HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

Afghan and SF Troops are inserted into the Cahar Cineh area during
Operation NAM DONG.
command post successfully commanded and controlled
its 217 soldiers within the area of Cahar
Cineh. With 50 SF advisors assisting the
Afghans and directing joint fires, the Kandak
pacified a heretofore ACM sanctuary. ODAs
from FOB 71 proved that a well-advised and
resourced ANA force could achieve decisive battlefield
effects. Operation NAM DONG was the
first ANA led operation in RC South and the
largest within the entire country at the time.
The operation gave the force heightened credibility
in the minds of coalition planners. Most
important, the local populace proved more supportive
and accepting of ANA presence. The
ANA helped to establish GOA legitimacy in previously
enemy-held terrain.
Operation NAM DONG significantly influenced
the psychology of CJTF-76 and CFC-A
and, therefore, the future mission assignment of
CJSOTF-A. NAM DONG occurred just after the
transition of authority at the CJTF between
25ID and Southern European Task Force
(SETAF) headquarters. Arguably a watershed
moment, the operation influenced CFC-A to
make partnering with ANA forces its key task
for 2006. It subsequently issued orders to that
effect in the fall of 2005. Based on CJSOTF’s
successes in employing Kandaks and its persistence
in requesting them, CJTF-76 would soon
assign CJSOTF forces the lion’s share of combat
advisory duties across Afghanistan.
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In July 2005, 3rd SFG
(A) and its subordinate battalions
transitioned with
7th SFG (A) and again
assumed duties as the
CJSOTF. Its subordinate
battalions, FOBs 31 and
32, geared their initial missions
to support the fall
parliamentary elections.
The FOBs also continued
border security operations.
Significant changes to mission
and command relationships
occurred in the
fall of 2005. First, CJTF-76
assigned the CJSOTF the
mission to conduct combat
advisory and employment
of ANA Kandaks. The
CJTF relieved the CJSOTF of primary responsibility
for securing the Pakistani border and
assigned the mission to an infantry brigade.
Second, in December CFSOCC resumed OPCON
of the CJSOTF and placed it TACON to CFC-A.
Both changes have had a major impact on SOF
employment in Afghanistan, arguably enabling
the CJSOTF to maximize its capabilities in supporting
the legitimacy of the GOA.
In October 2005, the CJSOTF issued OPORD
VALLEY FORGE, which directed the most significant
change to both its mission and footprint
since the early months of OEF in 2001. VAL-
LEY FORGE directed the FOBs to conduct FID,
to advise and employ ANA battalions. The
broader purpose of the CJSOTF mission was to
expand the operational capacity of the ANA.
FOB 31, in Kandahar, assumed responsibility
for ANA 205th and 207th Corps in RCs West and
South, respectively. After assessing ANA locations
and requirements, FOB 31 co-located three
ODAs with three different Kandaks in
Shindand, Farah, and Herat, all towns in western
Afghanistan. FOB 32 at BAF transitioned
its firebases in Bermel, Lwara, and Torkham to
conventional forces and began assessing the
ANA 201st and 209th Corps in eastern and
northern Afghanistan, respectively. It also
established permanent liaison officers (LNOs) at
TF PHOENIX, the national ANA training headquarters,
to facilitate the equipping and training