HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

east of the city of Khowst. While both
the firebase and the BCP improved
the local and arguably regional security
of Khowst, each position was protected
largely by local security hires,
vice ANA. Significant restrictions
remained on the ODAs’ use of these
forces for missions other than local
firebase security. More important,
these positions were intended to reinforce
the legitimacy of the Afghan
government along the border with
Pakistan. The requirement for government-trained
forces in these areas
saved over 200 people.
In March 2005, CJSOTF flood relief efforts in Oruzgan Province
was growing larger, even while the CJSOTF dinating with Pakistani elements at key locations.
could not fully employ those very forces.
To elicit cooperation from the Pakistan
FOB 12 continued the expansion of firebases
and BCPs along the border. In the late spring of
military, ODAs from FOB 12 fielded communications
equipment to Pakistani forces across from
2005, 7th SFG (A) ODAs that were OPCON’d to Torkham, BCP-4, Lwara, and Shkin. FOB 12
FOB 12, constructed new firebases at Gayan and even fielded SATCOM radios to the Pakistani
Bermel Bazaar in Paktika Province to enhance military in Miram Shah. In return for the
security at district capitals. An ODA at Lwara
established a long-awaited BCP at Wrice and
radios, the Pakistan military was supposed to
report ACM activities and to coordinate operations
placed its ANA Company in the position.
in the vicinity of the border. While the
The goal of the firebase and BCP expansion
remained twofold: bolster the security environment
communications initiative received a great deal
of attention from the CJTF, Pakistani military
in select locations and enable the CJSOTF officials did not reciprocate to the degree
eventually to turn over border security to
Afghan forces. The CJSOTF proved largely successful
in meeting the first objective. With both
firebases and BCPs came security forces, which
frequently dampened the flow of insurgents, cut
desired. The initiative did reduce tensions during
border clashes.
FOB 12 did manage to obtain OPCON of an
additional Kandak in the spring of 2005. It was
thus able to employ one Kandak in Paktika and
down on local crime, and led to an improved local a second in the vicinity of Jalalabad. In RC
economy. Afghans built the facilities, manned South, FOB 71, operating out of Kandahar,
them, and subsequently spent their wages locally.
requested and received its second Kandak in
But in mid-2005, the ANA simply could not March 2005. At the time, 2-5 Infantry, which
field enough forces to man the camps that the had covered Oruzgan Province, shifted its forces
CJSOTF had constructed. Even if the ANA to another area within Afghanistan. There was
could have assumed border security, many within
CFC-A and CJTF opposed basing the ANA
there for fear of inciting tensions with Pakistan.
The century-long dispute over the Pakistani border
could have sparked a conflict between coalition
concern that progress made in Oruzgan would
be lost if the infantry were not replaced. FOB 71
increased the ODAs in the province from two to
three, and sent an SF Advanced operating base
(AOB) to assume command as the infantry left,
and Pakistani forces at any time. While resulting in a smooth transition. FOB 71 also
ASF manned many of the firebases near the border,
their status as “militia” vice governmentsanctioned
forces meant that they would not fill
long-term security needs. ODAs could not leave
them unattended.
A significant initiative that went hand and
glove with border security operations was coor-
sent in ANA to increase the force from a company
to a Kandak. This gave the added benefit of
providing greater ANA presence among the local
population.
After weeks of preparation, FOB 71 elements
executed Operation NAM DONG in April 2005
with the ANA Kandak in the lead. The Kandak
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