HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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The operation called for isolation and encirclement of the valley area, followed by converging attacks to destroy AQ forces. A mixture of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations Forces (CSOF), and conventional forces would establish three sets of concentric rings astride enemy escape routes before the main strike into terrorist defenses in the valley. JSOTF-S, known as TF K-BAR, would lead the initial reconnaissance effort. About D-3, CSOF from TF K-BAR, to include TF 64 (Australian Special Air Service (SAS)), would begin occupying infiltration positions to observe enemy movements and direct air strikes. In fact, TF K-BAR would insert 21 SR teams that subsequently called in a steady stream of CAS throughout the operation, arguably saving the day for forces introduced on Takur Ghar. At D-1, 1 March, about 600 SF-led Afghan militia (TF ANVIL) would move into position along major enemy routes of retreat, and CJTF MOUNTAIN would air assault elements of both the 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions into an inner ring of blocking positions along the eastern side of the valley. Finally, TF HAMMER, a 260- man combination of ODAs and Afghan militia, would assault into the valley as the main effort. TF HAMMER included a secondary effort of 40 Afghans that would establish a blocking position in the vicinity of the Little Whale (a terrain feature). The ANACONDA planners believed that this combined maneuver would clear AQ from the Whale—a distinctive terrain feature southeast of Gardez—and adjacent valleys, forcing them into the blocking positions or into the open where they would be eliminated. In war, however, things rarely go exactly as planned—the enemy has a “vote.” Operation ANACONDA proved to be no exception. Three SOF teams were inserted into OPs before D-Day to validate TF RAKASSAN’s (2-187/101st) LZs, verify presence of high value targets (HVTs), and provide terminal guidance for CAS. These teams verified heavy enemy presence and were able to disable a heavy machine-gun covering one of the conventional HLZs. During the operation, they continually called in CAS. Rather than flee, the disciplined and well trained AQ soldiers stood and fought, and at times were reinforced along a series of draws and trails at 103 the southern end of the valley near Marzak, dubbed the “ratline.” While TF ANVIL met minimal resistance on D-1, TF HAMMER met intense resistance on D-Day, 2 March. A circling AC-130 mistook the northern Afghan and SF force of TF HAMMER for enemy and fired on them, wounding three SF and killing one. Also, 2 Afghans were killed and 12-15 wounded, which put almost half of the roughly 40 man northern force out of action. The wounded were medevaced and the Afghan force to the South, which was under mortar and artillery attack by the AQ forces, was able to send a security element up to support the remnants of the northern force. General Zia and his Afghan force expected air strikes to support then but only a handful of bombs fell on enemy positions and failed to deter the artillery and artillery bombardment the Afghan forces were under. The Afghans suffered more casualties and, as darkness approached, the decision was made by SF and Afghan commanders to fall back and withdraw to Gardez. Because of a brief period of bad weather and the unexpectedly heavy enemy resistance, only a portion of the TF MOUNTAIN troops inserted into their intended positions on D-Day, 2 March. Some of those that did insert fought under intense mortar and small arms fire. SOF, well hidden in their OPs, used direct fire weapons and coordinated CAS bombing onto enemy fighting positions. This provided some relief for the TF MOUNTAIN forces, especially in the south at HLZ Ginger east of Marzak. Due to the collapse of TF HAMMER and the difficulty in holding BP Ginger, MG Hagenbeck decided to reposition his soldiers to the northern end of the Shah-i-Khot Valley on 4 March and attack AQ from this direction. As the battle became more fluid, TF MOUN- TAIN recognized the need to put U.S. “eyes” on the southern tip of the valley and the “ratline.” It needed additional OPs near HLZ Ginger to provide surveillance and to call in U.S. airpower on the numerous concentrations of enemy forces. A 10,000-foot, snow-capped mountain, named Takur Ghar, appeared to U.S. planners as a perfect location for an OP. It dominated the southern approaches to the valley and offered excellent visibility into Marzak, two kilometers to the west. The mountaintop also provided an unobstructed view of the Whale on the other side of
the valley. Takur Ghar was a perfect site for an OP; unfortunately, the enemy thought so too. The enemy had installed a well-concealed, fortified force, which included a heavy machine-gun perfectly positioned to shoot down coalition aircraft flying in the valley below. On 2 March 2002, U.S. forces began planning to insert forces into two OPs the following night. Two MH-47Es from 2nd BN, 160th SOAR (A) would insert two teams; one MH-47E, RAZOR 04, would emplace a team to the north while the other MH-47E, RAZOR 03, would deploy a team of U.S. SEALs and an Air Force combat controller (CCT) on Takur Ghar. Late the next evening, the two helicopters took off from their base. Originally planned to go in earlier to an offset HLZ, maintenance problems with one of the helicopters and a nearby B-52 strike in support of TF MOUNTAIN delayed the insert. About 0300 local time, RAZOR 03, carrying the SEAL team, approached its HLZ in a small saddle atop Takur Ghar. On the approach, both the pilots and the men in the back observed fresh tracks in the snow, goatskins, and other signs of recent human activity. Immediately, the pilots and team discussed a mission abort, but it was too late. An RPG struck the side of the aircraft, wounding one crewman, while machine-gun bullets ripped through the fuselage, cutting hydraulic and oil lines. Fluid spewed about the ramp area of the helicopter. The pilot struggled to get the Chinook off the LZ 104 and away from the enemy fire. Petty Officer Neil Roberts stood closest to the ramp, poised to exit onto the LZ. Roberts and an aircrew member were knocked off balance by the explosions and the sudden burst of power applied by the pilot. Both slipped and fell out of the helicopter. Other crew members pulled the tethered crew member back into the aircraft. U n t e t h e r e d , Roberts fell five to ten feet onto the snowy mountaintop below. Roberts survived the short fall from the helicopter, likely activated his signaling device, and engaged the enemy with his squad automatic weapon (SAW). He was mortally wounded by gunfire as the enemy closed on him. Meanwhile, the crew managed to keep the heavily damaged aircraft aloft for a short time before the pilots executed a controlled crash landing some seven kilometers north of Takur Ghar. Once on the ground, the SEALs did a quick head count that confirmed what they already knew—Petty Officer Roberts was missing. TSgt John Chapman, the team’s Air Force CCT, immediately contacted a nearby AC-130 for protection. A short time later, RAZOR 04, after inserting its “recce” team, arrived on the scene and picked up the downed crewmen and SEALs, taking them to Gardez. The SEALs and pilots quickly formulated a plan to go back and try to rescue Roberts, despite the fact that they knew a force of heavily armed AQ manned positions on Takur Ghar. Knowing how the AQ brutally treated prisoners, Roberts’ teammates
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HISTORY 6th Edition
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1968 - The future home of U.S. Stri
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General James J. Lindsay accepting
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Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) Senator Wil
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USSOCOM Commanders There have been
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the impact on its people, the comma
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Mission and Organization USSOCOM’
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Logistics (SOAL). Finally, the Chie
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During the review process for the 2
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HQ USSOCOM Organization Chart 2006
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greatly improved the command’s ab
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(7) JMISC continued to provide PSYO
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USSOCOM’s MFP-11. By FY 2006, the
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forming its acquisition functions a
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nature were key goals in addition t
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COMMANDER’S TOP PRIORITIES FOR FY
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President George W. Bush signed the
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Iran Ajr, caught laying mines, was
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The invasion of Panama, known as Op
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Capturing Torrijos/Tocumen was cruc
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ful seizure of the Torrijos/Tocumen
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second pass, one pilot saw movement
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Harbor by having SEALs place demoli
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BLACK elements returned to Albrook
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Noriega’s Surrender: After his ap
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joint training with NSWTG small boa
Page 53 and 54: Special Tactics Teams train during
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Page 57 and 58: SCUD hunting patrol in western Iraq
Page 59 and 60: In January 1981, the FMLN (Farabund
Page 61 and 62: HOPE. On 12 January 1993, a Special
Page 63 and 64: missions into Mogadishu, all of whi
Page 65 and 66: Haiti had endured unremitting polit
Page 67 and 68: of Haiti. These themes stressed nat
Page 69 and 70: In the early 1990s, rival ethnic st
Page 71 and 72: what they had done for JOINT ENDEAV
Page 73 and 74: Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE NATO
Page 75 and 76: Peace Operations and Crisis Respons
Page 77 and 78: In conjunction with the UN, the Org
Page 79 and 80: Special Forces soldiers train Niger
Page 81 and 82: Operation SILVER ANVIL Noncombatant
Page 83 and 84: second patrol coastal vessel, USS F
Page 85 and 86: Operation FIRM RESPONSE, ESAT vehic
Page 87 and 88: In Phase II, the relief phase, CA s
Page 89 and 90: No other international donor has ma
Page 91 and 92: flooded and damaged areas, signific
Page 93 and 94: government, so the “lead agency
Page 95 and 96: Objective Rhino, a desert landing s
Page 97 and 98: ather than target coordinates into
Page 99 and 100: would prove adequate to both assaul
Page 101 and 102: 100 Despite what, in retrospect, ma
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Page 109 and 110: not designed to form a JSOTF. DAGGE
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Page 113 and 114: During 2003, however, Afghanistan s
Page 115 and 116: east of the city of Khowst. While b
Page 117 and 118: Operation RED WINGS LT Michael P. M
Page 119 and 120: their combat operations in southern
Page 121 and 122: Force (SOTF) 71 was CJSOTF’s batt
Page 123 and 124: Civil Affairs (CA) augmentation. Th
Page 125 and 126: line demarcating the KAZ, SOF and P
Page 127 and 128: TEXACO) and metering and manifold s
Page 129 and 130: accordance with his importance, Sad
Page 131 and 132: Saddam’s regime, terrorists, and
Page 133 and 134: with Iraqi police units. SOF have c
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Page 139 and 140: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sa
Page 141 and 142: Training in Yemen In December 2005,
Page 143 and 144: esulting operation known as Balikat
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Page 149 and 150: Command, Central SOCEUR....Special
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Page 153 and 154: Guatemala: 75 H Haditha: 127, 129 H
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47, 48 Northern Alliance: 91, 92, 9
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United Arab Emirates: 73, 118, 119,
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HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

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