HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

of ACM insurgents into Afghanistan. With only
25 ODAs in country, numbering perhaps 250 soldiers,
it seemed a tall challenge indeed to cover
about 750 miles of the Pakistan border and deny
movement, much less remain active in the interior
of the country. To put this task in perspective,
the Soviets could not seal the border two
decades previously with over 100,000 troops in
Afghanistan.
During its tenure from 1 June to 1 December
2004 as the CJSOTF, 3rd SFG (A) repositioned
some of its forces in concert with CJTF-76 directives,
especially in RC East. FOB 32, responsible
for CJSOTF operations in RC East, directed
the occupation of both Bari Kowt in northern
Kunar Province, and Torkham in eastern
Nangahar Province. It ceased operations in
Mazar-e Sharif and Konduz, making forces
available to re-occupy both Shkin and Lwara,
two contentious villages in Paktika Province in
which ODAs had worked in during the previous
year. The purpose of placing detachments near
these border towns was to disrupt the flow of
insurgents and materiel into population centers.
In the vicinity of Khowst, where infiltration of
ACM forces was highest, the FOB established
another border control point, Border Control
Point (BCP)-6, to augment the five BCPs established
by coalition forces in 2002. FOB 32 also
conducted a detailed assessment
of Chamkani, north of
Khowst, where an ODA presence
could choke the flow of
insurgents and materiel from
Parachinar, Pakistan, into
the cities of Khowst and
Gardez. Despite its requests,
however, 3rd SFG (A) could
not obtain more ANA forces
for the expansion of firebases
along the border.
When it assumed responsibilities
from 3rd SFG (A) on
1 December 2004, 7th SFG (A)
faced the same challenges as
its predecessor for its initial
rotation as the CJSOTF. It
soon inherited the added task
of standing up a Crisis
Response Element (CRE).
CENTCOM intended the CRE
113
to conduct raids against emerging targets anywhere
within the AOR. The element would
remain in Afghanistan TACON to the CJSOTF,
but OPCON to CFSOCC. Lacking additional
forces, CJSOTF-A used several of its deployed
ODAs, as well as the Navy SEALs, to establish
the response force. Additionally, it had to create
an operational detachment-Bravo (ODB) C2 element
out of hide, and have four ODAs in reserve
if additional forces were needed. This requirement
certainly conflicted with CJTF-76’s
emphasis on border security operations and,
subsequently, constrained the CJSOTF’s ability
to meet the CJTF’s intent.
The four ODAs of the CRE organized and
trained in Kandahar, and were TACON to FOB
71. While it did not perform missions for CENT-
COM, it did execute a number of missions for
FOB 71 in RC South and succeeded in capturing
numerous mid-level ACM personalities.
In RC East, FOB 12 expanded upon FOB 32’s
changes to the battlespace, especially in Khowst
and Paktika Provinces. In December, it constructed
a firebase at Chamkani, and one ODA
occupied it. Consequently, northern Khowst
Province witnessed an immediate improvement
in the security situation. In the central part of
the province, the ODB commissioned the construction
of an additional BCP at Jaji Maydan,
In early 2005, Afghanistan experienced its harshest winter in 30 years. Civil
Affairs Team 414 identified an urgent need for food, medicine, and blankets to aid
villagers in Zabul Province. The CJSOTF-A from 7th SFG (A) and 1st SFG (A)
rapidly configured and air dropped containerized delivery systems (CDS) bundles
containing sought-after supplies. They hit the mark and saved numerous lives.