HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

During 2003, however, Afghanistan saw a
surge in politically related violence and criminal
activity. Combined Forces Command –
Afghanistan (CFC-A), which was created to
oversee both ISAF and CJTF operations, subsequently
requested an increase in U.S. forces to
secure the interior of Afghanistan. Concerned
with the internal security situation, CFC-A had
to bolster the Karzai government and to prepare
the country for projected transition to ISAF (or
NATO) sponsorship in 2005. CFC’s request
prompted an increase in the number of U.S. conventional
forces, raising troop levels in
Afghanistan from a low of 7,500 in January 2003
to a high of 18,000 exactly one year later. The
increase in forces created command, control, and
battlespace synchronization issues largely
absent prior to 2004. SOF, previously able to
conduct missions as they saw fit, now had to
obtain mission approval at numerous levels to
conduct operations. Additionally, SOF would
soon see its most significant change of mission
since initiating the Afghanistan campaign in
2001.
Evolution of Roles and
Missions: February 2004 to
Present
112
The CJSOTF’s mission and battlespace orientation
changed very little in the broad sense
during its first two years in Afghanistan. Minus
its initial training of the Afghan Army, its chief
role remained the capture or destruction of key
personalities within the ACM network in
Afghanistan. Arguably, this mission focus prevented
SOF from maximizing its FID capabilities,
the chief of which was training, advising,
and employing government forces to enhance
security. A number of constraints existed on
both SOF and conventional forces, chiefly a U.S.
troop-to-task ratio insufficient to secure large
swaths of the country and a corresponding lack
of AMF to fill the gap. SF lacked sufficient,
“legitimate” Afghan forces with whom it could
work. During the years from 2004 – 2006, however,
both of these factors began to change.
Subsequently, the role of SOF changed as well.
In March 2004, the U.S. Army’s 25th
Infantry Division (ID) assumed command of
CJTF-180. To capture the historic significance
of parliamentary and national elections scheduled
for that year, it changed the designation of
the CJTF to CJTF-76 and instituted several
major changes.
In April 2004, the CJTF tasked CJSOTF-A to
focus primarily on border security operations in
both Regional Commands South and East. The
CJTF intended to halt the flow of ACM and their
supplies from Pakistan. In part, the CJTF wanted
to align missions based on geography. ODAs
occupied the several firebases along the
Pakistani border in RC East: Bari Kowt,
Asadabad, and Chapman. Even in RC South,
the CJSOTF had ODAs positioned in the farthermost
firebases, including Qalat, Gereshk,
and Gecko. Furthermore, CJTF-76 intended for
conventional forces to concentrate on stability
and support operations (SOSO) within the interior
of the CJOA. Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), composed primarily of CA personnel,
assumed even greater emphasis under
CJTF-76, and the headquarters wanted secure
conditions to facilitate reconstruction and the
fall elections.
The chief challenge for the CJSOTF was its
lack of access to ANA forces for employment in
combat. In the spring of 2004, the CJSOTF had
only two ANA Kandaks (battalions) under its
OPCON: the Commando Kandak (SF trained),
operating in RC East, and 2nd Kandak 201st
Corps. ODAs did employ relatively large numbers
of Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to provide
local security at their firebases; however, these
security elements could not legally conduct operations
beyond 10 to 15 kilometers of the firebase,
and these missions had to be directly related to
the firebase defense. Additionally, the GOA and
CFC-A both wanted to demobilize the ASF. The
GOA viewed the ASF as a militia and wanted to
rid the country of all forces that did not belong to
the army or police. To place a meaningful dent
in the flow of ACM forces and supplies from
Pakistan, the CJSOTF clearly needed access to a
far larger number of Afghan government troops.
Additionally, the directive from the CJTF
ignored the CJSOTF’s need for access to the
interior to maximize its collection of intelligence
concerning the insurgency. The occupation of
firebases in the interior population centers, such
as Jalalabad, Gardez, Zormat, Deh Rawood,
Tarin Khowt, and Deh Chopan, remained essential
for ODAs to gather information on the flow