HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

adic sniper and mortar fire. During the day,
OPs on adjoining hilltops, manned by TF K-BAR
CSOF, called in fire on AQ forces attempting to
reinforce the mountaintop.
At about 2015 local time, four helicopters
from the 160th SOAR (A) extracted both the
Rangers on Takur Ghar and the SEALs down
the mountainside. Two hours later, the survivors
and their fallen comrades were back at
their base. Medical personnel from the 274th
Forward Surgical Team, operating out of the
Bagram airfield tower, worked on the 11 wounded
personnel. By morning, all the wounded were
headed to hospitals in Germany and elsewhere.
On the morning of 4 March, TF RAKASSAN
air assaulted into Battle Position (BP) DIANE
and began clearing east of the Whale, specifically
the high-ground southward toward BP GIN-
GER. SF elements simultaneously helped
Commander Zia’s Afghan militia launch a reconnaissance
element into the northern portion of
the Little Whale to watch enemy movements in
the valley as renewed air strikes hit Objective
REMINGTON. Because Zia lacked sufficient
force to take REMINGTON, TF DAGGER coordinated
for additional Afghan militia. These
forces arrived on 10 March under the command
of General Gul Huidar. On 12 March, both
Huidar and Zia’s troops, with direction and
assistance from several ODAs, began clearing
Objective REMINGTON. The Afghan forces
seized the objective and nearby villages quickly;
all resistance elements had either fled or been
destroyed.
Operation ANACONDA would continue for
another seven days. TF RAKASSAN would be
replaced by 10th Mountain elements from TF
SUMMIT, which cleared the eastern area of the
battlefield to BP GINGER on 13 March.
Additional elements from 10th Mountain and
3rd BN, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, designated TF COMMANDO, air
assaulted onto the Whale on 14 March and conducted
a series of sensitive site exploitations
(SSEs) while clearing the mountain. TF COM-
MANDO completed its operation on 19 March.
The execution of Operation ANACONDA
was far from perfect. Poor weather, difficult terrain,
and uncharacteristically poor air-ground
coordination contributed to a less than desired
outcome. More important, a well disciplined
107
enemy had expected the fight and had prepared
his defenses well. Despite initial setbacks, coalition
forces adapted and destroyed a significant
number of AQ. The terrorists also lost a significant
amount of supplies and their last refuge in
Afghanistan. Neither SOF nor conventional
forces would meet AQ concentrations of this
magnitude and aggressiveness again until 2006.
Evolution of Roles and
Missions – Through Spring 2004
TF K-BAR
Shortly after 9/11, CENTCOM tasked its
Joint Force Special Operations Component
Command (JFSOCC) to establish JSOTFs to
prosecute UW throughout Afghanistan. TF
DAGGER, as previously mentioned, was established
at K2 in mid-October 2001.
The JFSOCC also planned to establish
another JSOTF, which it would designate TF K-
BAR, to conduct operations in the southern portion
of the country. The K-BAR element, commanded
by CAPT Robert Harward, began organizing
at Masirah, Oman, in mid-October. TF K-
BAR’s role would be to conduct special reconnaissance
(SR) and direct action (DA) to seek
and destroy or capture remnants of the AQ and
Taliban networks. It still needed forces and a
place to stage to assist TF DAGGER in its prosecution
of the UW campaign. But with the UW
teams’ rapid successes in November 2001, DAG-
GER was able to infiltrate detachments to
secure Kandahar. In essence, DAGGER was
about to have its forces in almost every section of
Afghanistan and was quickly running out of
ODAs to execute emerging operations.
In its efforts to establish the two JSOTFs,
JFSOCC faced two large challenges. The first
was basing. Achieving permission from
Uzbekistan to use K2 had proven difficult in
September and October. JFSOCC experienced
arguably greater challenges in stationing elements
of Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force-South (CJSOTF-S). Fortunately, the
seizure of airfields throughout Afghanistan
eased the basing challenge. The second major
challenge concerned manning the various
JSOTF headquarters. Despite its successes,
DAGGER’s challenges had proved legion. The
Special Forces Group headquarters element was