s in addition to AC-130s and AH-64s as
they fought their way to the linkup in the center
of the valley. The attack was sustained by
nightly airdrops of supplies to the lead maneuver
elements. As coalition forces destroyed or
drove out Taliban fighters, the governor convinced
local mullahs to point out the Taliban
who were hiding among the population.
The non-kinetic effort in the Tagab Valley
including humanitarian assistance and MED-
CAPS, and longer-term improvements to local
infrastructure. To maintain security in the area,
one ODA and a Company of ANA soldiers
remained at the Tagab firebase after the completion
of Operation al Hasn.
Though the CJSOTF had enormous success
working with ANA forces in the Tagab Valley,
its overall with the ANA slipped. As ISAF came
to recognize the importance of close partnership
with the ANA, they started to compete with
CJSOTF for ANA partners and a new ISAF
FRAGO in late 2006 partnered most
ANA units with ISAF conventional
forces, ending many of the CJSOTF’s
partnership relationships. During its
2006-07 rotation, 3rd SFG (A)
addressed this problem by having the
ODAs build closer relationships with
local Afghan National Police (ANP)
units. The ANP units, generally
recruited locally, giving the police
better local knowledge than ANA
units. The ANP had serious supply,
logistics, and pay problems, undermining
the effectiveness of many
ANP units.
In 2006 the CJSOTF, Combined
Security Transition Command –
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), Coalition
SOF from France and Jordan, and
the Afghan Ministry of Defense
worked together to establish a new
119
ANA commando program. The Commando
Kandaks were trained and advised by U.S.
Special Forces and were designed to give the
ANA more offensive capability. The training
went well in 2006 and 2007, and the combat performance
of the first Commando Battalions was
very good, in spite of supply and command and
control challenges. Plans called for six
Commando Kandaks.
Throughout the fall and winter of 2006-2007,
Taliban propaganda claimed that they would
launch a major offensive in southern
Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 2007.
SOF played a large part in helping ISAF thwart
these enemy plans. One SOF contribution was
killing and capturing many key enemy leaders,
including the charismatic Taliban military commander,
Mullah Dadullah-Lang. The loss of
these key leaders weakened the Taliban’s ability
to plan major combat operations and helped to
prevent the promised offensive in 2007. Taliban
did mass substantial forces in RC South.
ISAF and the CJSOTF launched offensives
in southern Afghanistan in 2007 to help preempt
the Taliban’s offensive plans. After 7th SFG (A)
took over the CJSOTF from 3rd SFG (A) on 1
April 2007, ISAF requested that CJSOTF-A
forces assist in driving the Taliban out of parts
of Helmand Province, which quickly became the
CJSOTF’s main effort. Special Operations Task
CJSOTF-A SF with 1st Kandak, 209th Afghan National Army Corps
Commander