HQ$History - United States Special Operations Command

The operation called for isolation and encirclement
of the valley area, followed by converging
attacks to destroy AQ forces. A mixture of
Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special
Operations Forces (CSOF), and conventional
forces would establish three sets of concentric
rings astride enemy escape routes before the
main strike into terrorist defenses in the valley.
JSOTF-S, known as TF K-BAR, would lead the
initial reconnaissance effort. About D-3, CSOF
from TF K-BAR, to include TF 64 (Australian
Special Air Service (SAS)), would begin occupying
infiltration positions to observe enemy movements
and direct air strikes. In fact, TF K-BAR
would insert 21 SR teams that subsequently
called in a steady stream of CAS throughout the
operation, arguably saving the day for forces
introduced on Takur Ghar.
At D-1, 1 March, about 600 SF-led Afghan
militia (TF ANVIL) would move into position
along major enemy routes of retreat, and CJTF
MOUNTAIN would air assault elements of both
the 101st and 10th Mountain Divisions into an
inner ring of blocking positions along the eastern
side of the valley. Finally, TF HAMMER, a 260-
man combination of ODAs and Afghan militia,
would assault into the valley as the main effort.
TF HAMMER included a secondary effort of 40
Afghans that would establish a blocking position
in the vicinity of the Little Whale (a terrain feature).
The ANACONDA planners believed that this
combined maneuver would clear AQ from the
Whale—a distinctive terrain feature southeast
of Gardez—and adjacent valleys, forcing them
into the blocking positions or into the open
where they would be eliminated.
In war, however, things rarely go exactly as
planned—the enemy has a “vote.” Operation
ANACONDA proved to be no exception. Three
SOF teams were inserted into OPs before D-Day
to validate TF RAKASSAN’s (2-187/101st) LZs,
verify presence of high value targets (HVTs),
and provide terminal guidance for CAS. These
teams verified heavy enemy presence and were
able to disable a heavy machine-gun covering
one of the conventional HLZs. During the operation,
they continually called in CAS. Rather
than flee, the disciplined and well trained AQ
soldiers stood and fought, and at times were
reinforced along a series of draws and trails at
103
the southern end of the valley near Marzak,
dubbed the “ratline.” While TF ANVIL met
minimal resistance on D-1, TF HAMMER met
intense resistance on D-Day, 2 March. A circling
AC-130 mistook the northern Afghan and SF
force of TF HAMMER for enemy and fired on
them, wounding three SF and killing one. Also,
2 Afghans were killed and 12-15 wounded, which
put almost half of the roughly 40 man northern
force out of action. The wounded were medevaced
and the Afghan force to the South, which
was under mortar and artillery attack by the AQ
forces, was able to send a security element up to
support the remnants of the northern force.
General Zia and his Afghan force expected air
strikes to support then but only a handful of
bombs fell on enemy positions and failed to deter
the artillery and artillery bombardment the
Afghan forces were under. The Afghans suffered
more casualties and, as darkness approached,
the decision was made by SF and Afghan commanders
to fall back and withdraw to Gardez.
Because of a brief period of bad weather and the
unexpectedly heavy enemy resistance, only a
portion of the TF MOUNTAIN troops inserted
into their intended positions on D-Day, 2 March.
Some of those that did insert fought under
intense mortar and small arms fire. SOF, well
hidden in their OPs, used direct fire weapons
and coordinated CAS bombing onto enemy fighting
positions. This provided some relief for the
TF MOUNTAIN forces, especially in the south
at HLZ Ginger east of Marzak. Due to the collapse
of TF HAMMER and the difficulty in holding
BP Ginger, MG Hagenbeck decided to reposition
his soldiers to the northern end of the
Shah-i-Khot Valley on 4 March and attack AQ
from this direction.
As the battle became more fluid, TF MOUN-
TAIN recognized the need to put U.S. “eyes” on
the southern tip of the valley and the “ratline.”
It needed additional OPs near HLZ Ginger to
provide surveillance and to call in U.S. airpower
on the numerous concentrations of enemy forces.
A 10,000-foot, snow-capped mountain, named
Takur Ghar, appeared to U.S. planners as a perfect
location for an OP. It dominated the southern
approaches to the valley and offered excellent
visibility into Marzak, two kilometers to the
west. The mountaintop also provided an unobstructed
view of the Whale on the other side of