HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

missions through, with, and by the newly created
Afghan border security force, the Afghan
National Security Force (ANSF). Six ODAs did
remain in RC East to disrupt insurgent flow
along border towns. These detachments, still
occupying terrain from Bari Kowt to Shkin in
support of the conventional forces, were headquartered
at Chapman, where an ODB performed
the traditional role of SOCCE to the RC
East commander. By and large, however, the
CJSOTF had fully transitioned to its FID
assignment.
The CJSOTF rotation from February –
August 2006 witnessed unprecedented interoperability
with the CJTF. 7th SFG (A) established
conditions for this relationship by conducting
pre-mission training with the 10th
Mountain Division prior to its assumption of
CJTF responsibilities. Processes were worked
out, and ideas for implementing operations were
shared. The relationship quickly paid dividends
for the CJSOTF in the winter of 2006. During
planning for Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST,
an operation designed to disrupt ACM activity
and thereby set conditions for NATO’s assumption
of command in RC South, the CJTF made
the CJSOTF its main effort. The CJTF assigned
the CJSOTF an infantry battalion TACON and
an infantry company OPCON, and placed both
an engineer company and aviation squadron in
direct support. What made this arrangement all
the more remarkable was that no command relationship
existed between the CJTF and the
CJSOTF.
FOB 73, operating out of BAF, employed the
CJTF forces largely in support of ANA operations.
The operation kicked off in April and ran
through late May. The results of Operation
MOUNTAIN THRUST were measurable: hundreds
of Taliban and ACM were killed; the
NATO transition of RC South occurred as scheduled;
infrastructural improvements, such as
bridges over the Helmand River and several new
government broadcasting stations, were completed
at an unprecedented pace; and ANA
authority spread over large swaths of RC South.
The ANA employed and permanently assigned
nine Kandaks in RC South in conjunction with
the operation.
Through the fall of 2006, 3rd SFG (A) continued
to execute Operation VALLEY FORGE
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U.S. SOF patrol with British soldiers in Helmand Province
throughout Afghanistan. While the transition of
authority between ISAF and CFC-A brought
changes to coordinating responsibilities, SOF
forces adapted to these nuances and worked not
only with the Afghan military, but with other
coalition partners to buttress GOA legitimacy.
After assuming control of RC South, ISAF,
further delegated responsibility for different
provinces to different nations. The UK got
Helmand, Canada got Kandahar, and the
Netherlands got Oruzgan. Command of RC
South rotated among those three nations. All
ISAF forces operated under ISAF rules of
engagement (ROE), and each nation also added
its own caveats that further restricted the ability
to use force. Most U.S. conventional forces
pulled out of RC South leaving CJSOTF elements
as the enduring U.S. presence in the area.
The FOB in Kandahar supported RC South, but
continued to operate under OEF ROE. The commanders
of the ODAs, AOBs, and the FOB had
to develop personal relationships with the various
ISAF commanders in their areas to make
this arrangement work. This was sometimes
challenging because Taliban propaganda portrayed
U.S. forces, and particularly U.S. SOF, as
being overly aggressive and prone to reckless
attacks that killed innocent Afghan civilians.
The Taliban had been building up strength
in its sanctuaries in Pakistan. In late 2006 and
2007, the Taliban and ACM redoubled their
efforts in hopes of driving out non-U.S. coalition
forces. The Taliban increased its combat operations,
and some ISAF elements required changes
to their ROEs to respond in kind. Taliban propaganda
made extravagant claims of civilian
casualties after firefights. U.S. SOF increased